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Since his electoral victory in May 2007, President
Sarkozy reiterated his unwavering will to push forward a Mediterranean
initiative as a main objective of
France’s
foreign policy. Until the founding
Summit in
Paris
last July, his idea of a Mediterranean Union -now
termed Barcelona Process: Union for the
Mediterranean-,
created several tensions among Europeans, as a result of diverging views
on the new initiative’s legitimacy, usefulness, scope of action, and
participating actors. Following negotiations on several fronts, a
consensus (with Germany) has finally been reached: the
new initiative will not replace the Barcelona Process, but will
complement it, by boosting regional and international attention in key
infrastructural projects that will facilitate interaction of
Mediterranean riparian states.
For
a long time absent from political discourse, the issue of regional
integration through Sarkozy’s recent proposal
offers Europe and the international community an opportunity to carry
out a strategic reassessment that will allow for more political
attention and economic resources to be directed towards upgrading
stability and economic opportunities across the Mediterranean. But to
prove successful it has to tackle six critical problems that have
affected the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since its’ launching in
1995:
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The Barcelona
Process has been too politicised, focusing on meetings rather than
tangible projects/results.
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The financial
instruments offered have fallen far short of expectations – needs
not being met – much less that what Eastern
Europe has received to manage their transformation in
the post-Cold War era.
-
The
partnership needs to become more future-oriented with tangible links
to the grassroots it is seeking to assist.
-
The new
financial mechanism of the European Neighbourhood Partnership
Instrument (ENPI), appears too diluted when it comes to policy
objectives, too little considering the number of countries being
addressed and not coherent enough especially when it comes to follow
up mechanisms.
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The issue of
‘joint ownership’ especially when it comes to joint decision and
implementation making between Europe
and the Mediterranean states has also not been properly addressed.
The French proposal for establishing a new
Mediterranean initiative helped to focus international attention on a
very important geo-strategic crossroads of different civilisations and a
crucial post-Cold War theatre of operations. For the re-launching of
regional cooperation to be successful it
is
essential that important factors are addressed simultaneously to create
a more conducive climate. A concerted international effort is needed to
address the following issues:
-
The Palestinian issue needs to be resolved – the post
Annapolis
phase of diplomacy must deliver some positive steps with a two state
solution possible.
-
The rise of terrorism and the global war against terrorism dominates
contemporary security discourse. An effort must take place to
enhance strategic cooperation in this sector.
-
The growing call for political reform in the Arab world must be
supported by the international community.
-
The rise of political Islam must be better accommodated by both
Europe and the US. The West has so far failed
to engage Islamic political movements.
-
The slowdown of EU political integration as a result of the Reform
Treaty saga has stalled its engagement in the Mediterranean. After the Lisbon
compromise, any future ratification of the Treaty must guarantee
with a new focus on the Mediterranean.
-
As a result of increase in global competition both
China and India are superseding the
Mediterranean
when it comes to competitiveness. A Euro-Med strategy to address
this reality is required.
-
The increase in illegal immigration trends is a main issue of
contention. The EU must adopt a comprehensive policy to address this
major both humanitarian and security related issue.
-
Future EU enlargements that may see the EU expand from 27 to 35
should not result in further marginalisation of the Mediterranean in the EU’s agenda.
-
The slowdown in EU economic growth, with the Lisbon Strategy having
not yet deliver results, is preventing the EU from focusing more
actively on its external agenda.
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The lack of regional integration in the Mediterranean is a major handicap preventing closer
political and economic relations. To date no serious south-south
Mediterranean regional forum has emerged that the EU can engage with
– perhaps the Arab League
could assume this role, with the initiative by Malta to promote EU/Arab League
relations serving as a mechanism to spur such relations.
When it comes to addressing regional security
challenges the list of threats and risks is a daunting one. The plethora
of the security challenges associated with the North-South debate
includes illegal migration, terrorism, religious intolerance and the
lack of human rights. Across the region geopolitical and geoeconomic
indicators are not positive. Foreign direct investment is lacking,
intra-Mediterranean trade remains limited, north-south economic
disparity is resulting in a permanent poverty curtain across the
Mediterranean, the demographic time-bomb continues to escalate,
unemployment continues to increase, illegal migration has reached
alarming levels, illiteracy remains a very high levels, and an
escalation of ongoing conflicts remains a serious concern.
