Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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THE AKP GOVERNMENT'S KURDISH PREDICAMENT By Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel
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Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science King's University College at the University of Western Ontario |
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Senior Fellow of King's University College Professor Emeritus of Political Science Co-director, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Group The University of Western Ontario |
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Ever since the PKK
(Kurdistan Workers Party) ended a year-long ceasefire on 1 June 2010,
Turkey has been gripped with violence and fear. Scores of Turkish
soldiers and Kurdish fighters have been killed, renewing anxieties among
Turks and Kurds alike regarding the prospect of a peaceful end to the
long-running Kurdish issue. According to some Turkish columnists, and
the Economist, an increasing number of Turks are now willing to accept
Kurdish separation. However, this fanciful idea has no chance of
becoming state policy and merely reflects the widespread frustration
felt in the country. No less frustrated is the governing Justice and
Development Party (Adalet and Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) of prime minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan whose ‘Kurdish initiative’ has stalled and may be
destined to fail. Ironically, the AKP government has done more than
previous governments in Ankara to advance Kurdish rights. In doing so it
raised expectations that it could succeed where past governments had
failed in resolving the Kurdish issue.
As a new and untainted party, and with the benefit of a majority
government, the AKP moved swiftly upon coming to office in 2002 to enact
a number of democratizing reforms: these removed several restrictions
that had curbed Kurdish cultural and political freedoms. Much to the
relief of Kurds, it also lifted the state of emergency (OHAL) in the
country’s south-east. Moreover, it held out the promise of achieving
even greater reforms, thereby making a real difference in the lives of
Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. Erdogan struck a positive chord among Kurds
when he declared ‘More democracy, not more repression, is the answer to
Kurds’. Such gestures, together with enhanced freedoms and improved
economic conditions in the Kurdish region enabled the AKP to win a
majority of seats in the Kurdish region in the parliamentary elections
of July 2007. Having elected 75 members in predominantly Kurdish
constituencies, Erdogan could boast that the ‘AKP is
the party of Kurds’. During its first term in office, the AKP’s
democratizing measures were generally well-received by Kurds who saw
them as a sign that the Turkish state was at last beginning to right
past wrongs in its dealings with them. But there was also considerable
skepticism and, when the application of new legislative provisions fell
short of what Kurds had expected (or hoped for), it predictably sparked
widespread complaint. However, that was only part of the problem. From
the viewpoint of Kurdish nationalists, the AKP response appeared
piecemeal and half-hearted, and more importantly, fell short of their
perennial demands for cultural recognition and some form of territorial
self-government. These demands were supported by virtually all shades of
opinion among Kurds. But every Turkish government had found them
enormously problematical, however defined, and in practice impossible to
meet. The AKP government was no exception. It had continued to build on
the policies of its predecessor in removing restrictions on Kurdish
cultural expression, but, like its predecessor, it had declined requests
for state-funded Kurdish education. Even more politically sensitive and
difficult to meet was the demand for autonomy for the Kurdish region – a
demand that had been omitted by the PKK for a few years after its leader
Abdullah Ocalan was captured in 1999 only to re-emerge later in various
formulations. But, as the leaders of the AKP well knew, even if they
were inclined to experiment with decentralization (and there is nothing
to suggest that they were), any hint of receptivity on their part to
altering Turkey’s unitary state structure would risk unleashing a fierce
national debate and put them into conflict with Turkish nationalists and
the Kemalist establishment. This was not a risk they were willing to
take. While the AKP received praise from Western capitals
for its democratizing reforms, its domestic opponents have given it no
comfort. The principal opposition parties bitterly contested its reform
agenda, accusing the government of making concessions to PKK terrorism.
At the same time, the AKP faced the considerable threat posed by the
Kemalist establishment as embodied by the senior ranks of the military.
The latter have traditionally identified Islamic fundamentalism and
Kurdish separatism as two of the greatest dangers facing Turkey and have
not hesitated to throw their weight against proposed measures that they
regard as threatening. No sooner had the AKP assumed office than some
high-ranking generals began a conspiracy to overthrow it, supposedly on the grounds that it threatened Turkey’s secular order. With no
support from the Chief of Staff, the conspirators were unable to carry
out their plans. The AKP averted yet another threat when it was spared
from closure by a single vote when the justices of the Constitutional
Court delivered a seven to six verdict against banning the party on the
grounds that it engaged in anti-secular activities.
Others threats and distractions, including a renewal
of fighting by the PKK, compounded the AKP’s problems, and help explain
why its reform agenda ground to a virtual halt by 2005. While the
government felt justified in deferring further reforms to a later date,
this was understandably disappointing to the Kurds. Not surprisingly,
the AKP lost ground to the Kurdish DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) in
the local elections held in March 2009. Later developments, such as the
Constitutional Court’s closure of the DTP on grounds of fomenting
separatism, and the banning of respected Kurdish politicians from
participating in elected office, further alienated Kurds. The PKK has
skillfully capitalized on Kurdish estrangement, and together with the
Kurdish DBP (Demokrasi ve Baris Partisi) that succeeded the DTP, served
notice that nothing less than satisfying the perennial demands of the
Kurds would be acceptable. It has also called on the government to
accept the PKK and the DBP as negotiating partners to resolve the
Kurdish issue. If the AKP
were to accede to this demand it would provoke widespread condemnation
for negotiating with ‘terrorists’ which is why it has rejected such a
politically risky course. The AKP’s much-vaunted ‘Kurdish initiative’ (first
announced in 2009 and later dubbed the ‘democratic initiative’) has thus
far offered only reforms that
are in the same mold as those previously adopted: that is, their aim is
to expand Kurdish cultural rights. But such reforms are considered
woefully inadequate by most Kurds. As the AKP prepares to campaign in a
national referendum for a more liberal constitution, to be held on 12
September 2010, and in new parliamentary elections a year later, it
faces an unenviable challenge: namely to broaden its Kurdish base by
convincing moderate Kurdish nationalists that its agenda is a work in
progress, will be continued in the future, and is in the long-term
interest of Kurds. That may be a tall order, considering that the
traditional Kurdish nationalist demands have been for constitutional
recognition as a distinct ethnic group, full control over their culture,
and the right to be represented by their own political parties, on a par
with Turkish parties. But if the AKP can somehow manage to bridge this
divide between itself and the Kurdish nationalists, and by so doing
bring Kurds into Turkey’s
cultural and political life
as equal citizens, then
Erdogan’s boast that his is the
party of the Kurds will be truly justified.
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