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Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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"EOKA, ENOSIS, AND THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS" By Andrew Novo
DPhil Candidate in Modern History at St. Antony’s College, Oxford
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This presentation involves a look at some aspects of
the EOKA struggle during the 1950s. I focus on three obstacles to
enosis, each relating to a
major player outside of Cyprus namely: Britain, Greece, and Turkey. It’s
not possible to understand the dynamics of the EOKA struggle without
investigating the factors outside of Cyprus. This is because the
policies of Britain, Greece, and Turkey had a dramatic impact on the
course of events on the island during the fight for
enosis. As a historian, my
work focuses on the EOKA struggle during the 1950s and the responses of
the British Government. I’m working not only on the struggle itself, but
on the broader political and diplomatic context trying to understand the
various factors at play. The three obstacles to
enosis that I’ll raise tonight
influenced the history of Cyprus. They have also helped to define the
present political situation. So I will be discussing the present briefly
towards the end. As most of you will know, the
enosis movement made a
momentous decision to use force in order to achieve its goal during 1954
and the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, EOKA, began
operations against the British in April 1955. The
enosis movement faced many
obstacles, more, I think than the men involved in it knew and perhaps
more than they wanted to admit. These obstacles shaped the course of the
struggle and its conclusion. EOKA’s war was conceived as a fight against the
retreating British Empire. The British presence in Cyprus was the most
obvious obstacle to enosis. Successive British Governments had opposed
enosis. They did this because
of the conviction that sovereign control over all Cyprus was necessary
to uphold Britain’s strategic and political concerns in the broader
Middle East. It’s important to remember that after World War Two,
Britain was in retreat. The entire Indian subcontinent, Palestine, and
Egypt had all been abandoned by British forces. In this climate, the
British looked on Cyprus as a place that had to be held at all costs.
Cyprus was legally a British territory, modest in size, strategically
significant, and had a small population. British control seemed firmly
grounded. Even so, there was already a debate within the British
Government about what exactly was needed in Cyprus. Hardline
imperialists remained convinced that the entire island must remain under
British control. More progressive thinkers, including future Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan, believed that sovereign bases could satisfy
Britain’s strategic needs. I should add as an aside that, not
surprisingly, once Macmillan became Prime Minister other officials and
politicians followed his lead. In 1960, Britain formally abandoning
sovereignty over the whole island, contributing to the compromise
agreement. Successive British leaders, however, remained uncompromising
on the issue of enosis. This
stance was maintained even though as early as 1951, Greece offered
Britain basing facilities in Cyprus and in Greece in return for
enosis. A second obstacle to
enosis, surprisingly, was the
attitude of the Greek Government. It has to be remembered that during
the Second World War and the Greek Civil War which followed, Britain was
Greece’s most important ally. Britain devoted enormous financial and
military resources to Greece during the war against Germany and in
support of the anti-communist side during the Civil War. This created
tension within the Greek Government and a need for caution in relation
to enosis. Politically, the
Government of Greece was uncomfortable confronting Britain. It was not
until the summer of 1954 that Greece decided to oppose Britain openly
over Cyprus. A particular blow came in July of that year. When asked
about the future of Cypriot self-government, the Minister of State for
the Colonies, Mr. Henry Hopkinson, replied that due to particular
circumstances, some territories could never expect to be fully
independent. Hopkinson’s “never” spurred Greece to raise Cyprus at the
United Nations in the fall of 1954. This decision marked an important
shift in Greco-British relations over Cyprus. Even so, the Greek Government was still not entirely
behind the enosis movement. Leaders in Athens felt that they could not afford
to support an open military movement in Cyprus. A decade of war had left
the country in a dire economic situation. Greece was also concerned
about how such actions would affect its relationship with Turkey. From
the 1930s, Greece and Turkey had cultivated a diplomatic understanding.
