Russia stands against big power deals on Kosovo

The plan presented by a UN special envoy for future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, cannot be a platform for the creation of the final solution on the issue, Russia’s permanent representative to UN, Vitaly Churkin, told Thursday. The UN Security Council held a meeting yesterday to discuss the results of the UN mission in Belgrade and Kosovo. Under Mr. Ahtisaari’s plan, Kosovo is to be granted independence. Russia’s diplomatic sources report that Moscow will insist on rejecting a current version of Ahtisaari`s plan and resume talks to find a mutually acceptable solution for both Belgrade and Pristina. Russia also demands that the Serbian refugees could safely return to their homes.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hopes Russia won’t have to use veto during forthcoming debates on a UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo. Russia favours a universal solution, which could be applied to similar conflicts in other countries. Russia believes a final status for Kosovo is a matter for further direct talks between the Kosovo Albanians and the government in Belgrade rather than for big-power dealing outside Serbia.

Unanswered questions

In February I participated in the meeting with Frank Wisner who came to Moscow after the last round of the Vienna negotiations. I asked him several questions about the Kosovo solution and its consequences and most of them remained unanswered. Frank Wisner could not answer my questions for one simple reason – his mission was different. He came not to discuss the Kosovo problem but rather to deliver a certain message to Russian leadership – if Russia blocks the UNSEC resolution it will ruin the international cooperation on this issue. I would like to raise these questions now because they are essential for understanding the Kosovo challenge to European and international security.

First, why is the Kosovo independence so topical now when the Communist regime in Serbia ceased to exist several years ago and Milosevich himself passed away a year ago, when Serbia is getting closer to EU and NATO? The answer was because Kosovars badly want it, and if they are not given independence, they will declare their independence unilaterally and the situation for non-Albanian population will be worse. This position of Pristina can be assessed as a pure blackmail but tacitly many US and EU politicians are in favour of this unilateral decision because it would free them from a difficult choice.

Second, what impact will the Kosovo independence have on the regional and European security in terms of a universal precedent? From my point of view it will affect Western Macedonia, whose population is Albanian and who will be encouraged by the Kosovo precedent, it will ruin a very fragile peace in Bosnia and will give a green light to secessionists movements in the post-Soviet space- Georgia, Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh). Put it simply, it will trigger a chain reaction in the region and in the post-Soviet space at large. Regardless of different political assessments and interpretations of the Kosovo precedent, it will be impossible to persuade the population of Abkhazia who passed through the bloody war with Georgia that their grievances are not so important as those of Kosovars.

Third, who will guarantee security of non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo? NATO could not prevent bloodshed in Macedonia in 2001 and in Kosovo in March 2004.

Fourth, why does the international community need to have two Albanian states in the region? Greater Serbia was a matter of concern of the international community but Greater Albania is still a matter of concern for some regional countries, first and foremost Greece.

Fifth, how will it affect domestic developments in Serbia and Russia who is entering the December parliamentary campaign?

For those states which have deep concerns about their sovereignty and territorial integrity an imposed dismemberment of their territories presents an unacceptable precedent. If the West succeeds in making Belgrade give up its sovereignty over part of Serbia, from the legal point of view it will be the first precedent after the Munich Dictate of 1938 when UK and France willing to appease Hitler agreed to dismember Czechoslovakia against the will of the Czech government and people.

If it happens with Kosovo, undoubtedly it will reinforce ultranationalist forces in Serbia and reverse the process of its integration with EU which even without the Kosovo issue is going with enormous difficulties. The last parliamentary election in Serbia is very telling from this point of view. It is not clear how Serbia’s respond to Kosovo’s independence.

As for Russia, though there are political forces in Russia who are waiting for Kosovo’s independence as a precedent for the rebellious regions –Abkhazia, South Osetia and others, Kremlin is not interested in the Kosovo precedent not only because it wants to avoid new tensions with the West but first and foremost because it will confront Russian leadership with a serious challenge. To recognize the rebellious autonomies along the Kosovo model would mean to reconsider the main principle of the Russian foreign policy about inviolability of the post-Soviet borders. So, Kremlin is a thin wall on the way of Russian nationalism and contains growing dissatisfaction with the double-standard policy of the West, the Kosovo problem included.

The last but not least –what does it mean for EU?

If Kosovo is granted supervised independence, the EU will be set to implement the biggest operations in its history. This includes the deployment of a 72-member EU delegation and a team of up to 200 local personnel. It will also draw on up to 1500 police and judicial experts and ongoing 16500 NATO force on the ground. The mission cost is estimated at 24 million euros for its first year in operation.

It is not clear how the EU will proceed if the UNSC fails to adopt a resolution granting supervised independence. To neglect Russia’s veto would mean to follow the US unilateralism which was criticized on many occasions by EU. And it is not clear whether all EU member states would support an EU mission under such circumstances which means that there will be a new split inside EU. Hungary, Romania, Greece and Slovakia are more inclined against Kosovo’s independence. The UK, Slovenia, Germany and Austria are firm supporters. Spain, Italy and Cyprus have expressed their discomfort at the prospect of Kosovo’s independence but have declared their willingness to follow a common EU line.

Relations with Russia and the prospects of cooperation on international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and many other security issues will be affected by the EU unilateralism.

Islamist threat to Europe can be stronger given the Balkan role in the plans of radical Islamist organisations. The main focus in the activities carried out by Islamic radicalism in the Balkans and in Europe at large is put on the recruitment and indoctrination of new followers in the Moslem populated countries and areas – Turkey, Albania or Bosnia as well as in the Moslem communities living in Europe. The terrorist network was build in FY during the war. Groups of Kosovars received military training in camps in north Albania and were sent back to Kosovo. Former Albanian president Sali Berisha openly supported the rebels in Kosovo and one of the first training centres in Albania was opened in his home village of Tropoje.[i] There is more evidence of external support to KLA fighters. Training camps were also detected by intelligence services in Bosnia, Croatia and Germany. External support was extended so far as to include reports about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard training to KLA members.[ii]

Solution

I think that the best solution for Kosovo is postponed status and gradual and consistent integration of Serbia and Kosovo into EU where the Kosovo problem will become irrelevant and be resolved on the level of Euroregions.

Or another solution which can be assessed the best of the worst is partitioning of the Province which would yield an equitable portion of territory to the Kosovo Albanians and most of Kosovo's Serbian cultural monuments to the Serbs. Otherwise Western Balkans is doomed to remain a powder keg in Europe.

[i] Ibid., p.22.

[ii] Rodan, S., “Kosovo Seen as New Islamic Bastion”, The Jerusalem post, 14 September 1998, p.1.

Research & Development Center - Intercollege