Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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WHAT IS TURKEY DOING IN THE MIDDLE EAST? By Didem Akyel
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International Crisis Group, Istanbul, Turkey |
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Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government
has taken on ambitious initiative after initiative during its eight
years in office. It oversaw the opening of Turkey’s EU accession
negotiations in 2005; changed entrenched nationalist positions on
Armenia and Cyprus; launched efforts
to address the problems of Turkey’s Kurdish minority; embarked on an
extensive constitutional reform process; and took on a mediation role in
international
conflicts ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East to Afghanistan.
Unfortunately some of these efforts have been less successful than
others and
in issues directly affecting Turkey, such as normalization with Armenia,
the Cyprus problem and the Kurdish initiative, AKP has faltered. This
has led critics to question the
wisdom behind seeking far-away roles when pressing
problems remain unresolved at home.
Most recently, eyes have been
on Turkey due to its increased visibility and activism in the Middle
East. Analysts have been interpreting this as a realignment of Turkey’s
foreign policy after Prime Minister Erdoğan’s televised row with Israeli
President Shimon Peres in Davos in January 2009.
But two recent events have caused further concerns:
Following
an Israeli attack on 31 May on an international aid flotilla trying to
break the Gaza blockade, in which ten Turks died, tensions between
previous two long-term strategic allies Turkey and Israel skyrocketed.
But it would be wrong to say Turkish policies regarding Gaza and Israel
are solely a result of the current government’s conservative religious
ideology. While it is true that AKP's support base is particularly upset
about Gaza, the government’s policy seems to also be backed by the more
secular nationalist opposition – a rare occurrence in Turkey. Regardless
of who is in government in Turkey, historically, relations with Israel
have tended to develop in parallel with public opinion about Israeli
readiness to make peace with and give rights to Palestinians. Previous
crises happened during the 1967 Six-Day War, the declaration of
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 1980, and the Gaza offensive in
December 2008. In fact in 2002, it was Turkey’s secular, left-wing Prime
Minister Ecevit who used extremely strong language to condemn Israeli
occupations in the West Bank. By the same token, the best period in
Turkish-Israeli relations coincides with the Oslo peace process of the
1990s.
Therefore, Israeli-Turkish ties will likely improve when the Turkish
public believes Israel is committed to peace talks with the
Palestinians. After all, it was only two and a half years ago when Prime
Minister Erdoğan,
as a host of Israel-Syria proximity talks, invited Israeli Prime
Minister Olmert to his residence in Ankara. The visit went well, but
just days later – and apparently having given no warning to Erdoğan
– Israel launched the Gaza war. The Turkish Prime Minister’s sense of
betrayal was shared by his popular supporters.
Furthermore, while Turkey sees a good moral cause in Gaza, the
politicians carrying out this policy naturally have a domestic agenda.
The sharpening tone of Turkey-Israel relations not only boosted Prime
Minister Erdoğan’s
popularity in the streets of the Middle East, but also won him support
from his conservative, religious constituency in Turkey ahead of July
2011 elections. But
some Middle Eastern governments, weary of competition,
are suspicious of Turkey’s anti-Israel rhetoric and expanding influence.
A second development that
contributed to debates about Turkey’s possible “turn to the east” has
been its entanglement in Iran’s nuclear issue and its rejection at the
UN Security Council of a new round of sanctions on 9 June. In the midst
of an ongoing diplomatic negotiation to arrange a nuclear swap deal for
Iran, which US President Obama had apparently encouraged, the UN vote
was a principled approach shared by Brazil.
There is nothing intrinsically “un-European” about advocating a
diplomatic solution to a potentially explosive issue, given the low
success rate of past sanctions in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is merit in the argument that after
30 years of unsuccessful isolation and threats, a policy of engagement
should be tried with Iran.
Turkey has reasons to worry about further volatility in its
neighbourhood as it negatively affects its commercial and economic
interests. Ultimately Turkey’s Middle East policy seeks to encourage
peace and stability through regional economic convergence – in many ways
like the EU post-war model.
In this regard, Turkey has implemented several initiatives with Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan and Libya such as visa-free travel, infrastructure and
communications links including new roads and railways, free trade
agreements, and regular joint Cabinet meetings. Most recently
on 11 June, it signed a
four-sided free trade agreement with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon with the
goal of creating a zone of free movement of goods and people.
These regional initiatives are more than just
“Islamic” policies, however, because similar arrangements are also
carried out with Greece and Russia, who have also become big beneficiaries of Turkey’s regional trade boom.
It would be against Turkey’s self-interest to lose the trust of its
traditional allies or to abandon its EU path. Even though
Turkey may
be bitter over continuous attacks by France, Germany, Cyprus and others
on its EU convergence process,
it cannot afford to let its newly-acquired prominence and confidence
divert its course from the EU. Because
it is mainly the charisma of its EU negotiations, along
with its economic achievements and the success of its democratic and
secular system, which give Turkey a high profile and respect in the
Middle East.
Its connections with Western institutions and its ability to make
regional concerns heard in places like Brussels, Washington and the UN
Security Council earn it more international respect than any aid flotilla or
anti-Israel rhetoric.
Moreover, Europe remains to be Turkey’s most important
commercial partner.
More than half of Turkey's exports
still go to Europe, 90 per cent of Turkey’s foreign investments come
from EU states and more than four million Turks live in Europe. By way
of comparison, the Middle Eastern countries take about a quarter of its
exports, send ten per cent of the tourists visiting Turkey and host less
than 200 thousand Turkish workers and residents.
Turkey’s activism in the
Middle East is not at odds with its Euro-Atlantic commitments. It
remains heavily supportive of NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,
including
against al-Qaeda.
Nonetheless, it would gain much credibility for its wider foreign policy
ambitions, and also prove its real commitment to international values
and principles, if it can reach a breakthrough on disputes close to home
first. First on its list are Cyprus and Armenia.
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