Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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Iran: An on-going Challenge after Thirty Years of Revolution By Farid Mirbagheri
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Associate Professor Department of European Studies and International Relations, University of Nicosia Dialogue Chair in Middle Eastern Studies |
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Four relevant events in the modern history of Iran should be noted at
the outset: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906, where the United
Kingdom appeared to side with those in favour of establishing
Majles (parliament).
The occupation of part of Iranian territory by the Soviet forces after
the WW II and their eventual withdrawal from the country by the strong
support of the United States and the brinkmanship of the Iranian Prime
Minister at the time,
Qavam. The
nationalisation of Iranian Oil Industry by the Iranian Prime Minister,
Mosaddegh, and the
subsequent coup in 1953, engineered by the UK and the US, to remove him
from power; and the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79. In the first three
instances Iranians seemed to know what they sought whereas in the last
they appeared to know what they did not want. In all the cases some form
of overt or covert external hand attempting to engineer and/or influence
(the course of) events seems to have been at play.
Internal Challenges
Two important domestic challenges have beset the Islamic system in Iran
since its foundation three decades ago. First is the question of
modernity in its political form, i.e. who does sovereignty in the
political realm lie with? God or people? Does the ineffable word of the
Almighty revealed by and through His Messenger constitute the framework
within which political action may be formulated? Or is it the will of
the majority that should form the basis for governance? The second
challenge is the rule of
Shari’a as it was devised many centuries ago. The applicability
of Shari’a has in
itself posed an important question on the historicity of humanity; if
rules devised one thousand four hundred years ago for a specific group
of people under specific circumstances can and should be generalised to
all of the people all of the time, the axiomatic conclusion would be
that humanity is a standard immutable pattern of behaviour throughout
time and history. i.e. humankind is an ahistorical creature. Real life
examples of the rule of
Shari’a in our time such as the Taliban Afghanistan and the
current day Sudan offer poor models to emulate.
In short the question of rationality vs
Shari’a (the former
focused on national interests but the latter on religious interests) has
dominated the underlying philosophical debate in the Islamic Republic.
Can such religious dictums as ‘economy without interest’ or the
polarisation of humanity into good and evil be practical guides to human
governance in the twenty First Century? The so-called ‘reformist
movement’ had a poor attempt at reconciling rationality with
religiosity. First led by Khatami as president, aided by a ‘reformist’
parliament, the movement sought to present ‘religious democracy’ as the
practical Islamic alternative to Western democracy. The Movement failed
spectacularly because it lacked clarity of goals and means to achieve
those goals (no one has been able to explain or understand what
‘religious democracy’ really means); also the hurdles put in its way by
the more conservative forces contributed to its losing support.
External Challenges
The fundamental external challenge for the Iranian system, emanating
from the domestic challenge, has been the pursuit of ideological goals
(religion is ideologised) in the era of national interests. The most
dramatic failure of this discourse was illustrated by the collapse of
the Soviet Union some twenty years ago.
In more concrete terms it is the enmity expressed by the Iranian rulers
against the United States that gives shape to this challenge. The
question for the Iranian government is why thirty years of
anti-Americanism? Has it
served the ideology or the national interest of Iran? On the face of it
at least, the USA has appeared to act in line with ideological and
national interests of Iran as predicated by the Islamic Republic. The
Bosnian question, the ousting of the Taliban and the deposing of Saddam
lend evidence to this proposition. Reportedly the only foreigner killed
for Iranian constitutionalism was an American called Howard Baskerville.
The consequences of this enmity have been many for Iran and Iranian
people: Iran has been kept of the World Trade Organisation; it seriously
lacks spare parts for its commercial and fighter planes leading to much
higher black market prices paid by iran; kept out of international fora
such as the UN Security Council and deprived of Iranian assets frozen in
the US since the hostage crisis.
Of course this anti-Americanism must be welcome by US competitors. After
all Iran has the fourth largest oil reserves and the second largest gas
reserves in the world. It is located strategically overlooking the
Persian Gulf and the straits of
Hormoz. Over seventy
million Iranians provide a potentially valuable market.
It was with regard to the above that a reported Grand Deal was offered
by Tehran to Washington in 2003. Allegedly the Deal proposed cessation
of Iranian support for Hamas and Hizbollah, recognition of Israel if the
latter left the Occupied Territories and granting access to IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors for full and unlimited
inspection of nuclear sites. In return the Islamic Republic asked for
security guarantees from the United States (US having demonstrated the
ability to dislodge regimes through sheer military prowess such as in
former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq)), lifting of sanctions, removal
of Islamic Republic’s name from the Axis of Evil and allowing European
investment in Iran (in 2003 after the ousting of Saddam, Iran had
reportedly stopped all nuclear activities in fear of US military
reprisals). The Deal is said to have been delivered by a Swiss Diplomat
to Washington, who was reportedly reprimanded for having undertaken this
task. Washington reportedly rejected the Grand Deal.
Two other attempts, one by former US President Reagan in 1980s and one
by former Iranian President Rafsanjani in 1995, to mend fences between
the two countries were inconclusive. It remains to be seen if diplomatic
manoeuvres in Tehran and Washington are enough in themselves to turn a
new leaf or that more fundamental changes are required to bring that
effect.
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