Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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HIGH DEMAND FOR A REFORM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: A VIEW FROM MOSCOW By Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova
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Head of the Department on European Political Studies, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russia Academy of Sciences |
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The Russian-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia has shown that none of
the existing security institutions, called to resolve such conflicts,
appeared capable to effectively execute the duties. The UN Security
Council was not able to react to the South Caucasus crisis in a
constructive and result-oriented way having plunged in futile
discussions. The NATO under the pressure of the USA has unequivocally
taken the part of Georgia in the conflict. OSCE – the key facilitator of
the conflict resolution process– has appeared paralyzed. The European
Union (EU), strictly speaking, not being the security organization and
not having security space separate from the NATO, has appeared the
unique international partner of Russia, which under its own initiative
has taken a difficult intermediary mission in the conflict. The very
threat of a big conflict around Ukraine, which could become the
beginning of a new confrontation in Europe, has revived in the West
discussions about President Medvedev's initiative on a new European
security architecture. This initiative was launched in June 2008 and in
November 2009 it took a form of the Draft Treaty.
Medvedev proposal as well as the Draft Treaty has caused an ambiguous
reaction in the West. Some observers have compared it with the
Soviet-like peaceful initiatives: “say something glamorous first, and
worry about implementation later.”
Other Western politicians and political analysts have regarded this
proposal as Moscow’s attempts to drive a wedge between USA and Europe.
But in reality it was a message to the West to do the job the
international community was supposed to do after the end of the Cold War
when the old binary security system was destroyed but nothing was
created to replace it. However the Draft treaty has at least two soft
spots.
First, it addresses only one of the fundamental contradictions of the
post-bipolar era, namely the contradiction between the right of nations
to freely choose and join security alliances and the right of nations to
oppose the expansion of the security alliances when they are perceived
as a threat to national security. But it ignores two other fundamental
contradictions - the contradiction between the principle of territorial
integrity and the right of nations for self-determination and the
contradiction between the right of nations for sovereignty
(non-interference in the domestic affairs of the states) and the right
of nations for humanitarian intervention. It would be worthwhile to
revise the Helsinki Final Act and define what is still topical, what
could be changed or amended.
Second, the Draft Treaty does not address the question
about a new security architecture itself. The postbipolar architecture
of the European security is a chaotic heap of old and new institutes,
without clear division of roles and functions between them that assumes
rivalry of institutes and leads to a paralysis of all security system.
Neither Russia, nor the West wants to destroy the existing security
institutions or to build a new one.
It looks that the optimal solution can be found within the context of a
new distribution of roles and functions between the existing
institutions and formats in line with the main directions of the
European security – economic and energy security, external security of
Europe, internal security, humanitarian and international law aspects of
security.
It is obvious
that the UN will remain the main international umbrella security
institution. As far as the European security is concerned, the OSCE
functions in the fields of economic and military security should be
given to other institutions which are better suited to perform these
missions. The OSCE is to be responsible for the international law and
humanitarian problems in close cooperation with the Council of Europe.
The basis for economic and energy security in Europe should be the EU-Russia
cooperation, and in a broader context between the EU, Russia, Ukraine
and Turkey with the partnership of EuroAsEc when needed. It would be
worthwhile to adopt a Single Energy Charter based on
the energy
interests
of
producers, consumers and transit countries as well as on the common
energy system, which would strengthen
security and exclude conflicts in this sphere. Such a
system should be built on the long term legally binding basis with
common rules of arbitrage. It will be called upon to implement primarily
the projects aimed at ending the “arms race through pipelines” and to
work out a model of partnership participation in the energy distribution
systems of each other and the development of new fields in
hard-of-access areas of the mainland or offshore.
Security within European region, first and foremost conflict prevention
and conflict resolution in Wider Europe as well as fight with extremism
can be assured through cooperation of the EU (in the context of ESDP)
with Russia and other CIS states gravitating to EU. Formation of common
rapid reaction forces for peace enforcement and peacekeeping would be
required for achieving these goals. Aside from this, new international
mechanisms of monitoring, arbitrage and intermediary should be created.
The external security of Europe, first and foremost, counter-measures
against proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, should be
achieved through cooperation of NATO/US and Russia (NATO-Russia Council)
with participation of CSTO for resolving security problems in Central
Asia and
Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
(SCO) in the Far East. This cannot be achieved without
radical changes in the NATO-Russia relations, the NATO recognition of
CSTO and anew common security strategy.
Of course, such a system won’t appear overnight. Today even in Russia,
which has initiated this grand design, there is no broad political
consensus on the debated issues, not to mention EU and NATO. However the
existing problems do not mean that the goal of new European security
architecture cannot be achieved by definition. No doubt, it is always
easier to criticize than to make concrete proposals. If the NATO members
are concerned about Moscow’s efforts to marginalize the Alliance, they
must engage frequently in strategic discussions with Russia on key
security challenges and present their own views on the post-bipolar
architecture. Their reactive negative position on Russia’s initiative
will be viewed in Moscow as just new evidence to the fact that the West
does not want to change anything being quite satisfied with the existing
security model.
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