Speech by Claire Palley

Speech by Claire Palley

(Appendix)

AN AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION

1. If Cypriots are to reach agreement on a settlement, they need seriously to discuss a large number of matters categorisable under five headings. These are: Security; Property and the Right of Residence; Territory; Fiscal and Economic Issues; and Governance. They will also need to discuss adaptations of the terms of accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union. Such discussions should be intensive and in depth, disregarding advice to the sides to decide their future by, as it were, putting their all on six, seven, or even eleven squares. In virtually continuous discussions, without excessive consultation of parties not present, in particular “motherlands,” each side will appreciate the inter-linkages between various proposals, see alternative possibilities and envisage offsetting compromises.

2. What are not included on this agenda are matters of concern to the Republic of Turkey purely in her Turkish State capacity. They are not lawfully or properly to be taken into account in negotiations on the State of Cyprus. Turkey’s standing in relation to Cyprus is under the 1960 Treaties, insofar as these are valid and still operative. In particular, under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey has undertaken to prohibit, so far as concerns herself, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly partition of the Island of Cyprus or its union with any other State, and she has also undertaken under Article II to

“recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution”.

Other than in its important inter-communal aspects, the 1960 Constitution has remained operative. Assuming Turkey were not in breach of the Treaty of Guarantee, she would, under its Article IV, have rights and a duty (in the event of the Treaty’s breach or attempts to change the state of affairs) to consult with the other Guarantors, the UK and Greece. If common or concerted action by the Guarantors does not prove possible, Article IV reserves the rights of each Power to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty. Turkey has no other rights beyond those in the 1960 Treaties.

SPHERES WHERE RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED AND SPECIFIC TOPICS NEEDING DISCUSSION

1. SECURITY (in the widest sense) (EXTERNAL)

This requires consideration of

(i) Treaty revision as regards the following treaties:

(a) Treaty of Guarantee to clarify:

1. The issue of the alleged right of unilateral military intervention.

2. The scope of the guarantee and whether it covers both the federal Constitution and those of the federal units.

(b) Treaty of Alliance to ensure:

1. There is speedy demilitarisation of Cyprus by withdrawal of foreign troops.

2. The final outcome is complete demilitarisation of the Republic.

1. Ensure that any bases are leased from Cyprus;

2. Provide international judicial dispute-settlement machinery (failing successful negotiation within a time-limit) as regards disputes concerning the Treaty’s interpretation and application.

(ii) Exclusion of foreign intervention in Cyprus’s internal affairs. This requires discussion of:

(a) A Constitutional prohibition on intervention by foreign States in the affairs of Cyprus and its federal units.

(b) A specific Constitutional prohibition on extra-constitutional bodies operating with foreign participation and the giving of directions to the Governments of the federation or the federal units.

(c) Police forces in the federation and federal units being under civilian control, with Cypriots being members of such forces, subject to the requirements of EU law.

(d) Treaties which confer rights on foreign States, which rights are exercisable within Cyprus’s jurisdiction.

(iii) The European Security and Defence Policy

Discussion is necessary as to whether Cyprus, as a sovereign EU Member State, should be entitled fully to participate in the Common ESDP, subject only to the requirements consequential upon demilitarisation of Cyprus.

(iv) Police

This requires discussion of the sizes, permanent and temporary, of:

(a) the federal units’ police forces;

(b) the federal police force; and

(v) UN mandate for peace-keeping

The following items require discussion:

(a) The mandate of any UN Mission or peace-keeping force and whether this should be under Chapter VII of the Charter.

(b) The scope of the mandate to uphold the peace settlement, including ability to intervene, if necessary, without a fresh mandate.

(c) The establishment of a Security Council Committee to monitor all aspects of implementation of the settlement, which, in conjunction with the Secretary General, should submit 3 monthly reports to the Security Council.

(d) The enhancement of any UN peace-keeping force’s administrative power and powers regarding enforcement of law and order, in particular of all areas to be territorially adjusted, subject to powers of delegation by the UN.

(e) Costs of the UN’s Cyprus operation and contributions to be made by the UN, the federation and the federal units.

(vi) Implementation of the Plan

Associated with the issue of the scope of the UN mandate is that of implementation. Discussion is required as to

(a) troop reductions; relocation and rehabilitation of inhabitants from areas to be territorially adjusted; actual transfer of territory; and guarantees against failure to implement on due dates; and

(b) how to ensure persons will be allowed to return home to the unadjusted areas.

