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Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN US FOREIGN POLICY By Monroe Newman
Professor Emeritus of Economics, Pennsylvania
State University
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The world doesn’t change just because the U.S. changes
administrations. And in many
ways, neither does the U.S.
It retains its obligations, allies, commitments, adversaries, problems
and power – military, economic, social and ideological.
It retains the internal forces that shape its foreign policy,
though there may be a shift in relative strength among them.
And it retains the legacy of its history, for most of which it is
proud but some of which it might want to expunge. It is within this framework of constancy that a new
administration undertakes to place its mark on the world scene.
The Obama administration has been doing that.
A partial list of its acts suggests the mark it seeks to make. In a very short period, it has separated the U.S.
from its policies of the past by:
·
pursuing changes in climate policy,
·
scheduling the closing of Guantanamo and
other prisons,
·
forbidding torture,
·
allowing U.S. funded agencies abroad to
instruct in the full range of birth control options, highlighting the
evils of human trafficking,
·
expressing a willingness to speak with
adversaries,
·
forging alliances with China and Russia
on North Korean matters,
· pressuring Israel to cease the expansion of
settlements and questioning their legality, speaking directly and
peaceably to the millions of Moslems in the world,
·
setting a timetable for military
withdrawal from Iraq,
·
focusing force against adversaries in
Afghanistan,
·
helping Pakistan protect its citizens and
government,
·
altering policies toward Cuba,
·
and at the time of
this writing, being cautious in discussing
the election turmoil in Iran. Some of the background for just one of these actions
can be instructive. Taken
separately, a majority of Americans of each faith supports the existence
of two states in the land made holy by centuries of bloodshed.
Advocating – and going beyond that, offering plans for a
two-state solution – satisfies both principles and popular will at home.
Some residents of the contested area on both sides are opposed to
such a settlement and they and others may have to live and die with
their objections. What principles appear to be operative? First,
recognition that being the world’s superpower is not an entitlement to
overweening power. Secondly,
internationally (as well as domestically) that diversity is entitled to
a principled welcoming.
Next, accommodation and conciliation are not only respectful, they can
lead to enduring resolutions.
Lastly, that the country’s greatest strength is in its ideology
so its beacon to the world should not be shuttered by its behavior. During these months, the world has been changing.
Economic forces have stimulated protectionism, increased U.S.
financial dependence on foreign investors (leading to questioning of the
role of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency), and worsened
income inequality. There was
an undesired election outcome in Israel and unexpected outcomes in
Lebanon and Iran, unrelenting bellicosity from North Korea backed by
actions, and a rise of intolerance in much of the world that is shown in
individual attacks and demagogic politics. The reaction to North Korea may be indicative of a
willingness to adjust policy to changing circumstances.
Originally offered direct conversations, the North Koreans
rejected them and instead lapsed into further threats.
The administration’s response has been a return to measured
forcefulness despite the possible peril to allies in South Korea and
Japan. The administration is warning that combativeness has a limited
scope before it becomes unacceptable.
There may well be a more general lesson here.
Largely uncharted so far is the new administration’s response to
non-state adversaries and their sometimes state sponsors and supporters.
Harking back to constancy, a hundred years ago an American
president recommended a foreign policy of “Speak softly but carry a big
stick.” The indications so
far are that this is what we may see. |
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Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs Copyright © 2009. All rights reserved |
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