Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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THE PROXIMITY TALKS: NO SPECIAL REASON FOR CELEBRATION
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Faculty
in the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation in Bar-Ilan
University and Research Associate at the York Center for International and Security Studies in York University |
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Once again, the Israelis and the Palestinians are about to engage in
negotiations, this time in the format of 'proximity talks' mediated by
the United States. Will these talks finally lead to the resolution of
the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict? There is a good reason to
doubt that they will. After all, nothing has really changed in the
parties' positions or in their ability to deliver an agreement since the
Annapolis peace talks reached a dead end in December 2008.
In
the talks that continued throughout 2008, following the Annapolis
Conference, the Israelis led by PM Olmert reached understandings with
the representatives of the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority (PA) which
rules the West Bank. Three main points marked these negotiations
These negotiations finally reached a dead end when Abbas failed to
respond to Olmert’s December 2008 proposal of what Olmert defined the
maximal concession any Israeli PM could ever make. Olmert proposed a
declaration of principles including Israeli withdrawal from 94% of the
West Bank, and an exchange of territories involving the remaining 6%,
Israel’s token acceptance of 5,000 Palestinian refugees, the division of
Jerusalem, and a special international regime in the ‘Holy Basin’. Abbas
never responded to Olmert’s offer
There is good reason to believe that the upcoming round of talks will be
plagued by similar factors, which may severely undermine the talks’
chance of delivering meaningful results. Since early 2009, President
Obama, through his personal emissary to the Middle East George Mitchell,
has put tremendous pressure on the Israelis, led by the PM Netanyahu
(newly elected in March 2009) and the Palestinians, led by Abbas, to
resume negotiations on a final-status agreement. Since then, the Obama
administration has consistently refused to not take "no" from either
party, and it seemed that the third party wants an agreement more than
the parties themselves do. Despite these third parties' efforts,
the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians
continues to be tainted by deep
misgivings about (a) the other’s incapability to sign an acceptable
agreement, (b) Israel's settlement policy, and (c) Abbas’ validity as a
Palestinian leader able to commit on behalf of the Palestinian people,
in view of the fact that his effective control is limited to the West
Bank, while the Hamas government controlling the Gaza Strip explicitly
denounces not only the negotiations with Israel but Israel’s very
existence.
Under such U.S. pressure, in June 2009 Netanyahu declared his support
for a two-states-for-two-people solution, expressing Israel’s
willingness for painful and reciprocated compromises. This was received
with skepticism by the Palestinians, who doubted that Netanyahu was
genuinely willing to pursue peace agreement with the PA on this
foundation.
Encouraged by Netanyahu's statement, the United States renewed its
efforts to bring the two parties to the negotiating table. In February
2010, Netanyahu accepted the U.S. plan for proximity talks, and agreed
to a 10-months halt in construction in the settlements. The Palestinians
resented the temporary nature of this concession and demanded that
Israel declare a permanent suspension of construction in Jewish
settlements as a precondition for the talks. The Palestinians also
refused to resume negotiations before the United States elucidated what
would happen if the talks failed. The Palestinians reluctantly agreed to
participate in the proximity talks only after intense pressure was put
to bear both on the Palestinians and the Arab League. The Palestinians
cautioned that, in any case, they would re-assess the situation in four
months. The United States continued to urge the parties to begin talks,
and in response to the US-Israeli diplomatic crisis over Israeli
construction in East Jerusalem in March 2010, put extra pressure on
Netanyahu to implement confidence-building measures before the
negotiations started.
The
gap between the parties is, however, more than just a matter of
mistrust. It is also a matter of substance. The future of Jerusalem, the
main bone of contention that has undermined all attempts so far to
resolve the core issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, seems to be
more relevant than ever as tensions between Muslims and Jews in East
Jerusalem increase, fanned by Palestinian incitement and Israel's
unwillingness to stop construction in Jerusalem as a precondition for
negotiations. The parties’ basic positions on this issue have not
changed
Were this not enough to forestall any constructive talks, the Israelis,
the Palestinians, and the United States are also divided on procedural
issues, specifically the structure and foundation of the talks. The
proximity talks are less of a step forward than the Israelis sought:
They prefer to conduct direct discussions with the Palestinians, as they
have had since the Oslo process in 1993. In terms of content, the United
States has determined that the talks will be based on Obama's
declaration of Jewish and Palestinian states, and all core issues will
be discussed. While the Palestinians wish to start the talks from
Olmert's December 2008 offer, which they initially rejected, the United
States has clarified that the understandings reached in the Annapolis
process would not be binding, and that discussions would be based on
previous agreements signed by Israel and the PA and the Road Map.
Finally, contrary to Palestinian and Arab League demands, the
negotiations will not be limited in time.
Today, the parties find themselves propelled into negotiations despite
their mutual mistrust, and their inability and unwillingness to improve
on previously offered concessions. Both are unhappy with the format of
the planned talks and the pressure put on them to express flexibility.
In such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that the talks will be
successful in ending this protracted conflict.
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