This newfound peaceful coexistence was further strengthened by the
expansion of the NATO alliance in 1952. These new political realities
gave Greece extra incentives for caution. Greek caution meant that the
enosis cause was driven by
Cypriots. Over time the struggle centered on two men: Colonel George
Grivas and Archbishop Makarios. The insistence of these two men troubled
the more realistic thinkers in the Greek Government. Evangelos Averoff,
the Greek Foreign Minister during the EOKA struggle wrote that Makarios
“moved heaven and earth to bring the Cyprus issue to a head.” During a
meeting between the two men in 1951, when Averoff was Deputy Foreign
Minister, he tried to slow Makarios’s momentum. Averoff highlighted the
problems of poverty, hunger, and homelessness in Greece and told
Makarios of his concern for the Greek minority in Istanbul. Both the
Greek economy and the Istanbul minority would be threatened by pressing
the cause of enosis. The
Archbishop dismissed Averoff’s arguments. The liberty of Greeks, he
said, took precedence over their living standards; and the Greeks living
in Istanbul were doomed to destruction regardless of events of in
Cyprus. Averoff was shocked, later writing that Makarios’s words had
stabbed him in the heart. Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek Prime
Minister from October 1955, did convey to Makarios his willingness to
help, but like Averoff, Karamanlis warned the Archbishop that the
outlook for enosis was
unpromising and that Makarios needed to be more realistic. These concerns meant that
enosis was pursued cautiously
by the Greek Government. Pressure, particularly from Makarios, boxed
Greece into supporting an armed struggle. Although arms and supplies did
eventually come to Cyprus from Athens, Grivas, at least according to his
memoirs, was never satisfied with the small amounts. He pressured
figures in the Greek Government constantly for more material and
diplomatic support. Grivas did not, however, pressure the government in
Athens for men. The EOKA struggle was conducted entirely by
Greek-Cypriots for Greek-Cypriots. Only one or two Greek nationals
appear to have been directly involved in EOKA operations in the 1950s.
Grivas wanted only Cypriots to participate in the struggle. Grivas
explained his choice as follows, and I quote from his
Memoirs: “I
had decided to use only Cypriots in the fight, to show the world that
our campaign was purely Cypriot in origin and conduct; I knew, besides,
that if I began recruiting men on the Greek mainland, the secret would
be all over Athens in a few days.” Grivas had his own clear ideas about what the men
would be used for. His views, however, were in apparent conflict with
the wishes of Makarios. The historical record shows that the Archbishop
favored of a short campaign of sabotage, bombing and harassment.
Fighters would be armed only with explosives and grenades and would
target buildings instead of individuals. Such operations, Makarios felt,
would convince the British to abandon Cyprus. Grivas, however, knew the
British better. The colonel planned a long struggle involving guerrilla
operations, targeted assassination and political murder. He hoped to
inflict real damage on the British security services and to draw a
strong response from the British Government. Repressive measures in
Cyprus would create international pressure against the British
occupation. This “moral defeat,” combined with Britain’s inability to
maintain control of the situation would eventually force the British
out. Grivas’s assessment was far closer to the mark. However, neither
Grivas nor Makarios seemed to take much account of the third obstacle to
enosis – Turkey and the
Turkish-Cypriots. The twin forces of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots
were the most formidable forces against
enosis. Their demands were
furthest from what Makarios or Grivas were willing to accept. Of the
two, the Turkish-Cypriots seem to have been even less compromising in
relation to any potential settlement. Turkish-Cypriots pushed for
Turkish arms and Turkish military advisers to create the Turkish
Resistance Organization (TMT) in 1958; they renounced partition only
with the greatest reluctance in 1959; and they insisted that a
detachment of Turkish troops in Cyprus be part of the final peace
settlement. The attitude of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots
towards enosis was always
negative. Turkish-Cypriots feared that they would become second-class
citizens in a Greek Cyprus. Turkey argued that a Greek-controlled Cyprus
would complete a hostile encirclement threatening it both economically
and militarily. This view was based on the Turkish Government’s latent
mistrust of the Greek Government both as a former adversary and as a
potential communist state. Even though the Greek Civil War had ended in
victory for the anti-communist forces, many senior people in the Turkish
military and government continued to regard the Greek regime as weak and
the communists as waiting in the wings. In March 1951, the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mehmet Koprulu confided to the British Ambassador in Ankara
that the Turkish Government’s longstanding policy was to “refuse to
admit the existence of a problem” in Cyprus as long as they were assured
that Britain would not leave the island. Turkey’s relative restraint on
the Cyprus issue before 1955 was not indifference, but political
posturing. As events in Cyprus picked up, so did Turkey’s vocal
opposition to the idea of enosis. Just a month after Koprulu’s statement
[April 1951], the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Andrew Wright reported that a
Turkish-Cypriot delegation had requested an interview to express their
“anxiety… over enosis and ‘to request whether anything could be done’ to
alleviate the great uneasiness felt by local Turks on this account.”
