Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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The Shot Not Yet Heard Round the World By Andrew Novo
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D. Phil Candidate in Modern History, University of Oxford |
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The censuring of Iran by the United Nations
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 27 November shines the
world spotlight on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program once again.
Later that day, the former Israeli ambassador to the UN, Dan Gillerman
expressed satisfaction with the move, but also argued that it had come
very late in the game. Gillerman went on to explain that there were two
clocks in play, the diplomatic clock, and the clock counting down to a
nuclear-armed Iran. The former ambassador had no doubt that the latter
was moving more quickly.
Expectations that Israel will strike Iranian nuclear facilities remain
common. A poll in the Israeli newspaper
Ha’aretz from April 2009
showed that 66% percent of Israelis approve of military action against
Iran. An article in the
Jerusalem Post from 3 September insisted in no uncertain terms
that the time had come for Israelis to act before Iran develops nuclear
weapons and threatens a second Holocaust. How realistic is such an
attack by Israel? More importantly, what would it mean if it happened?
On
one level, it is easy to imagine Israeli air-strikes designed to
destroy, or at least slow, Iran’s nuclear development. Israel undertook
precisely the same sort of action in 2007, destroying a North-Korean
built nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert. More famously, in June 1981
fourteen Israeli F-16s, specially modified for the operation, flew over
Saudi Arabia and into Iraq where they succeeded in inflicting heavy
damage on the French-built Osirak reactor. They were back in Israel
before the Iraqi air force could respond. International condemnation
rained down on Tel Aviv, but soon subsided. Iraq, already engaged in its
massive eight-year war with Iran, was unable to respond aggressively.
The
apparent success of these operations should not blind us to the reality
that a similar attack on Iran would involve far greater difficulties.
Iran today is not Iraq in 1981. The regime in Tehran is not distracted
by another major conflict; it would able to strike back against Israel
directly using mid-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads;
it could also encourage Hizbollah to launch attacks from Lebanon. Iran
has a sophisticated air-defense system utilizing new technologies from
powerful trading partners. As opposed to the single Iraqi reactor, there
are several known Iranian nuclear sites.
Reports from within Israel are that the IAF has once again prepared a
group of specially modified attack aircraft that will have the capacity
to strike targets in Iran. An unconfirmed press leak suggested that the
Israeli government approached the Bush administration in its final days
for approval to use Iraqi airspace and that permission had been denied.
The
strike, however, may not come through an air operation modeled on
‘Operation Opera’. Israel is also a more powerful today than in 1981.
The Israeli navy has a number of missile warships as well as several
submarines which are capable of launching missiles and could, in the
last resort, arm them with nuclear warheads. The type of strike
necessary to neutralize Iran’s nuclear ambitions would undoubtedly
combine a sea-to-land launch with an air assault and would be the most
significant combat operation by Israel since the 1973 war.
The
hard-fought war in 1973, coming only six years after Israel’s famous
six-day triumph, scarred many Israelis. Israel’s victory was only
achieved at great cost, and land was returned to Egypt as part of the
subsequent peace agreement. The 1973 war also had an economic cost.
During the war, OPEC slashed production and sent the price of oil
skyrocketing. An oil embargo was launched against nations which
supported Israel, particularly the United States. In combination with
the 1973-74 stock market crash, the oil crisis caused major pain in the
world financial system.
The
global effects of a conflict in 2009 or 2010 would be just as severe if
not greater than those in 1973. If it chooses to attack Iran, Israel can
expect a conflict as difficult and costly as the war in 1973. The world
can expect another energy crisis in tandem with a major stock market
crash. In combination with the financial problems already confronting
the world’s economies, the effects could be disastrous. Israel’s leaders
undoubtedly understand the magnitude of the challenge confronting them.
For this reason, it is logical to assume that they will remain prudent
regarding the direct use of force against Iran. European leaders
currently partnering with the United States in an attempt to find a
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue understand these realities, as
does the United States.
If Israeli, European, and Americans leaders
understand this reality, Iranian leaders do as well. They expect that
the application of any punitive military measures to limit their nuclear
capabilities is simply too costly to be attempted. With the credibility
of the threat of force in question, Western leverage is slipping away
and with it, the hope of preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle
East.
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International Affairs Copyright © 2009. All rights reserved
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