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Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE UNION'S MEDITERRANEAN POLICIES By Roderick Pace
Professor and Director of the European Documentation and Research Centre, University of Malta
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As this
piece was being written the guns fell silent in Gaza after 22 days of
war. More than 1000 people have lost their lives so far, the bulk of
them Palestinians – one third of them children. Five thousand have been
injured, scores of homes destroyed. As soon as hostilities broke out,
Egypt, co-president of the newly formed Union for the Mediterranean,
indefinitely suspended all the Union’s meetings. Some dismay, in a sea
of indifference, began to surface that yet again, another EU policy
intended to stabilise the turbulent Mediterranean region was prematurely
moribund, unable to make any impact on a major regional conflict.
Egyptian-French diplomacy had immediately gone into full gear as soon as
the conflict erupted. In the first week of the New Year, the “Egyptian
Plan” called for an immediate cease-fire and talks in Cairo between the
belligerents.
In the EU
we need to reflect on this latest conflict to try to discover the
weaknesses of our approach. Without much pretence to novelty, may I be
allowed to make a few suggestions.
I do not
think we need to dig too deeply beneath the surface to uncover the
weakness of our approach and much of what I say here is “déjà vu”.
Starting with the research community we need to re-examine carefully the
thrust and content of our discourse. Are our long documents and analysis
really impacting on the minds of decision-makers? Then, take the
metaphors we use (and this just one example for lack of space): for
example, “frozen conflict” has been used so widely and recklessly that
it has lost its meaning. The images it projects are so removed from what
is going on. The Mediterranean conflicts are not frozen at all, but the
process of resolving them is.
The
second proposal I would like to make, is that we ought to look more
closely at European foreign policy initiatives to see whether in their
detailed application they are really meeting their lofty objectives. For
example, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – now “Union for the
Mediterranean” – has often been celebrated as the only initiative which
brings together all the belligerent parties in the Middle East Conflict
under the same roof. The initiative is praised for increasing dialogue
in the Mediterranean region. These claims are exaggerated: Hamas is
excluded and Syria stays away from most meetings and worse, a real
dialogue has never galvanised the process.
A closer
look at the way in which the EMP / Union for the Mediterranean operate,
mercilessly shatters these “myths”. At various meetings ranging from
experts’ gatherings in EU financed networks to the Euro-Mediterranean
Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), dialogue is rare while confrontation is
rife on the Middle East Question. This behaviour reminds me of the sorry
tale of a couple going through an acrimonious divorce but who are
nevertheless constrained to live together under the same roof until the
community of acquists
is
divided. In conflict situations, ministers, experts and parliamentarians
are expected, at least rationally, to put their heads together and
propose solutions. But the EMP and EMPA structures usually seize up.
Mediterranean politics are overburdened by linkage politics and “hostage
taking”. Last October, Jordan postponed an important Euro-Med Conference
on water in support of the Arab League’s quest for membership of the
Union for the Mediterranean. In January 2008, Egypt stopped
participating in the bodies of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary
Assembly after receiving sever criticism from the European Parliament
for its bad human rights record and its treatment of the Cops. The sorry
tale of the failed Mediterranean Security Charter says it all.
The third
proposal: nothing is ever said of other important, (albeit lesser)
conflicts in our region despite their potentially harmful effect on
regional stability. I am referring here to the situation in the Western
Sahara and the Cyprus Question. Structures created to foster dialogue
and help in the resolution of regional conflicts ought not to overlook
any conflicts. It may be argued that initiatives such as the EMP/Union
for the Mediterranean, already close to capsizing under the weight of
the Middle East Problem, will certainly sink if more conflicts are
loaded on them. But if
participating states are serious about fostering dialogue instead of
scoring diplomatic points, then this excuse is nonsensical.
The
fourth point is an old one: can the EU ever hope to achieve its
stabilization aims if it continues to refuse to talk to key players such
as Hamas and Hizbollah? Hamas targets Israeli civilians, was the first
to break the cease-fire, uses its own population as a shield, is closely
allied to Syria, trains its fighters in Iran, smuggles arms and
munitions into Gaza, does not recognise Israel…. but has received the
overwhelming support of Palestinians in a free election and is a key
player in any solution to the Arab-Israeli question. The EU can never
condone its violence, and it must do its utmost to ensure that it does
not rearm, but can it afford to snub it?
My last
point is this: all policies, national or supranational have their high
and low points. Some also become irrelevant. But I see a tendency in the
EU to send policies to the recycling bin before they have become
completely obsolescent. The EMP has been facing difficulties, many of
them crucial but which could also be resolved given time. We can never
overlook its achievements modest as these are. Policies often need fine
tuning, not discarding. Unilateral policy initiatives by EU Member
States, even those launched with lofty objectives in sight, often cause
greater confusion. Internal EU dialogue needs to be strengthened before
new policy initiatives are launched.
The
“Union for the Mediterranean” is a case in point. It started off as a
vague proposal of a “Mediterranean Union” excluding non-Mediterranean EU
member states and threatening to split the EU. Spain was irritated by it
because it would eclipse the Barcelona Process. Hence it was called
“Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean”. At the November 2008
Ministerial meeting, all reference to Barcelona was dropped. The French
initiative has helped refocus attention on the Mediterranean at a time
when many were losing interest in it. But it has also underlined that
the “Mediterranean approach” to problem solving is sloppy.
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