Once violence began in April of 1955 the Turkish position hardened. In
Turkey there was open hostility towards
enosis and concern that the
British Government would abandon the Turkish-Cypriots by making
unfavorable concession to the
enosis movement. The concerns of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots
represented real divides between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and
between the Greek and Turkish Governments. I believe that these
divisions have been minimized by many contemporary historians in favor
of the more standard view that British manipulation led to the conflict
between Greek and Turkish interests over Cyprus. I would make two points
on this. First, on a grand strategic level, the British wanted to avoid
conflict between Greece and Turkey at all costs. Cyprus was a potential
flashpoint for this. Any Greco-Turkish hostility was a threat to the
stability of the Eastern Mediterranean, to NATO, and to Britain’s
position in the Middle East. Britain took a particularly strong stance
over Cyprus because of their larger goals in the region. It is illogical
to argue that they would actively undermine this position by drawing
Greece and Turkey into conflict with each other. Various members of the
British Government did encourage Turkish officials to speak up about
Cyprus in the international arena. This was done to soften the effect of
Greek action at the United Nations. It’s hard to imagine that this sort
of diplomatic maneuvering damaged Greco-Turkish relations (including the
relations of Greeks and Turks in Cyprus) more than the violence
initiated and carried out by EOKA. It’s often argued that the British recruitment of
Turkish-Cypriot policemen was unambiguous evidence of divide and rule. I
want to mention the following facts about the Cyprus Police Force to get
a full understanding of the situation. First, Turkish-Cypriots
represented a disproportionate percentage of the force from the time the
British took control of the island. Under the Ottomans, security was
exclusively in the hands of the Turkish minority. The British brought
Greek-Cypriots into the force. If they had wanted divide and rule, they
would have left the force entirely Turkish as they found it. At the end
of 1954, 61% of the force was Greek-Cypriot, well below the population
majority of 80% but still a substantial majority. When the EOKA campaign began, Greek-Cypriots began
leaving the force in large numbers. Some left because they sympathized
with EOKA, others because they feared EOKA. By the end of 1956, the
proportions had essential been reversed and 60% of the regular force was
Turkish Cypriot. This inversion happened in spite of slight increases in
overall police strength because too few Greek-Cypriots volunteered for
service. The British Government in Cyprus needed to increase the size of
the police force to deal with EOKA. With almost no Greek-Cypriots to
recruit they accepted many more Turkish-Cypriot applicants. British
policymakers were not happy with this outcome and actively recruited
British policemen from across the Empire, including from Britain itself.
By the end of 1957, Turkish-Cypriots had decreased to less than half the
force while British policemen had increased to 18%. By the end of 1958,
only 47% of the force was Turkish and 22% was British. Finally, it is important to remember that the
violence between the two communities during the summer of 1958 was not
sparked by the British. A bomb planted by Turkish-Cypriots at the
Turkish ministry of information sparked the violence in the summer of
1958. Britain and Greece were appalled by the cynical and dangerous act.
Turks naturally blamed Greek-Cypriots, but British and American
intelligence had evidence that Turkish-Cypriots had planted the bomb.
Rauf Denktash has subsequently admitted this fact. It is another example
of how Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots were genuinely against
enosis. They were willing to do anything to defeat it. In the end, a
combination of fear, violence, diplomacy and political expediency
defeated the enosis cause in
Cyprus. The agreement of 1960 prohibited
enosis, but the cause was not
officially abandoned until after the invasion of 1974. The three outside obstacles to
enosis that I’ve mentioned all
have corollaries in today’s political landscape. Although the British
Government gave up sovereignty over the whole island, it has kept
sovereign bases. They remain an important component of projecting
British power in the region. The Suez crisis of 1956 showed that Britain
cannot necessarily act in the region against the wishes of the United
States. It can act with tacit American support or in support of American
operations, as in the two Iraq wars. Britain also relies heavily on its
alliance with Turkey for leverage in the region. In solving the Cyprus
problem, the importance of that relationship, as in the 1950s, will tilt
Britain towards the Turkish position. Greece retains the caution towards Cyprus that it
demonstrated in the 1950s. As a member of the EU and NATO it has worked
hard to improve relations with Turkey, especially in recent years.
Greece has adopted the view that if Turkey meets EU entry conditions
fully then it will have the full support of Greece for membership.
Greece is once again in the position of balancing its sympathy for the
Greek Cypriot cause with its desire to maintain good relations with
Turkey. Greece’s relationship with Turkey is a priority for the
government in Athens. It will be interesting to see how that priority is
balanced with achieving a solution in Cyprus. Turkey’s position today is even more complicated. The
invasion of 1974 allowed the Turkish Government to create the de-facto
partition of the island that it had hoped for since the 1950s. Turkey’s
continued military presence in Cyprus, the issue of settlers and
property have created thorny problems for both Turkey and the EU.
