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Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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WAR IN GAZA By Farid Mirbagheri
Associate Professor, Department of European Studies and International Relations, University of Nicosia Dialogue Chair in Middle Eastern Studies
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The recent war in Gaza was the latest violent episode
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israeli forces unleashed their
military might on the break-away Hamas, who in defiance of the
mainstream Fatah movement and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had
through a coup taken control of Gaza and its one and a half million
inhabitants well over a year ago. Hamas was against the negotiations
sponsored by the international community to resolve this oldest global
conflict and steadfastly refused to recognize Israel. Moreover its
periodic barrage of rockets on Israelis marked the organization’s
uncompromising attitude towards all peacemaking efforts.
Hamas believed, or appeared to
believe, that violent defiance of diplomacy would bring it glory in the
eyes of Palestinians thereby replacing Mahmoud Abbas and taking control
of the West Bank too. Reality, however, turned out to be different. Internally, Hamas miscalculated. Though there are no
reliable polls (and one wonders why they are not conducted. Could it be
Hamas preventing such polls?) on the sentiments of the people of Gaza
towards Hamas. But it is crystal clear that Hamas’s militancy has now
resulted in around 1.500 Palestinian deaths and thousands more injuries
(many of the dead and the injured infants and children). The war has
also weakened Hamas’s power infrastructure and greatly diminished its
military potency. There is now every possibility that any long-term
solution would include a far more serious effort to stop the flow of
arms from Egypt to Gaza, which could include the stationing of UN troops
along the border with Egypt. Economically, the damage incurred in Gaza
must be in hundreds of millions of dollars if not more. On all domestic
fronts, therefore, Hamas’s political and military leadership has been
undermined as the result of the war. Externally, this last war, just like the war in
Lebanon a couple of years ago, has demonstrated the orientation of
global powers and has reaffirmed the coordinates of regional politics.
All the Arab countries almost unanimously, like most of the world, have
supported Mahmoud Abbas and have considered Hamas as a rebel
organization. Hamas’s ties with Shi’a Iran has angered Sunni Arab
countries and the organisation’s headquarter in Syria, led by Khalid
Mash’al, has failed to gain much support, if any, from the Arab League.
The UN Security Council resolution to stop the war was adopted only
after much destruction had already taken place in Gaza and Israel was
close to its war aims. It was as if everyone seemed content with the
diminishing military capacity of Hamas. Those who keep thinking that sheer violence and utter
defiance of diplomacy can steer the politics of the region in a
radically different direction have once again been proven wrong.
Ideologised politics cannot break the logjam that has been persisting
for well over half a century. Others have tried that and failed. The
only feasible solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute seems to be a
two-state solution with secure borders. Both Palestinians and Israelis
must accept that.
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Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs Copyright © 2009. All rights reserved |
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