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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY INTEGRATION IN THE EU AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CYPRUS By Andreas Theophanous
Professor of Political Economy, University of Nicosia Director of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs
Introduction The European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) in many ways constitutes a unique experiment in economic
history, representing a case of monetary union without a comprehensive
political union, but with a single currency and a common monetary
authority. The EMU had run ahead of fiscal and financial integration and
happened at a time of diverse economic records and circumstances in
This paper looks at the European Union
(EU) from a historical perspective and pays particular attention to the
creation of the EMU and the relevant future challenges.
Within this framework the paper assesses the
potential political ramifications and implications.
We also advance the position that in the long run
for the euro to be successfully sustained and to also be a permanent
leading international currency the EU must further advance its political
integration.
The paper also briefly considers the case of
Although the creation of the European Community (EC) is not independent
from the overall dynamic process of the formation of regional economic
blocs and even globalization, it is important to recall the conditions
under which the EC was founded.
Although the Treaty of Rome practically set up a Customs Union among six
countries (W. Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg),
in essence it paved the way for a much more ambitious project.
At about the same time the European Free Trade
Area (EFTA) was founded which had a less ambitious agenda as it
was essentially concerned with advancing free
trade. Over time the EC was successful in becoming much more influential
and in the end almost all countries that originally belonged to EFTA
joined the EC/EU.
When the EC was founded in the 1950s its objectives, tacitly and
implicitly, were the following:
·
Reconciliation:
to heal the wounds of the past
·
To promote
peace and security
·
To create the conditions for the economic reconstruction of
·
To pave the way for the economic ascendancy of
·
To help contain the
·
To sustain
democratic institutions and human rights
·
To promote the ultimate objective of the political unification of
By 1989 much had been achieved.
Undoubtedly, there were at times different stumbling blocks which seemed
to impede or rather decelerate the process of European integration.
But the EC always found ways to move forward.
For example, during the 1980s when the EC faced what came to be
described as Euro-sclerosis, European leaders rose to the occasion and
worked effectively in the direction of overcoming problems.
The outcome was the Single European Act, which aimed at promoting
a truly Single European Market.
The EC/EU pursued a pragmatic approach, which aimed at maximizing the
benefits subject to the existing constraints. The EU understood the
difficulties of trying to simultaneously advance both widening and
deepening but at the same time the Union realized that it would be
losing the forest for the tree if it inflexibly chose to advance
deepening at the expense of widening or vice versa.
It was of vital importance for the EU to expand the security and
prosperity zone. It is
within this overall philosophical perspective that successive rounds
enlargement should be understood.
Nevertheless further expansion is now considered in a different
light in terms of the absorption capacity of the EU.
Over time the member-countries learned the art of compromise and
flexibility. The European institutions acquired an importance of their
own in the eyes of national policy-makers as well as of people at large.
And gradually it was both understood and accepted that a
reallocation of powers, jurisdiction and authority between
The EU has been repeatedly criticized for what it was not successful in
doing. For example, it has
been suggested that during the Yugoslav crisis, in the 1990s, the EU’s
actions proved to be inadequate in containing the crisis, the tragedy
and the bloodshed in the Balkans.
Although this criticism is valid it finally prompted the member
states to seriously raise the issues of common foreign policy, defence
and security at the EU level.
This development despite its shortcomings confirms the
perspective that the concept of the nation-state in the EU is undergoing
a transformation.
II.
The Advent of the Euro and the Economic and Monetary
As early as 1969 at the Hague European summit, the leaders of the 6
member states of the then EC agreed on the adoption of a common currency
within the framework of an Economic and Monetary Union over a period of
ten years. However, at the 1980 Luxembourg European Council meeting the
EC heads of state abandoned the objective of completing the final stages
of a European Monetary System within the initial timetable when it was
realised that the target was too ambitious. Nevertheless, the important
element was that there was a vision to move in the direction of a common
currency.
As a result of both the adoption of the Single European Act and of full
capital mobility it was becoming increasingly clear that the European
Monetary System (EMS), which was adopted in 1979, was inadequate to meet
the new challenges. The
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 marked a turning point in the process of
European integration: the member states agreed to proceed toward a truly
European
Moreover, there was much criticism about the wisdom of such a move.
According to Feldstein the adoption of a common currency made
sense only if a political decision to move forward to a Federal Europe
was taken. He argued that in
the absence of such a vision and clear political objectives the adoption
of the euro would create more problems than benefits. Among other
things, he predicted the persistence of unemployment and, given the
existence of asymmetrical shocks and different circumstances in each
country, the emergence of a new set of developments which could cause
considerable strife at both the European and international level.