(vii) Transitional arrangements

Discussion is needed as to:

(a) The initial arrangements, their duration, and joint executive government.

(b) The “equality” in rotation between President and Vice President .

(viii) Settlers (Turkish nationals)

This topic requires examination in light of international law earlier ignored by the UN.

Specific aspects are:

(a) The stay of certain Turkish nationals on humanitarian grounds; criteria; and numbers.

(b) Limits on immigration of Greeks and Turks to maintain demographic balance and the Island’s cultural character.

(ix) Schengen

Consideration of entry and residency rights of Greek and Turkish nationals subject to Cyprus’s ability fully to participate in:

(a) the Schengen acquis;

(b) the Schengen area; and

2. PROPERTY AND THE RIGHT OF RESIDENCE (INTERNAL)

Property provisions need discussion to ensure that both sides perceive the settlement as just and as in conformity with human rights and humanitarian law.

Specifically needing consideration are:

(i) Whether, in general, all dispossessed owners should be entitled to reinstatement to their property, with compensation being an alternative only in exceptional cases.

(ii) What protection should be given to current users of homes, agricultural land and business premises, who have themselves been dispossessed of similar property of approximately equal value.

(iii) Whether and what protection should be given to owners of significant improvements who made these after negotiations for settlement commenced (in December 1999) or made them under a permit issued prior thereto.

(iv) Modes of immediately prohibiting further transfers of title of or long leases of property owned by dispossessed persons, so as to protect their rights.

(v) To what extent subsequent purchasers from dispossessed owners should, be protected.

(vi) Whether there should be provisions, resulting, in effect, in widespread property nationalisation, followed by compensation by bonds, and whether, where property is taken for public benefit or military purposes, the relevant Government must promptly pay the owner.

(vii) Whether long-leasing of agricultural, business and other property is a better option than forced sale.

(viii) What the decision-making priorities should be when determining competing property and occupation of property claims and how lengthy delays can be before restitution becomes enforceable.

(ix) Whether machinery and procedures can be created to facilitate acquisition of land in convenient locations for public and private housing, in particular mechanisms to encourage sales by reinstated owners of land.

(x) How best to organise a Fund providing subsidised loans under federal guarantees and how best the development of a property market can be encouraged.

(xi) To what extent the private sector should be involved in facilitating sales, leases and property exchange, and whether any Property Board’s functions should be reduced in scope to dealing with (a) valuations and (b) compensation claims.

(xii) Whether there should be an equally composed Compensation Tribunal to decide loss of use damages, based on international standards, funded by the Federal Government, the Government of Turkey and by contributions by European States and the USA and superintended by the European Court of Human Rights.

(xiii) What should be the permissible scope of temporary “safeguard measures” to restrict trade, establishment of businesses, industry and professional activities in the Turkish Cypriot federal unit and what EU procedural safeguards are required to ensure absence of abuse.

3. THE RIGHT OF RESIDENCE (INTERNAL)

Discussion about principles is essential. This should give due weight to:

(a) Turkish Cypriot concerns to retain the Turkish Cypriot federal unit’s predominantly Turkish Cypriot identity;

(b) the specific methods by which each federal unit can retain its cultural and ethnic identity;

(c) individual citizens’ right of return to their homes, as required by the UN Security Council Resolutions and by human rights law, and to citizens’ freedom of “establishment” and residence in their own country;

(d) phased return of displaced persons and priorities in according return, so that return does not cause instability or disorder of any kind;

(e) the methods by which each Community can ensure that a Community-based political system operates without disproportionately restricting political rights;

4. TERRITORY (INTERNAL)

The sides need directly to discuss the territory of each federal unit from two different standpoints:

(a) Whether further territorial adjustments or special arrangements are required to:

(i) accommodate areas where members of the main Community or national minorities are located, such as the Karpas, Tylliria and Messaoria villages. Part of such discussion should be on administrative arrangements to safeguard the rights and status of such “minorities” in accordance with the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; and

(ii) avoid administrative or other difficulties due to the location of territorial lines;

(b) Whether federal areas would facilitate:

(i) co-operation by the Communities in joint government of the federal areas;

(ii) avoidance of the need for territorial adjustments in certain locations;

(iii) better protection of Cyprus’s environment, with large federal national parks; and

(iv) provision of a federal capital with joint governmental arrangements in addition to separate municipalities.

5. FISCAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES (INTERNAL)

The following themes require further consideration, initially through a Technical Committee with international experts and with equal membership of Greek and Turkish Cypriot experts:

(i) Central banking and currency

Inter alia, this should address the structure of the federal central Bank, its competences; and supervision and stability of commercial banks.

