Speech by the Author:

The genesis was my distress at the UN Secretariat’s conduct in wasting the opportunity of reaching a negotiated settlement, an opportunity which had taken many years to create, and at a time when there were incentives for Turkey to settle the Cyprus problem, if she wanted to commence EU membership negotiations. Yet the blame for losing this opportunity was cast by the UN on the Greek Cypriot side (and negative international attitudes cause harm to all Cypriots, irrespective of whether they voted “Yes” or “No”).  I was shocked at the injustice of this unscrupulous UN conduct.   I was also dismayed that international law and human rights standards, required by the UN Charter  to be respected, could so lightly be discarded by the Secretariat, in order to further the policies of some Permanent Members of the Security Council, namely American and British policies regarding Turkey, Iraq, Middle East reconstruction, and reversal  of federalising tendencies in the EU.

Most serious of all was the fact that, unless the situation was properly explained to other States (after their being misled by the UN, the USA and the UK), most States would lose interest in pressing for a Cyprus settlement. Indeed, they would believe Mr. de Soto’s claim that the Greek Cypriot side did not really want a solution. Certainly, they would not appreciate that the Annan Plan had been imposed; that the Greek Cypriot side had been treated unjustly, even unlawfully; that Turkey had been “given” economic and geo-strategic benefits to which she was not entitled; and that, unless major aspects of Annan V were altered, despite their having been “given,” no settlement would be reached. I therefore wrote with some passion, which I did not deceptively conceal by masking language and pretences to objectivity. A frank, honest, but expert, account, alternative to the UN propaganda in the Secretary-General’s Report of 28 May 2004, was essential. In the same way that Greek Cypriots were told by the UN Secretariat to engage in “profound and sober reflection,” States needed to engage in a similar exercise, examining what the international executive body, charged with upholding Charter principles, had done. And I became determined to try to rovoke opinion-shapes into reflection.

In addition, detailed explanations would show the significant respects in which the Plan needed to be altered, if even only rough justice were to be done.   The book would also show how the UN Secretariat changed the rules governing the way it should behave, and abused the changed rules to impose a Plan that became more and more defective as the Secretariat continued to modify it to meet Turkey’s demands. Finally, I was disturbed that all small or weak States, who sought UN help by way of “good offices”, might likewise find their interests overridden by a devious Secretariat, acting to assist certain major Powers pursuing their very different interests. Such weak States would then find, just as Cyprus has done, that new impediments to a settlement had been created. Would the Palestinians the Polisario of the Western Sahara, the Moldovans and the Georgians, let alone the Azeris and the Armenians, for example, be treated in the same way if the Secretariat became actively involved in their problem situations?

TURNING NOW TO CONTENTS:

The first theme of the book is the UN Secretariat’s conduct, in the context of the proper framework of “good offices,” empowering it to assist parties to a dispute. That framework would have limited the Secretariat’s role, but, pressurised by the USA in the 2004 negotiations, the rules were arbitrarily changed – just as they were as regards Iraq, Kossovo and forcible intervention in States, something really resulting in “dire consequences”. The Secretariat should have acted in its traditional role as an “honest broker,” rather than, at the instance of some members of the Security Council, imposing a settlement shaped by Turkey’s demands.  In their re-defined role, members of the Secretariat became “judges,” who were neither independent nor impartial, as judges are required to be.   The UN “judges” even “prosecuted” the Greek Cypriot side for its alleged misdemeanours in voting down the Plan, and briefed States and the international media in such a way as to cover up Secretariat responsibility for this. The false story, propagated by the Secretariat as to what happened in the negotiations, is answered in the book by providing the actual facts. Thus the record is set straight, for example, on alleged Greek Cypriot refusal to negotiate, uncompromising attitudes, filibustering, and

even rejection of any solution to reunite Cyprus.

The second theme was historical, because non-Cypriot audiences, for whom the book was written, need to understand events from 1954 until 2002. I only drew attention to key aspects of that period, doing so mainly in pictures to keep things brief.  Many satirical captions were added to emphasise points, and also to encourage frustrated readers not to throw down a book which was heavy-going. I did this without acrimony, not explicitly criticising either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot politicians. Nor did I go into depth about the rights and wrongs of the last 50 years and the internal politics of the two Communities. These are topics on which Cypriots will argue endlessly. International readers would have been bored by any delving into Cyprus politics, when they wanted to know about the Annan Plan negotiations. In any event, the appropriate authors for the large topics of internal politics and relative culpability for events are Greek and Turkish-speaking political sociologists. Thus, I confined my text to essential facts, avoiding personalities, and leaving readers to make their own overall assessments. I must add that my approach was shaped by remarks by President Clerides after casting his “Yes” vote.

He said:

          “Whatever the people today decide, what is really important

          is that we should all co-operate, because the Cyprus Republic

          will have to face a lot of difficulties.”

The third theme was aspects of the Plan impacting on human rights and legitimating crimes and aggression under international law. Those aspects were the settlement of Turkish nationals in the Turkish-occupied area; the provisions governing property; and the limited extent of the right of return of displaced persons. The Plan blatantly disregarded UN Resolutions, which the Secretariat was required to uphold. The Resolutions specified:

First, All foreign military personnel present in Cyprus, otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, should be withdrawn without delay. Thus only 650 Turkish troops could stay, as permitted by the Treaty of Alliance;

Second, All unilateral actions that changed the demographic structure of Cyprus were deplored;

Third, Both sides must permit persons, who wish to do so, to return to their homes in safety; AND

Fourth, Respect of fundamental human rights must be ensured for every person, and the right to property must be accepted.

Moreover, the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, repeatedly endorsed by the Security Council, were swept aside. The Agreements had stipulated freedom of establishment, the right of property and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic. Yet, because of the Secretariat’s mendacious statements that the UN Resolutions had been observed and that the settlement was balanced and just, most States, unaware of the details, supported the Annan Plan. Those States like the USA and the UK, who were fully aware of the details, gave priority to their own geo-strategic and political interests in accommodating Turkey.  The book therefore analyses the Plans technicalities, which hide more than they show, so that the Plan’s effects become clear, especially as regards property, the right of return and Turkish settlers.

The fourth and final theme was positive opportunities for the future, facilitating co-operation, rather than entrenching division. In particular, I set out an Agenda for future negotiations.   That Agenda, arose out of the Chapters on Greek Cypriot concerns explaining why a large majority of Greek Cypriots voted ‘No’. Turkish Cypriots concerns about bi-zonality and political “bizonality” were also mentioned.  That the Agenda raises more issues disquieting Greek Cypriots is because the UN has already tilted the scales in Annan V to meet virtually all Turkish Cypriot concerns and Turkey’s demands in the fullest possible measure.

In conclusion, my book advocated re-consideration of the merits of the Plan, in the hope that international opinion-shapers will press for re-opened negotiations between the two sides.   If they do so, they should emphasise that the Plan itself stipulated that it would become “null and void” if not approved in both referenda. That stipulation was approved as part of the Plan in the Turkish Cypriot referendum.  Since the “null and void” stipulation was agreed, and understood in advance as a protection for both sides, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish gains in Annan V cannot stand as legitimate impediments to a fresh settlement.  The international community needs to encourage relatively rapid reaching of agreement, before Turkey loses interest in the EU, or a Turkish nationalist government emerges. Otherwise, the Cyprus problem will be indefinitely prolonged, with continuing risks to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.