Nevertheless, the idea of the EMU and the euro were received positively
by others. The adoption of a common currency made sense from an economic
perspective irrespective of the a priori existence or not of
political objectives.
According to Wyplosz the existence of a single market which was moving
more and more toward further integration in conjunction with the
existence of different national currencies would always lead to
situations of currency crises, as an outcome of speculation or other
fundamental factors. Certainly such outcomes could be
counter-productive.
Moreover, the adoption of a common currency could lead to price
stability and harmonization, drastic reduction of transaction costs and
would also contribute to the creation of a truly single integrated
European market.
At the same time it should be stressed that the adoption of the euro
created processes that could lead not only to further economic
integration but also to the possibility of further political
cooperation. The creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
introduction of the euro were
thought of as potentially applying pressure to develop political
mechanisms for holding monetary policymakers more accountable. III.
The Political Economy of the EMU: the Record and
the Challenges
The EMU has generated many positive results and benefits for member
countries: it has led to integrated capital markets, has supported a
more stable economic environment by anchoring inflationary expectations,
lowered borrowing costs across the board and thus underpinned
considerable economic growth. This ultimately helped to advance the
objective of real convergence (although much more remains to be done),
thus reducing the marked disparities in per capita income levels. At the
same time the elimination of transactions costs and increased price
transparency further enhanced trade
and benefited the consumers.
Following the marked devaluation of the US dollar in the period
2005-2008, the euro has come into focus as an alternative international
currency. Consequently, the strength and governance of the new currency
constitute areas of increasing interest in global finance. But the
single currency in the framework of divided and/or shared sovereignty
raises a number of issues and potential threats.
There is what may be described as the optimum currency area challenge,
the fiscal challenge, the growth challenge and the financial stability
challenge. Moreover, the
fundamental question and challenge is whether in the long run the euro
can be successfully sustained without further political integration.
Alternatively put, the question raised is whether the euro will
dynamically create a process which will lead to further political
integration.
Lessons from the Past Monetary unions in the past can
generally be distinguished between two categories: national and
multinational unions. Their experiences provide us with a number of
useful lessons. Most importantly, national and multinational monetary
unions were set up with broadly the same economic objectives: to
facilitate trade by reducing transactions costs of currency exchange,
reduce or even eliminate trade restrictions, reduce exchange rate
volatility and prevent wasteful competition for seigniorage. National
monetary unions were set up for the added political imperative of
creating nation states. Unlike national monetary unions, multinational
monetary unions in the past did not survive the test of time.
Multinational monetary unions (such as the Scandinavian Monetary Union)
could not survive in an unstable international environment and with
pressures on divergent paths regarding the optimal mix of national
fiscal and monetary policies. National monetary unions (i.e. US,
The EMU is different from earlier
experiences of monetary unification in a number of respects. Whereas
multinational monetary unions in the past kept separate monetary
authorities, the EMU has created a single currency and a common monetary
authority. In contrast with national monetary unions, member states have
kept a substantial part of their political sovereignty and also a large
degree of fiscal sovereignty. A key potential problem is conflict among
national agendas for growth and full employment. This problem of course
is related to the incidence and severity of potential asymmetric shocks.
It should be kept in mind though that political
will toward greater political integration or the creation of cooperative
fiscal arrangements will be vital for the underlying durability of the
EMU.
Perspectives from the Optimum Currency Area Literature
OCA theory considers the conditions necessary for a monetary union with
a single currency to be successful. Initially OCA literature focused on
the trade related benefits of adopting the single currency. The
conclusion was that the corresponding reduction of transaction costs
would benefit national economies in direct proportion to their degree of
trade openness.
Given the EMU and the adoption of a common currency and effectively
common interest rates, national governments do not have the option of
monetary discretion. In this framework it should be clarified that the
adjustment process to shocks and monetary integration cannot be
separated from the flows of all forms of resources.
It may also be important to revisit the role of the EU and its
institutions and policy options.
In the context of asymmetric shocks and other challenges there is
scope for a common fiscal authority for transferring resources from the
positively affected regions to the regions and countries adversely
affected. Of course the role of a
fiscal authority is not limited to this function.
The Fiscal Challenge
One of the most important questions raised relates to the impact of the
adoption of the single currency on the fiscal policies of the countries
of the Eurozone. The interdependencies of monetary and fiscal policies
cannot be overlooked.
Sargent and Wallace for instance, convincingly argued in 1981 that
particular monetary objectives cannot be met irrespective of what is
going on in the fiscal domain.
