Speech by Prof. Van Coufoudakis:

As the author indicates, her book portrays events from the perspective of one who was close to the negotiations. Her account, in contrast to the instant and simplistic commentary of some critics, is fully documented with extensive footnotes, references to specific papers and documents exchanged by the parties during the course of 1999-2004. This is why the author states that her book “will tax the patience even of the keenest reader”. In nearly 450 pages, the reader will find 18 chapters, 9 major appendices, and a very rich photographic collection with light hearted captions that supplement this important book. We should thank the author for this photographic archive. It provides an important visual history of Cyprus since 1954. I should also add that that appendices include extremely useful information such as (a) the now famous 11 points by Turkish Ambassador Ziyal that were virtually incorporated in Annan-5;(b) the response by the government of the Republic to the Secretary General’s plan dated March 29, 2004; and (c) a very informative chart of villages predominantly inhabited by settlers and their voting behavior in the referendum. The most important of the appendices is a nearly 40 page comparative chart analyzing section by section the five plans presented by the Secretary General and his staff.

This is Claire Palley’s fourth major book.  Like her other books, this has also been published by a major law book publisherin England and the United States. This book is very timely in view of recent attempts by the government of the Republic and the United Nations for new talks on the Cyprus problem. However, the significance of this book goes well beyond the borders of the Republic of Cyprus. It is a warning of the risks involved for all those who invoke the good offices of the Secretary-General in a conflict resolution process. It is also a classic case study of how an international institution, like the United Nations, lacking leaders of the caliber of  Doug Hammarskjold and U Thant, can violate its own principles and become an agent of influential permanent members of the Security Council, like the United States and the United Kingdom. In the particular case of Cyprus, Kofi Annan and his staff exceeded their jurisdiction; mislead the international community in their reports and actions on Cyprus;  became parties instead of facilitators in the Cyprus problem and undermined the credibility of the United Nations by attempting to impose a settlement tailor made by the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. They did so by threat, disinformation, by violating cardinal rules of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and European law. The Greek Cypriots genuinely wanted a settlement. Even though they reluctantly accepted the February 2004 New York formula, they expected the Secretary General to use his discretion in good faith. They were proven wrong.I should add that this is not a critique of the policy of internationalization pursued by successive governments of Cyprus since the 1963 crisis. The constructive role of the UN in upholding, at critical times, the independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and  the legitimacy of its government is well known. The criticism lies with this Secretary-General and his staff, headed by Alvaro de Soto, who usurped their jurisdiction in order to impose a settlement. Appointed on November 1, 1999, Alvaro de Soto put together a staff of young attorneys and other like minded types who worked closely with David Hannay of the United Kingdom and Richard Holbrooke, Alfred Moses and Tom Weston of the United States. A full court press was instituted by Washington starting in February of 2004 with the sole purpose of “knocking heads together” under David Hannay’s and Tom Weston’s guidance. In this manner, the UN team abandoned the concept of good offices, became a participant in the Cypriot drama, and identified with one of the parties and its external sponsors.

In her analysis of the various Annan plans, the author shows how the UN attempted to trick the government of Cyprus into signing or endorsing a foundation agreement that would bind the parties to the results of the arbitration, or later, on March 25, 2004  to sign a commitment document to an unfinished settlement package. The devil, in reality, was in the details but that was to become clear later. As the United States proceeded with plans to invade Iraq, Turkey received a promise of billions of dollars and American support for Turkey’s positions on the Annan plan in return for her participation in the war. Daniel Fried of the Bush administration has admitted that much. The US position on the various versions of the Annan plan are ample proof of Fried’s position. Washington, for strategic reasons guided and supported Turkey’s EU accession aspirations. By facilitating a solution of the Cyprus problem acceptable to Turkey, Ankara would be given  “clean hands” from her occupation of a prospective member of the EU.

The UN Secretariat exploited the Cypriot willingness to reunify the island on the eve of its EU accession. The priority given by the Republic of Cyprus to EU accession became a serious pressure point. Attorney General Markides  was authorized to accept Annan II, which the author considers the least bad of the five plans presented by Kofi Annan. However, there was no assurance that there would be no worsening of the plan in order to gain Turkey’s acceptance. Greece and the EU, each for different reasons, also wanted a resolution of the problem prior to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. The author shows how external involvement aided and legitimized political changes in the occupied areas by recognizing Mr. Talat as Turkish Cypriot leader, displacing the so-called president Raouf Denktash. The author also fully documents Washington’s heavy financial and political involvement in Cyprus under the guise of creating an environment conducive to peace. Washington supported so-called civil society and voter education programs funded through the US Embassy in Nicosia under the guise of UNOPS. The author fully documents all her assertions from US sources, a fact that has upset many recipients of such funding in the free areas of the Republic. I want to make clear that Claire Palley considers this issue only as an issue of propriety, not anything else. The author details how UN plans like Annan-III were “plonked” by arrogant UN advisers on the parties and how the United Nations insisted that the newly elected and yet to be sworn president of Cyprus participate and negotiate at the Hague meeting in the winter of 2003.

