Speech by Prof. Andreas Theophanous:

Claire Palley’s book “An International Relations Debacle – The U.N. Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1999-2004” comes at a time when a major focus of the international community seems to be how to overcome the so-called “isolation” of the Turkish-Cypriots instead of addressing the substance of the Cyprus Question – which is the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkey.

Palley provides a detailed and precise account of the events that took place during the period 1999-2004 when the UN was trying to promote a solution.  It is no coincidence that she describes the outcome as “An International Relations Debacle”.  Indeed, the unsuspecting and independent observer may wonder how – at the end of the process – one side rejected the plan by 76% and the other accepted it by 65%.  This acquires particular importance especially when it is taken into consideration that over time it was the Greek-Cypriot side which was pressing for a solution and yet strongly rejected the UN Plan, and the Turkish-Cypriot side which was creating obstacles in the way of a breakthrough – and yet strongly endorsed it.

Moreover, it should also be underlined that in the final version of his Plan – the Secretary General included virtually all of the final 11 points conveyed to Mr De Soto by Ambassador Ziyal on 26 March 2004 (Appendix I, p.264).  In relation to this, point 4: “The restriction of 5% to be applied to the Turkish citizens to establish residence in Cyprus even after Turkey’s accession to the EU should be lifted” is indicative: it does not address Turkish-Cypriot concerns but, instead, it satisfies the interests of Turkey.  Yet these positions were also advanced by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the Secretary General of the UN included them in his Plan.  On the other hand, many of the positions of the Greek-Cypriot side were not even given their fair share of attention.  In sum, it seemed that the whole process and the finalization of the Plan were in several ways predetermined.

Thus, it is no surprise that the Secretary General of the UN and his team failed to produce a Plan which could be even.  Dr Palley does not to take the extra step to explicitly suggest that perhaps part of the plan was to take Turkey “off the hook” and thus facilitate the further progress of her European ambitions as well as the grand designs of Turkey’s allies.  But she provides a detailed and analytical account of the events that took place and leaves it up to the reader to reach his or her own conclusions.

Dr Palley correctly notes that “students of international relations are always told that they should not reify the UN or the Security Council or idealise it: these institutions consist of States, with their own interests, and Member States when shaping UN decisions are motivated by such factors.  The same kind of advice must now be given about the Secretariat as a whole: it is an international bureaucracy of public servants, alert to the wishes of its masters, the Security Council (especially some of its Permanent Members) and to those of their own nominating Governments.  Unless there is a Hummarskjöld or a U Thant at the helm, determined to adhere to his own line, there is also likely to be considerable external influence upon the highest executive” (pp.8-9).  Certainly, this is a very serious point with far reaching policy implications.  Do Cypriot policymakers, who have been used to having high expectations in relation to the UN, get the message?  And does Cyprus need to reassess or rather refocus its foreign policy?  The UN will always be an important institution in International Relations.  But there are other institutions and factors that must be given more attention.

Dr Palley does not deny that in one way or another she was involved in what was taking place.  But that does not take away from the value of her work.  And she does have opinions about the issues that have been raised. After all this is one of the tasks that serious authors are engaged in.  Whether one agrees with her or not is a different matter. Dr Palley rises to the occasion successfully.

I have no doubt in my mind that what has taken place in Cyprus during the period 1999-2004 and especially from November 2002 to April 2004 – culminating with the referenda – will constitute an important case study in international relations and politics as well as in diplomacy.  Dr Palley’s book is and will be extremely useful to policy makers, diplomats, academics and policy analysts, to journalists, students and concerned citizens. I have long held the view that developments in Cyprus including the content of the solution to the Cyprus problem will have far reaching implications and repercussions beyond this island-state.  That is an additional reason why those, who will sooner or later undertake again new efforts for a resolution, should learn from previous mistakes and omissions.  In this regard Dr Palley’s book offers a unique account that must be taken seriously into consideration.