The argument can of course be reversed.
Fiscal objectives may not be independent of developments in the
monetary domain.
From a practical perspective the adoption of the euro involves a policy
of fiscal restraint. In the
long-run this leads to extremely positive outcomes such as
accountability in relation to how public funds are allocated and spent,
pushing aside wasteful spending and thus promoting efficiency and so on.
But in the short run, fiscal restraint may cause hardship and the
adjustment costs may be high.
In the case of the EMU a fiscal union may evolve through a federal
structure which would, inter-alia, involve the transfer of competencies
and functions from the national authority to the supranational level.
Fiscal federalism can offset the
effects of asymmetric shocks thus adding to the operation of a monetary
union. The transfer of more
fiscal responsibility from the national level to a would be federal
authority in the Eurozone seems to be necessary for the viability of the
monetary union but one which is difficult to achieve.
The Growth Challenge
Long-term economic growth is ultimately critical for the long-term
viability of the monetary union. Low growth per se or variable growth
rates across member countries lead to conflict and apply political
pressures over issues of the common monetary policies.
High rates of economic growth tend to reduce fiscal imbalances thus
aiding the effectiveness of the single monetary policy. By the same
token low rates of economic growth heighten fiscal imbalances making a
common monetary policy more controversial as the needs of individual
member countries begin to diverge. The ageing of the population and the
rising health costs will be imposing added fiscal strains.
The next five to ten years will be particularly challenging for the EMU.
This is because growth rates may be slowing and also, more
importantly, because growth differentials may be widening.
Nevertheless, much remains to be done in the direction of further
economic and political integration for the EMU to be successful in the
long run.
The Financial Stability Challenge
At the same time, financial sector shocks can potentially undermine
monetary regimes and discredit central banks responsible for their
operations. The Eurozone is an integrated capital market with a common
currency and monetary authority. Yet the regulatory framework is in the
hands of the national authorities. As a result the extent to which the
regulatory framework can provide preventive supervision is limited. That
is, there is no central body or authority that would be aware of banking
problems from early on. However,
shifting supervision to the supranational level may have practical
difficulties given the current institutional arrangements.
III.
The Political Economy Challenge: Economic Ramifications and Political
Implications
The adoption of the single currency encourages the deeper integration of
all the economies in the Eurozone. In the long run this would, through
different processes, lead to a more efficient, thus more competitive,
economic structure. It
should be also noted that the adoption of the euro involves essentially
the transfer of competencies in several areas from each nation-state to
the EU and its institutions. This in turn raises expectations regarding
the role of the EU as a supra-national structure. This issue may well
involve political implications also.
While in the past there have been cases of strong powers and weak
currencies, there has never been a case of a strong currency without a
state. The implication is
that, with the adoption of the euro, the EU has irrevocably entered a
path, which will lead to more changes.
More specifically, the EU may have to adopt a modern constitution
and also promote a common foreign and security policy.
In other words, if the hypothesis that for the best possible
performance of a currency in the international arena, a full political
entity is a necessary though not a sufficient condition is correct, the
EU will have to fully advance its political institutions and move toward
the direction of further political integration.
It may also be interesting to assess the impact of adopting the common
currency (the euro) on identity in the current and future members of the
Eurozone. Future generations that will not have gone through the
experience of national currencies but will be using and sharing the
euro, may have a higher propensity to put more emphasis on the European
identity.
Given the historical experiences with financial and currency crises, we
may also note that fiscal strains and low economic growth constitute
major risk considerations for the EMU and the single currency.
On the other hand such circumstances tend to enhance the need for
solidarity and coordination. Whilst
the welfare state can be the basis of much social stability and economic
resilience in
Government finances are coming under severe strain as a result of two
interconnected developments. On the revenue side there is increasing
pressure in a globalised world to reduce corporate tax rates. On the
spending side a number of interrelated factors – the ageing of the
population, rising medical costs, and rising demand for public services
in general – are straining public finances. Lack of coordination of
national fiscal policies may create a serious threat to the single
currency.
The long run success of the euro also critically depends on a sustained
rate of real growth. Low growth or markedly variable growth rates across
different regions and countries would generate political strains against
the euro. The euro has
de facto evolved as the second
reserve currency of the world. However, the euro stands in contrast to
the dollar in a number of respects. Unlike the dollar, the euro is not
the currency of a superpower. The euro is held for the purposes of
diversification and for political reasons. More importantly, it is not
dependent on continued capital inflows like the dollar. Coming back to the issue of whether
the euro itself will pave the way for further political integration it
is important to note that during the deep international financial and
economic crisis of 2008-2009, the euro proved to have ameliorated the
negative impact in the countries of the Eurozone.
