Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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SYSTEMS OF ORDER AND SYSTEMS OF SECURITY By Melanie Antoniou
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Jean Monnet Post-Doctoral Fellow, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - European University Insitute |
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The historical evolution of political systems into
three main patterns of order – pre-modern, modern and post-modern – has
carried with it an analogous evolution of the security systems. However,
the historical evolution has never been clear cut, that is why, in the
current international political and security systems, and their regional
subsystems, coexist elements of pre-modern, modern and post-modern
orders. Robert Cooper’s (2003) analysis of the three
historical models of order paves the way for an understanding of the
interrelation between political systems and security systems, as well as
the coexistence of different systems in the same era. Very briefly, the
pre-modern order represents the political system before the
establishments of the rules and norms of the Treaty of Westphalian
(1648). Within the pre-modern order, states form a ‘loose’ structure
without a clear or sufficient sovereign authority, while they are under
the hierarchical order of another dominant power (empire). Thereby,
‘states’’ security is connected and guaranteed by that dominant power.
The modern order represents the emergence of the secular, sovereign,
nation state. As a logical consequence of the need for the sovereign
state to be protected, the modern order poses a framework of inter-state
relations based on the Westphalian ordering principles of anarchy,
balance of power (or bandwagoning within intergovernmental
institutions), non-intervention, the separation of domestic and foreign
affairs, and the rule of law. In contrast, the post-modern order is
based on a different set of rules and norms. Within the post-modern
order, international security does not rely on balance or bandwagoning,
whilst inter-state relations are based on democratic principles such as
consensus, dialogue, transparency, openness, and mutual interference. In
that sense, state sovereignty accepts international constraints, as it
is pooled within supranational institutions. The main pattern
of the current international order as it was established after the end
of the Second World War and reconfirmed with some adjustments after the
collapse of the Soviet Union is characterized by the
institutionalization (of an intergovernmental structure) of political
life. That is, for instance, the United Nations is the fundamental
pillar of the current political system, while its Security Council forms
the security system of the current international order. The UN is based
on the principles of sovereign equality (UN Charter art. 2.1) and
non-intervention (UN Charter, art. 2.7), however, the only body within
the UN system, which is empowered to recognize the threats, to decide
and enforce international peace and security is the Security Council (UN
Charter arts. 39-51), which is dominated by the five permanent members
(US, Russia, China, UK, France). In fact, the ‘big five’ system creates
‘a hierarchy at the UN, with the five permanent members of the Security
Council having a special status that gives them the right to veto any UN
action that they find objectionable’ (Ryan, 2000: 158); a reality that
results in the creation of ‘a conventional system of power politics’
(Whittaker, 1997: 5). Therefore, under any means, the UN system
maintains, first and foremost, the ordering principles of modernity.
Similarly, at a regional level, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) maintains the ordering principles of
modernity. The only well
developed exception from modernity towards post-modernity is seen at a
regional level and is related to the EU system of governance, even
though it includes some striking paradoxes. For, the EU incorporates, at
once and the same time, rules and norms that are related to
post-modernity, modernity and, even yet, to pre-modernity. On the one
hand, due to the EU’s peculiar pillar structure, its institutions appear
to have significant variations on their allocation of power and
competences among the different policies. Therefore, the EU’s
institutional structure weds supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.
As a fact and, as opposed to the supranational first pillar policies,
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its integral part the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which form the second pillar
of the EU, are conducted on an intergovernmental institutional setting
and principles that enable mainly the most powerful member states to
staunchly preserve their sovereignty and pursue their interests in an
interplay of balancing and counterbalancing both within the EU and on
the international stage. That intergovernmental character of the CFSP/CSDP
‘is confirmed and even strengthened by the new (Lisbon) treaty’ (Missiroli,
2008: 6). On the other hand,
Cyprus creates another paradox within the EU, given that it remains the
only member state that has an ‘in-out’ status within the CSDP, but also
because it is the only member state that inserts elements of a
pre-modern order within the EU due to its guarantors system of defence
and security. In other words, Cyprus is the only member state into which
has been imposed significant limitations on its sovereignty in favour of
other dominant powers and as a part of a regional power politics game,
and not as a concession to a supranational institution, which, at the
very least, would be an evolutionary step towards post-modern rules of
governance. The potential continuation of the guarantors system in
Cyprus would have significant and multiple consequences to different
actors. First, it would bring permanent functional implications in the
making and development of certain EU policies. Moreover, it would become
a permanent stigma on the EU’s post-modern normative structure, and not
in favour of modernism, but in favour of pre-modernism. Second, given
that Greece has already expressed its willingness to withdraw from the
guarantors system, it would be difficult for the UK, a member state of
the EU and a fervour supporter of its enlargement, to justify its
persistence on such old fashion ordering principles and security systems
in the region, moreover, when they come at the expense of another member
state. Similarly, it would be difficult for Turkey, a candidate member,
to justify its pre-modern policies in the region and, in particular on a
small neighbour state like Cyprus, an already member of the EU.
References: Cooper, Robert (2003), The breaking of nations:
order and chaos in the twenty-first century, London: Atlantic. Missiroli, Antonio (2008), The Impact of the Lisbon
Treaty on ESDP, Directorate General External Policies of the Union,
European Parliament, Briefing Paper, EXPO/B/SEDE/2007/50, Brussels, 31
January 2008. Ryan, Stephen (2000), The United Nations and
International Politics, Houndmills: Macmillan. Whittaker, David J. (1997), United Nations in the
Contemporary World, London: Routledge. |
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