One year after: Which way for Cyprus

ONE YEAR AFTER: WHICH WAY FOR CYPRUS

On this day last year, the UN Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus question was put to

two separate referenda and was rejected by an overwhelming 76% of Greek Cypriots.

The Republic of Cyprus, whose government is the only internationally recognized entity

and represents the entire island, is now a member of the EU. There is less tension than

ever before, and increased but still relative freedom of movement. Over 7,000 Turkish

Cypriots are working in the government–controlled areas – and many Greek Cypriots have

been visiting the areas they deserted during the 1974 events.

It is instructive to understand why the Plan was rejected – but it is even more important

to see how Cyprus can move forward to a sustainable solution that may provide benefits

not only to the parties directly involved but also to the broader area. After all, a functional

model for the coexistence and creative cooperation between the Greek Cypriot Christians and

the Turkish Cypriot Moslems in Cyprus would serve much broader objectives.

To the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, Annal Plan V would not only have legitimized the

outcome of the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, but

would have also worsened the status quo and indeed reversed many of the benefits of accession

to the EU. The legitimate security concerns of the Greek Cypriots were not addressed; and the

system of guarantor powers – Britain, Turkey and Greece – was not only maintained but was

reinforced. In any case, most Cypriots (including many Turkish Cypriots too) believe that the

Republic of Cyprus has matured and does not require “guarantor powers”.

Following the partial lifting of restrictions on free movement on April 23, 2003 and the supporting

measures of the government, more and more Turkish Cypriots have been applying for official

documents of the Republic, receiving free medical treatment in state hospitals, and securing

employment in the government-controlled areas. Indeed, relations between the two communities

at different levels have improved; and the hypothesis that the two communities cannot live

together was not confirmed.

Economics is influencing the relations between the two communities. And it is the economy

that to a great extent will sustain the solution. Following the 1974 debacle, the government-controlled

areas of Cyprus managed not only to recover but also to generate what has been described as an

“economic miracle”. It was this performance that enabled the Republic of Cyprus to successfully

pursue its accession to the EU. And Cypriots assumed that a solution of the political problem reunifying

the island would lead, at minimum, to economic gains for all and, at maximum, to a new economic

miracle. Yet for many Greek Cypriots, the Annan Plan seemed to ignore fundamental economic principles.

A major fear was that, in the event of its implementation, there would have been serious socio-economic

deterioration for the Greek Cypriots. Such an outcome would have been destabilizing – adversely affecting

the Turkish Cypriots as well, even though the latter would have benefited in the short run.

The strict bizonality requirements of Annan Plan V would have effectively undermined the prospects of a

unified economy and thus of the convergence of the productivity levels and of living standards of the

two communities in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots also suspected that the complex constitutional arrangements

proposed under the Plan would certainly not have led to a functional system but to paralysis and breakdown.

The majority of Greek Cypriots also perceived that Annan Plan V would not lead to a cooperative political

system but instead would consolidate division and produce bottlenecks – to be resolved by non-Cypriot judges,

who would effectively assume supreme political power.

The provisions for addressing property issues were not considered satisfactory either. There is also a growing

conviction that more integration and greater reliance on market forces may address such complex issues much

more effectively than legal provisions, the interpretation of which may not be clear even to those drafting them.

The question is how to move forward. The election of Mehmet Ali Talat as the new Turkish Cypriot leader

on April 17, 2005 may be indicative of sustained support for reunification – even though no major move can occur

without the consent of Ankara.

Inevitably, relations between the EU and Turkey affect Cyprus. Turkey may be tempted to keep Cyprus as a

hostage for its own accession. But this does not have to be the case. Under the circumstances, the most practical

step is an essential upgrading of the confidence building measures between the two sides on the island. That

should include the return of the ghost town of Famagusta to the Greek Cypriots and more economic opportunities

for the Turkish Cypriots. Enhanced cooperation and more tangible benefits for both communities would pave the

way for a sustainable settlement that would be to the benefit of all concerned.

Research & Development Center - Intercollege