Turkey’s bid for EU entry has factors much larger than Cyprus, but
Cyprus remains a key part of the equation. Simply put, the EU will have
enormous trouble continuing to move forward with the entry of a country
which occupies part of a member state. This will be a test of strength
between European and Turkish resolve over the importance of Cyprus. I
would be cautious, however, about thinking that the EU will
automatically solve the Cyprus problem in favor of Greek-Cypriots. After
all, Turkey was not prohibited from beginning its negotiations because
of the occupation of Cyprus. A solution, if it comes, may not be the
kind of solution that most Greek-Cypriots hope for. The final version of
the Annan Plan of 2004 was emphatically rejected by Greek-Cypriots even
though the EU (including Greece), the United States, Turkey, and the
Turkish-Cypriots were all in favor of it. And Greek-Cypriots were openly
criticized in these circles for their vote. This indicates that the rest
of the world defines a ‘fair’ compromise in ways significantly different
from the majority of Greek-Cypriots. It remains to be seen just what Turkey’s goal in
Cyprus will be moving forward. Some are content with the status quo – de
facto partition. Painting Greek-Cypriots as rejectionist after the
referendum in 2004, these forces are gradually moving to end the
isolation of the north. They have little desire for a solution that
would return sovereignty to a Greek-Cypriot majority. Demographic
changes in the north based on high birth rates and immigration from
Turkey represent another problem for Greek-Cypriots. With each passing
year, immigrants from Turkey become more a part of Cyprus. Getting them
to leave is progressively more difficult. The 80/20 population split is
a thing of the past. Many European leaders are skeptical about Turkish
entry in the EU for reasons beyond the Cyprus issue. It serves their
interest to use the Cyprus problem cynically, drawing it out to prevent
Turkey’s accession, while avoiding more controversial issues such as
Turkey’s religion or poverty. In many ways, Turkey is facing key
decisions. Obstinate militarism and the occupation of an EU member
contradict Turkey’s attempts to portray itself as a modernizing and
progressive nation which truly belongs in Europe. As in the 1950s, Cypriots face several options. Some
are more realistic than others.
Enosis in 1955 was unrealistic. I believe Cypriots paid a high price
for pursuing that course. Confronted with the political realities of
today, Cypriots will have to choose a more realistic approach than in
the 1950s if the problem is to be solved in their favor. Membership in
the EU and the reluctance many European countries have about Turkey’s EU
membership are positive starting points for the Greek-Cypriot position.
However, the obstacles should not be discounted. Turkey remains an
important ally for many European countries and for the United States.
There is a de-facto partition of the island, 40,000 occupying troops,
and deteriorating demographics. If Greek-Cypriot political leaders do
not wish to accept the status quo, they face three basic choices. The
first is to put their faith in the EU. Cypriot politicians can hope that
the EU will support better terms than what has previously been offered
by the United Nations. Perhaps Brussels’ entry requirements for Turkey
and rulings in favor of Greek-Cypriots, combined with diplomatic
pressure will force Turkey to compromise. Second, Greek-Cypriot
politicians can try and return to the plan rejected in 2004. They can
try to generate public support for it, arguing that the familiar, if
flawed, terms of the Annan Plan are better than an unknown solution at
an unknown future date. Third, they can chart a new course, create new
alliances and partnerships and press to change the balance of opinion
about Cyprus globally. It would require enormous diplomatic work and
effort, but perhaps countries could be shifted countries away from
Turkey and towards the Cypriot point of view. The choice, in the end, is one of values. In the
1950s, most Greek-Cypriots supported EOKA in a struggle for
enosis.
Enosis was pursued because
becoming part of the Greek state was more valuable to Greek-Cypriots
than their security, their prosperity, or peace. The cause was defeated
largely because the goal of enosis
was uncompromising and out of step with the realities of the situation.
The choices of today are also a question of values: the importance of a
Greek identity in Cyprus, the trust in the EU and its institutions, and
the willingness to reach out to new partners to solve an old problem. Whatever the course, it should not be chosen lightly.
The problems confronting Cyprus today are real. A poor choice could lead
to another fifty years of turmoil. In spite of this, the right approach,
if it can be found and pursued, promises security, stability, and
prosperity in ways that Cypriots have never known. |
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International Affairs Copyright © 2009. All rights reserved |
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