Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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WHO WILL MEDIATE BETWEEN TURKEY AND ISRAEL? By Anat Lapidot-Firilla
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Senior research fellow and the academy director, Mediterranean unit of The Van Leer Jerusalem Insitute |
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The behavior of Israel’s deputy foreign minister, Danny Ayalon, toward
Turkish Ambassador Ahmed Oğuz Çelikkol, greatly embarrassed the Israeli
public. The public’s argument is not with Ayalon’s message – that the
Israeli government has reached the limits of its patience toward the
unrestrained verbal attacks against Israel by Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu – but rather
with the way the message was conveyed. The Israeli public, as well as
Cabinet ministers and senior officials in the Foreign Ministry, are
embarrassed by the pathetic manner in which their protest was presented.
Their embarrassment is strongly reminiscent of the discomfiture of many
Turks by the behavior of their prime minister at Davos. Whereas most of
them agreed with the criticism of Israel over its actions in Gaza, they
recoiled from the populist and emotional style of their prime minister.
Following the incident, members of the Turkish elite analyzed the psyche
and behavioral problems of their leader. In both cases, senior
representatives exhibited behavior that is out of line with the manners
and comportment of the "civilized" Westerner who, no matter what the
context, remains polite.
The two countries are similar not only in the public’s reaction but also
in the fact that their foreign policy is tightly linked to domestic
policy and politics. In Turkey, because of legal limitations, the
foreign arena has become a place where religious agendas and imperialist
dreams can be expressed freely. In addition, criticism of Israel
provides an opportunity to criticize the Kemalist military
establishment, which is seen as promoting immoral relations with the
Israeli military establishment. As criticism of Israel increases, the
legitimacy of the military decreases. In Israel, Turkey serves as a
means of goading extremist parties and politicians, such as Foreign
Minister Avigdor Lieberman. The Israeli press uses Turkey to serve its
political agenda of promoting talks with Syria and – at the local level
– to besmirch Lieberman’s rightist party and to advance the interests of
centrist parties, Labor and Kadima, as well as the interests of the
defense industry. However, the attitude of Labor Party politicians
toward Turkey is no less patronizing and embarrassing than Lieberman’s.
The declarations of Industry, Trade and Labor Minister and Labor MK
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer have given rise to the mistaken perception that he
will “repair” relations between the countries – not by changing Israeli
policy, but rather by “explaining” the situation to the Turks. However,
even Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s trip to Turkey, covered in press
reports that contrasted him favorably with Lieberman, did not improve
relations between the countries and certainly did not tone down Turkish
declarations against Israel. Perhaps Barak’s visit will bring some
improvement to the defense industry, but it is a pity that the analysis
of relations between the two countries should be limited to patterns of
behavior and colored by domestic politics.
We are witnessing complex diplomatic processes. One of the goals of
Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdoğan and his energetic foreign
minister, Davutoğlu, is to improve Turkey’s standing in the
international arena. If Turkey wants to become an important country,
Davutoğlu claims it must free itself of its dependence on the United
States and build psychological strength and power. While Turkey is
failing with regard to the European Union, is forced to give up its
assets and claims in northern Iraq, and is making no progress on the
Cyprus question, the Turkish press and Turkish politicians are talking
about transforming Turkey into a regional power. Not a day passes
without an article that repeats the slogan, “Turkey is an important
country.” Turkey, it is repeatedly argued, is the key to turning the
European Union into an effective organization; without its mediation,
the Islamic and Western cultures will clash; and only Turkey can lead to
regional peace and mediate between the hawks in the region.
A strategic change in Turkey’s foreign policy is linked to the
disappearance of the United States as a significant player in the
region. Obama’s policy is ethical and correct, but only in theory. Talks
instead of conflict, regional treaties instead of the hegemony of a
superpower – this policy has restored the ethical standing of the United
States for the moment. But in the long run, it is precisely this policy
that will lead the region to a clash, and the relations between Israel
and Turkey are the clearest manifestation of this process. Turkey’s
desire to free itself from dependence on the United States has led to
the building up of the Russian alternative and a regional treaty with
Arab countries, including Syria. The treaty that was meant to promote
Turkish economic interests is wrapped in an alternative ideology that is
similar to Obama’s rhetoric: peace and negotiations instead of conflict.
Turkey’s independent stance in its foreign policy and the breaking of
the isolation of Syria in the service of Turkish interests have harmed
both American and Israeli objectives. Unsuccessful in promoting peace
between Israel and Syria, they have damaged relations between Israel and
Turkey. The new doctrine of the Turkish foreign policy has changed
Israel from a strategic ally to a competitor. This policy was adopted
long before the war in Gaza. It reflects a new world view, both in
ideological and practical terms, that encourages Turkey’s activism in
the entire region, from Bosnia to the Caucasus and from the Black Sea to
the Gulf of Suez. It is linked to the disappearance of an alternative of
Arab leadership in the Middle East and the transformation of the Turko-Persian
arena to the dominant one in the region, replacing the Arab one. This
activism becomes aggressive in places where Turkey has failed to
convince others of its role and abilities. The Turkish offers to mediate
between Israel and Syria, for example, have in the past year become a
persistent demand, which incorporates a demand for recognition of the
right of Turkey to be involved in the region because of its imperial
Ottoman history. While Western countries are trying to erase their
colonialist past, Turkey is trying to revive it.
The Islamic populism of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, goes
well with the demands for a place under the sun in the international
arena. Both derive from the feeling that the Muslim world is not
sufficiently recognized internationally and is not adequately
represented in international institutions. The United Nations, for
example, in which Turkey now has a seat on the Security Council, has
become a platform for Turkey’s attempts to raise its status while
transmitting to Turkish constituents a sense of greatness. Perhaps the
most worrisome characteristic of Turkish politics today is "Putinization."
The Russian model has been adopted and the new regime has made the
Turkish press its captive. Those who dare to criticize the government
and its diplomatic line are prosecuted and subject to disproportionate
fines. The Dogan Group fine of $2.5 billion should have served as a
wake-up call. Freedom of expression in Turkey exists only among those
who toe the government’s line.
Turkey may not be the one to teach Israel how to behave toward
minorities and others. However, this fact does not mitigate Israel’s
unwillingness to accept legitimate criticism of its use of excessive
power toward Palestinians. Reinstating the peace process will give the
Israelis and the Palestinians hope and will restore Israel’s
international standing. And as for relations with Turkey, it appears
that the desire of Israel’s defense establishment to export defense
merchandise is more powerful than any other consideration. That is a
pity. Relations cannot be based on the desire to export defense
products. Understanding the aims of Turkish foreign policy as well as
the subtleties of its domestic politics will help create a realistic
policy. Turkey, too, must better understand the domestic politics of
Israel. Turkish concepts do not always translate well to Israeli ears.
Erdoğan’s attempts to explain that he is not against the Israeli people
but rather against the Israeli state or government are drawn from the
traditional Turkish distinction between the people and the state, which
dates to the 1950s. In Israel the words are interpreted differently. As
long as there is no mutual recognition of a different conceptual world,
and in the absence of similar interests and suitable foreign policies,
it would be worthwhile to search for someone to mediate between Turkey
and Israel. |
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