Speech by

Andreas Theophanous

 

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you all to this very timely event.  I would like to thank all our distinguished speakers who have kindly accepted our invitation.  Special thanks to Mr Gustave Feissel who came all the way from California to share with us his thoughts and perspectives. 

 

Undoubtedly, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have devoted much time and energy on the Cyprus problem in the last few decades.  But despite this, more often than not Cypriots have been used to having a passive role and always expecting developments to occur from external initiatives.  This is basically because Cypriots felt that although the problem had serious internal dimensions, the key to major developments lied outside the island.  To the present day and to a great extent this is still valid.

 

Having said that we must also realize that there are now greater opportunities for initiatives from Cyprus.  With the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the EU – and with Turkey having embarked on accession negotiations, circumstances are changing.  Cypriots can play an upgraded role in several ways.  The Research Center of Intercollege has created a tradition in trying to address the Cyprus problem through symposia, conferences, seminars, round-table discussions as well as systematic policy oriented research and analysis.  We will continue and indeed enhance our efforts with the hope that we will make a worthwhile contribution.

 

Although the Cyprus problem is still unresolved, the domestic situation today is very different compared to what it was a few years ago.  Developments in the last three years have changed the context and have provided a new setting.  A major change occurred with the partial lifting of obstacles to free movement and with what has followed ever since.  And of course accession to the EU is of utmost importance.  There is now more interaction between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; and the hypothesis that the two communities cannot live together has been seriously challenged.  On the other hand, there are still fundamental philosophical differences of approach in the two communities, that is true.  All in all, we must acknowledge that still much work remains to be done for a solution and, moreover, for its viability.  And this will not be an automatic process.

 

It is important to understand the circumstances of the creation of the Republic of Cyprus and its turbulent early life.  And we should not forget that it was characterized as a “Reluctant” Republic.  We should also take into consideration the lack of adequate political maturity and tolerance as well as the systematic foreign interventions.  Furthermore, prior to 1974 the mainstream Greek-Cypriot ideology did not adequately address most Turkish-Cypriot concerns.  And at the same time we cannot ignore the Turkish designs on Cyprus.

 

In the post 1974 period there has been a fundamental philosophical and political change which unfortunately has not yet been fully conveyed to the Turkish-Cypriot community as well as to outsiders.  The new element is that Greek-Cypriot ideology as well as Greek-Cypriot vital objectives revolve around the Republic of Cyprus in a way which can be inclusive of Turkish Cypriots.  This, in conjunction with the European value system, which can be shared by all Cypriots, may provide major opportunities.

 

On their part, Turkish Cypriots seriously consider the concept of coexistence in one state but they have different perspectives on what form this will take.  Although many Turkish Cypriots use the passport of the Republic – still most of them see the Republic of Cyprus as a Greek-Cypriot state.  Greek Cypriots suspect that the Turkish view of a solution is more of a confederal nature.  For the vast majority of Greek Cypriots this is seen as worse than the status quo and even worse than a clear partition.

 

At the end of the day reaching a solution will be a voluntary process – and, making it work will involve much good will and patience on both sides.  For years, Greek-Cypriot leaders have been talking about a painful compromise.  Most Greek Cypriots though, and especially the younger generations, would not vote in favor of a painful compromise.  Greek Cypriots prefer an honorable compromise.

 

Perceptions do matter.  Turkish Cypriots felt that the Greek-Cypriot NO on April 24, 2004 amounted to a lack of willingness to live together.  And Turkish Cypriots still question the motives of the Greek Cypriots.  On their part Greek Cypriots feel that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership always goes along with Ankara – which more or less aspires at least to the legitimization of the outcome of 1974.  Greek Cypriots also feel that Turkish Cypriots today wish to maintain or even legitimize the status quo – as they can enjoy the benefits of both worlds.

 

Be that as it may, there must be an honest exchange of views at all levels – and a public debate, which after all, is useful for any solution to work out.  Allow me to note at this point that while in the past there was much preoccupation with reaching a solution there was much less attention paid to understanding and addressing the dynamics of the day after a solution.  We still have to examine this issue comprehensively.

 

We all acknowledge that Cypriots have to work hard to arrive at a solution and also to make it work.  But it would be a serious omission not to stress that outside powers have a predominant role to play.  To what extent is Turkey willing to change its policy on Cyprus?  Or would Ankara wait until it secures what it wants from the EU?  Ankara may be willing to accept a solution similar to Annan 5+ or Annan 6, but in order to go further – it would require special incentives.  Greek Cypriots felt and feel that the implementation of Annan 5 and / or any other similar plan amounts to a worsening of the status quo.  After all that is why they voted overwhelmingly in favor of NO on April 24 last year.  If the stalemate continues, I suspect that Cyprus would eventually present Turkey with stumbling blocs, directly and indirectly.  And the overall political climate on the island may deteriorate.  We should work in a way such an antagonistic scenario is avoided.

 

Obviously, it is essential to move forward, creating the conditions for a lasting settlement.  While addressing major issues and guidelines for a solution it may be important to move forward simultaneously with an agreed set of confidence building measures.  Such a development may be associated with mutual benefits and a positive psychology to move forward.

 

In one way or another the EU will have to take a stance on issues.  Cyprus is becoming a litmus test for the credibility and the ability of the Union to act upon its own declarations.  Cyprus will also be a litmus test for Turkey’s willingness and ability to really change.  In this regard, what is sometimes perceived as Turkish arrogance in Nicosia and in many other capitals of the EU, may create more problems to Turkey and embarrassment to its allies and friends.  Indeed, it will be to the interest of Turkey if it moves in the direction of adopting European norms and if it conforms with the European political civilization.  In this regard, it is essential to understand that a country which is a member of the EU cannot have guarantor powers.  After all guarantor powers were part of the problem and they cannot be part of the solution.

 

Last but not least let me stress that in Cyprus what is at stake goes beyond this island-state.  In many ways developments in Cyprus may influence the philosophy with which several regional and international issues will be addressed.  Moreover, at a time when the EU, the US and the international community in general try to advance the cause of tolerance and the co-existence of groups with different ethnic and religious backgrounds – it will be a great achievement if we can arrive at a model – which encourages the creative co-existence and cooperation between the Greek-Cypriot Christians and the Turkish-Cypriot Moslems.  Undoubtedly, such a pleasant and fruitful development will have a positive spillover effect in addressing issues in the Balkans, the Middle East and beyond.

 

In this regard, as a Cypriot, I will feel happy when the time comes that Cyprus will appear, in the international press, not as a conflict area or only as a tourist destination – but as a model state of democracy, pluralism, tolerance, creativity and cooperation, and market economy with social sensitivity.  And moreover as a member of the EU which is an asset for the Union promoting its interests and projecting its values in the broader area.

 

Thank you very much.  And we now look forward to two fruitful sessions with our distinguished speakers.


Research Center - Intercollege

Copyright © 2005. All rights reserved