The indivisibility of security between
Europe and the
Mediterranean is the key reason
for both the EU and the Mediterranean states to support the new
initiative. European
and Mediterranean
partners need a critical reassessment of their regional cooperation
strategies, with clearly defined objectives and instruments to advance
long-term objectives and a clear sense of priorities.
Important questions arise here, including,
what sort of regional cooperation makes sense? Where is there a chance
of advancing?
In the case of the
Mediterranean,
the task of overcoming the obstacles that are hampering regional
cooperation must consist of better management of ongoing regional
efforts and more effective monitoring of goals being sought.
A road
map that stipulates short, medium, and long-term phases of
region-building is necessary if any progress is to be registered in
establishing a Euro-Mediterranean community of values. All international
institutions with a Mediterranean dimension should provide their think
tank platform to map out such a strategy so that a
Union of
diverse Mediterranean states becomes a reality in the near future. At
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
Mediterranean
runs the risk of becoming a permanent fault-line between the prosperous
North and an impoverished South. The key development to watch in the
next decade will be to see whether the phase of cooperative competition
that has dominated post-Cold War relations to date is eventually
superseded by an era of conflictual competition. If this age of
socio-economic indifference scenario does take hold, disorder will
dominate Mediterranean relations and as resources are depleted, the
region will become an economic wasteland.
The
only way this scenario can be avoided is if the Barcelona Process is
overhauled, international institutions such as the World Bank, OECD, and
the IMF become more altruistic in their dealings with the region, and
the Mediterranean countries themselves adopt a self-help mentality.
Rather than undermine or diminish the significance of the Barcelona
Process, the growing socio-economic disparities across the Mediterranean
underlines further the significance of the Barcelona Process, the only
multilateral process of its kind in the area.
The failure of
the Barcelona Process to register significant advances has forced
Euro-Mediterranean strategists to reconsider what policy mechanisms
might be introduced to stimulate progress toward the achievement of its’
founding objectives. These mechanisms include greater attention to
specific sub-regional trends that are currently manifesting themselves
around the
Mediterranean and greater
attention to the domestic prerequisites of transnational cooperation. If
the EU wants to promote regional integration in the Mediterranean
in the short term, it must seek to support more directly all
sub-regional groupings that can have a positive impact on the
conflictual patterns of regional relations.
A sub-regional approach does not entail
formal dissolution of the Barcelona
project. All current and prospective members could maintain their
membership, whatever their status in sub-regional groups (whether
defined by geography or by functionality). This could facilitate a more
efficient operation of other sub-regional groupings by
compartmentalizing the Israeli-Arab conflict resolution.
Regardless of whether this has been a real
impediment or merely a diversion; it has nevertheless complicated
Barcelona
proceedings, sometimes to the point of paralysis.
Pending a resolution of the conflict,
minimizing if not eliminating the number of forums in which Israelis and
Arabs participate together might facilitate more focused attention by
all parties on the economic, social, and governance issues that are at
the heart of the EU’s post-Cold War Mediterranean experiment.
All
extra-regional actors, with an interest in ensuring that future
relations in the Mediterranean remain peaceful and more prosperous,
including NATO and the US must act to ensure that the Middle East is not
left to collapse as a result of an attitude of indifference.
International organizations must guard against adopting an attitude of
indifference when it comes to securing a peaceful future for this
region. The outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other
regional conflicts will have a major bearing on the future of regional
relations. Geographical proximity and stability in the Mediterranean
dictates that the EU needs to try and influence dynamics in the
Middle East
more systematically than it has been in recent years. Failure to do so
will continue to stifle attempts to strengthen regional relations
through the Barcelona Process and also have a negative impact on the
implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy’s agenda and
therefore in the development of President Sarkozy’s initiative. The
French initiative must aim at reviving and recalibrating the Barcelona
Process by building on the pattern of relations that exists today:
to
create a ‘Barcelona Plus’ situation where Euro-Mediterranean relations
are truly re-launched on a more solid footing. It offers an opportunity
to spur the resurgence of sub regionalism – intensify sub regionalism
and bilateral interplay. It also offers the chance to map out a more
action oriented and more target focused agenda. However, it will be
necessary to engage both EUs’ and
Mediterranean
states’ leadership and political will. It will also need political focus
and practical input from business and civil society, from both sides of
the Mediterranean.
The task is huge. The success or failure of regional cooperation will
determine whether the
Mediterranean
will become an area of peace and prosperity or continue to struggle as
an underdeveloped hotbed of tensions and violent conflicts.
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