Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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"AND BRING ALL CYPRUS COMFORT" By Michalis S. Michael
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Research Fellow, Centre for Dialogue Deputy Director, Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, Australia |
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Why is this small island-state in the Eastern Mediterranean still
physically divided despite nearly four decades of persistent UN efforts
to bring about a negotiated settlement?
Is there anything new in this conflict which explains why Cyprus
should be hitting the headlines – including enticing our former foreign
minister Alexander Downer’s foray into conflict mediation? Why the
recent feeling of optimism, followed by the failure and anxiety, for an
eventual solution, especially within the European context?
What can Cyprus teach us about the nature of protracted conflicts
and ways of resolving them?
When in 2001 Ibrahim Aziz filed against the Republic of Cyprus and its
three guarantor powers, at the European Court of Human Rights, one could
have been forgiven for imagining that EU-ization of the conflict would
somehow empower the citizenry against the ubiquitous communal state.
Five years earlier, Titina Loizidou, won a landmark lawsuit against
Turkey for denying her access to her property in northern Cyprus.
Although
both cases lend themselves to polemical exploitation, in different ways
and for different reasons, they aspired to higher expectations from any
settlement of the Cyprus problem. At a more fundamental level, such
narratives underscored the ethical dilemma compounding each attempt to
resolve the Cyprus conflict: how to construct a legal-constitutional
order, dictated by a set of historical determinants, including the
desire to rectify past injustices, which reconciles human rights and
group security, with the expectation of upholding the fundamental
precepts of liberal democracy, whilst fortifying the foundations for
sequential integration/unification.
The
importance of Cyprus and what this long conflict teaches us lies in the
complex web of interacting factors—internal and external to Cyprus—that
have shaped the overall negotiating process. In analyzing the
relationships between the two sets of factors—internal and external—and
their interconnected and often contradictory implications, it is
possible to identify elements of continuity and change both within and
between its various historical facets. In conceptualizing relevant
trends and relationships, we develop an overall assessment of the
psychological and political dynamic that has thus far obstructed a
resolution of the Cyprus problem.
The intercommunal talks generally treated the Cyprus problem as an
ethnic conflict, and sought its resolution on this basis. It must be
noted that the two communities had been politically, economically,
socially and psychologically separated over time, whilst the 1974
partition endowed this separation with a geographical, demographic and
military dimension. This deeply entrenched separation constituted the
main impediment to any effective rapprochement. The net effect of the
physical division of the island has been to hamper communication,
interaction and contact not only between the two communities but even
between those forces which were prepared to pursue, or at least explore,
common interests and objectives. In addition, postponement of a solution
led, at different times, to one or both parties resorting to unilateral
actions outside the confines of the process, thereby exacerbating the
conflict and further impeding negotiation and third party mediation.
One of
the key conclusions to emerge from this discussion is that both
communities had, for different reasons and in different ways, became
supporters of the status quo which they viewed as, if not ideal, at
least preferable to the uncertainties of any future regime that did not
incorporate their maximum expectations. On one side, the Turkish
Cypriots feared that reunification within a strong federation would see
them revert to the pre-1974 situation as an isolated minority dominated
by a larger and more powerful Greek Cypriot community. On the other
side, the Greek Cypriots viewed any federal solution that did not
encompass a strong central authority and the withdrawal of the Turkish
troops, as no better than their existing predicament. They would be
sacrificing their legitimacy as the sole recognized Cypriot state and
would be risking the total occupation of the island. Though the
motivation and the rationale may have differed, the position of both
parties was similar in one important respect: they both considered the
incentives for change to be weaker than the security of the status quo.
Fear of worst case scenarios paralyzed their will and their capacity to
pursue a riskier but ultimately more promising course.
Conflict resolution contains no certainties. It is often thwarted by
many unknown variables and susceptible to internal and external
fluctuations. Besides security, the conflict’s nagging presence becomes
a constant reminder of the impossibility of sealing off one epoch from
the next with any confidence in evolutionary progress. Asymmetry,
inequality, disparity, and inclusion/exclusion, continue to define and
redefine inter- and intra-communal relations, often underscoring class,
gender, generational and other social cleavages. The pervasive
disposition of the status quo, sits uncomfortably with Cyprus’s
historical order. In the interim, new trends have pegged Cyprus’s
particularism to regional and global transformations. Europeanization is
but one manifestation of Cyprus’s modernization as it teases out the
boundaries of Western expansion and the contradictory convulsions of its
own search for self-definition.
The
Cyprus conflict has many identities. The challenge confronting Cyprus
ultimately lies in its capacity to transform itself into a postmodern
society with a political arrangement that transcends its historical
insecurities. Often a climate of uncertainty and ambivalence demands
risk-taking. In this sense the EU offers itself as a surrogate for
creative politics. As Cypriots need to overcome their past and create
their own history, there is the danger that continual rejections will
prolong stalemate, and stalemate will entrench partition.
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