(ii) Economic policy

Inter alia, this covers economic policy in general; minimum standards for Cyprus workers as to social protections, transport and health treatment; labour market policy; common development policy.

(iii) Fiscal policy and stability

Inter alia, this covers establishment of a Macroeconomic Stability Council; limitations on federal guarantees of external debt; policies to avoid tax competition;

(iv) Cost effectiveness

Inter alia, this covers

(a) Reduced expenditure by not requiring international personnel in Cyprus institutions (e.g. foreign judges and the Property Board);

(b) UN assessed contributions for any UN Mission or Force;

(d) The relative burden-sharing of costs by each federal unit.

(v) Permanent machinery for reviewing fiscal and economic arrangements in the federation

(vi) Cyprus’s use of its assets and natural resources

Inter alia, this covers:

(a) competence to exploit all Cyprus’s national natural resources without foreign interference, but subject to EU law e.g. submarine areas; and

(b) aviation and airports policy, particularly in relation to the number of international airports and a national carrier.

6. GOVERNANCE (INTERNAL BUT ALSO EXTERNAL IN PART)

Fully appreciating Turkish Cypriot concerns that neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other, and that federal governmental organs should strive for consensus, especially by avoiding divisive policies or measures, more attention needs to be given to ensuring functionality, workability and viability in practice, with consequential lowering of some barriers to effective daily decision-making. Discussion is needed as to:

(i) The legislative sphere. If additional judicial functions are conferred on the Supreme Court, such jurisdiction should be invocable to decide legally disputed issues, thereby avoiding unnecessary cases of divisive voting.

(ii) Executive decision-making. Better ways of preventing executive decisions unacceptable to either main Community should be devised, with the issue of “deadlock-resolution” also requiring re-consideration.

(iii) The judiciary. Changes in respect of competences and composition of the Supreme Court require consideration, namely:

(a) removal of the Court’s deadlock-resolution competence, avoiding direct judicial law-making and executive decisions;

(b) removal of the element of foreign judges;

(d) speedy judicial references on grounds of compatibility with any Comprehensive Settlement;

(e) appellate competence to ensure compatibility of legal interpretation throughout the federation.

(iv) The scope of federal economic competence, which requires re-evaluation. (Overlaps with fiscal and economic policy issues.)

(v) The Co-operation Agreements on EU Affairs and External Relations need revision to facilitate speedier decision-making. Certain procedural aspects regarding treaty making by federal units also require consideration. (EXTERNAL)

(vi) Some Federal Laws, Treaties and Constitutional Laws, (These caused significant disagreement between the sides in relation to the Annan Plan.)

(vii) The Federal Public Service arrangements to ensure greater demographic proportionality, functionality and flexibility.

(viii) Governance rights for “minorities” in the constituent states (This is mentioned under territorial arrangements.)

(ix) The election and composition of representative organs in the federation and in the federal units require thorough reconsideration, so that they are such as to satisfy concerns about maintenance of an appropriate balance as to each unit’s cultural identity, bearing in mind the 1977 High Level Agreement and the equal status of the Communities at the federal level.

7. ACT OF ADAPTATION TO THE ACT CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS OF ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND THE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TREATIES ON WHICH THE EUROPEAN UNION IS FOUNDED AND PROTOCOL NO. 10 ON CYPRUS

Topics agreed under the preceding themes require discussion in relation to necessary accommodation of EU provisions, subject always to any such accommodations being:

(a) in line with the principles on which the EU is founded; and

(b) consistent with the relevant Security Council Resolutions.

COMMENT

The length of the Agenda should not be dismissively assessed as pedantic categorisation by “a German professor”. The future life of Cypriots, indeed all the structures supporting their political, legal, economic and social forms of organisation, will be affected by any new Plan for a comprehensive settlement. Superficial comments by diplomats or anxious politicians, who sometimes over-simplify matters, should not deviate the two Cypriot sides from checking through the issues. They will not start from scratch: they have canvassed most aspects in the last 4 ½ years – indeed in the last 44 years. If “political will,” a tired but necessary cliché, is present, the two sides could, in concentrated negotiations, forge an agreement relatively quickly. This, having been thoroughly considered and weighed, would be more durable than any “quick-fix” arrangements made to satisfy third Parties. Foreign Powers are not altruistic; their interests are other-directed; and they seek only to bury the Cyprus problem, and probably Cyprus too, as a factor which has, for too long, been an irritant in their international relations.

Research Center - Intercollege