In her 8^th chapter, the author details the issue of the settlers and how that issue was one of the main reasons for the rejection of Annan-5 by the Greek Cypriots. She quotes Mr. Pfirter,  a Swiss constitutional advisor to de Soto, admitting at a lecture at Bogacici University in Istanbul  that the “plan did not foresee that anybody would be forced to leave…” Chapter 9 is also quite informative as the author exposes the manipulative presentational tactics employed by de Soto and his staff who used rhetorical devices to obscure negative details from the Greek Cypriots. Even worse was Kieran Prendergast’s April 7, 2004 attempt to hide the fact that Turkey had not given the required commitment to sign into force the proposed treaty. Chapter 11 is also important as it documents in detail the Nicosia  phase of the talks from 19 February through March 22, 2004, 

and de Soto’s tactics. It deflates the myth that the government of Cyprus did not prioritize her demands. In chapter 12, there is further elaboration on the issue of prioritizing, something that appeared once more in Prendergast’s  recent report to the Security Council. Given the interrelationship  of issues like territory-security-property,  prioritizing is not as an easy task as deSoto and some of his supporters have argued.

In chapter 13 the author shows how Annan-4 was a “dummy run” before Annan-5 was presented. It was intended to provide cover that “consultation” had actually occurred. Annan 4 and 5 were far worse than the Greek Cypriots had imagined. The author concludes with a simple truth, that at Buergenstock the chance for a settlement was lost because Turkey and her allies became too greedy and that the Secretariat, looking for a success that would improve its relations with the United States decided to settle regardless of justice. For de Soto, it may have also been a personal issue as well. He wanted to break president Papadopoulos who stood up to him. Thus, the UN exploited the discretion given to the Secretary-General in New York. As a result, human rights ,international law, and UN resolutions on Cyprus went out of the window. The priority of a

political deal with Turkey had been fully met.

The author analyzes the real effects of the plan on Greek Cypriots, discusses in detail the right of the displaced to return to their homes in safety and their right to  property. It is important to note Palley’s conclusion that the property provisions were based on a global property exchange with compensation the norm rather than restitution. She analyses current legal cases such as the Apostolides vs. Orams, and concludes that those condemning the Greek Cypriots for their “no” vote, either did not understand the details of Annan-5, or were misled on the effects of the plan. Those who understood the effects of the plan and yet claimed that it balanced human rights “can only be adjudged hypocrites, pursuing preferred political goals while paying lip service to international law and human rights standards.” The cynicism of the property provisions is best summarized by Lord Hannay in his book (184-5) who stated that “decisions on residence should be  taken  (by criteria) as job location, schools, family and not the backward looking criterion of  inherited property ownership.”

In chapter 16 the author discusses the process leading to the referenda and discounts various allegations regarding the nature of the debate on the plan. The author shows clearly the freedom of debate in print media, on TV and radio. What was lacking was clear and honest information on a massive 10,000 page complex plan that was not finalized until hours before the referendum.

Chapter 17 details more than a dozen reasons for the rejection of Annan -5 by the Greek Cypriots. The book concludes with lessons from the experience of 1999-2004. Rather than idealizing the UN, we should recognize the UN and its Secretariat as a political organization open to  pressures of powerful members who can entangle the Secretariat into pursuing their goals. In view of the Secretariat’s recent performance in Cyprus, questions are raised about its ability to be effective in dispute settlement, military occupation, and upholding the law. This is of major consequence to small states.

The author concludes in an optimistic note about the potential role of the EU on Cyprus. She also examines the issue of Turkey’s accession prospects and indicates that those emphasizing the Cyprus problem in the EU avoid the real issue of the Turkish problem which is the continuation of the old Eastern Question. She recommends also a return to the original good offices mission of the Secretary-General under resolution 367 of 1975. Negotiations for revisions of Annan I and II may hold the best prospects for success. Knowing the issues, the players and their recent actions will help the Greek Cypriot side  be in a better negotiating position.

As I indicated in my introduction, this book must be read in depth and seriously by anyone involved in the resolution of the Cyprus problem, or who will likely be involved in another round of negotiations. This well documented book and the critical insights of the author, is an important testament that will shape any future attempt at a settlement. When the book came out last month, some critics  attacked the author without reading this impressive and demanding volume. I recommend that critics let their ideology aside and put this book on their summer reading list. Somber reflection and analysis will help everyone as we face renewed pressures and efforts for resolving this problem.

In the meantime, I want to congratulate Claire Palley for a most impressive volume. If we understand her analysis and her disturbing conclusions, we will be better prepared to face the future. Thank you Claire Palley for making this possible for us.