The multidimensional usefulness of the euro is
very much understood and complaints about loss of national monetary and
economic independence are gradually put aside.
The sustainability of the euro while at the same
time trying to achieve other economic objectives is the core issue.
These dynamics raise
de facto
the issue of further economic deepening and political
integration.
Even if not all of the countries of the EU and
even of the Eurozone may be interested in discussing the further
economic and political integration this will be undertaken by some
countries.
This may lead to the scenario of a multi-speed EU
with the core moving toward a form of federation.
IV.
The process of transition to the euro
has been smooth without any significant obstacles. The government
consistently pursued a prudent fiscal policy without upsetting social
fundamentals and other parameters. This policy in conjunction with
satisfactory GDP growth paved the way for nominal convergence with the
The benefits of euro adoption are of greater
interest; these are classified into two main categories: a) the direct
implications of monetary integration, and, b) the long-term adjustment
processes set in motion for real convergence. The improvement in the macroeconomic framework
generates the conditions necessary for attracting added foreign direct
investments and for encouraging domestic investments. These new trends
in turn provide added stimulus to economic activity and help improve
productivity levels raising at the same time the consumption
possibilities of the country. For The euro has the potential to be a
unifying tool in All these issues must receive their
fair share of attention by the political and business leaders of both
communities in In this regard perhaps it is important
to consider the possibility of a paradigm shift: from the bizonal
bicommunal federal model in which power is essentially concentrated in
two constituent states to a model of functional federation in which
power derives basically from the central government.
Within the framework of this discussion it is also
essential to acknowledge that the functional federal model entails an
integrationalist approach and also allows the market forces to play an
important role.
For this scenario to materialize though the
consent of the Turkish(Cypriot) side is important. VI.
Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for Further
Research
The introduction of the euro has had far reaching implications in the
countries that have adopted it and in the international monetary system
generally. The EMU is a unique
endeavour in monetary history in the sense that it is the only case of
monetary union with a common currency and a common central bank but
without a comprehensive political union. It is today the most advanced
form of economic integration and poses many advantages for its members.
The creation of truly integrated capital markets and the introduction of
the single currency have meant the virtual elimination of currency
crises for its members. The euro has created a nominal policy anchor
necessary for macroeconomic stability which has been more supportive for
trade, investment and ultimately economic growth. The reduction of
transaction costs and the absence of exchange rate volatility across the
countries of the Eurozone have greatly enhanced trade and productivity.
At the same time in terms of political repercussions, the introduction
of the euro constitutes an act of transfer of competence and, indeed,
power from the national level to a supra-national structure. Given that
the adoption of the euro may also be symbolic of the further reduction
of the sovereignty of the nation-state and the simultaneous further
upgrading of the EU, it is only natural that there may be higher
expectations from the
But the euro is only ten years old and has not really been tested in a
protracted low growth environment. Low growth or variable growth rates
across member countries heighten fiscal imbalances making a common
monetary policy more controversial as the specific needs of individual
countries begin to diverge. Globalisation and intensified competition
means that real growth patterns in the EU are changing.
Fiscal federalism can offset the effects of asymmetric shocks and
consequently can play an important and complementary role to monetary
policy. Government finances at the national level are coming under
severe strain as a result of a number of factors: the ageing of the
population, rising medical costs and rising demand for public services
in general. Lack of coordination of national fiscal policies raises a
singular threat to the single currency. Hence, the development of fiscal
federal arrangements may be of great importance to the functioning of
the EMU. However, fiscal federalism will be most difficult to achieve
outside a distinct process for political unity.
In the financial sphere, in order to enhance the stability of the system
in the EMU it might also be necessary to shift some elements of
supervision at least, to the supranational level. The EMU is an
integrated capital market but regulation is in the hands of national
authorities which limits the ability to provide preventive supervision.
For small open economies like
At the same time the euro has the potential to be a truly unifying tool
in
Undoubtedly, the issues raised are many and multidimensional, and more
research on the several specific topics is certainly warranted. Some of
these topics would be EU budgets, how to address socio-economic problems
not only in particular countries but also on a regional level, and a
study of the further evolution of the euro and the repercussions on the
concept of European identity.
Last but not least it should be stressed that much more systematic
research is required in relation to the EMU and the political, social
and economic repercussions and implications for the member states and
the EU as a whole. In the
case of
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