Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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TURKEY'S FRONTLINE FOREIGN POLICY 1 By Shlomo Avineri
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Director-General of Israel's Foreign Ministry in the first cabinet of
Yitzhak Rabin Professor of Political Science at Hebrew University |
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A few months before he became Turkey’s foreign
minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s chief adviser, met with a group of Middle Eastern
academics and policy experts, including Arabs and Israelis. With
his academic background and immense erudition, he succeeded in
painting, on a wide canvass, the new directions of Turkey’s
policies under the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
leadership.
By then, it had become clear that Turkey’s road to the European
Union had been closed, somewhat rudely, owing mainly to combined
German and French pressure. But those who expected Islamist fire
and brimstone from Davutoglu were deeply disappointed.
What was articulated was a levelheaded and sophisticated exposé,
seldom heard from policymakers: it was thoughtful, honest, and
breath-taking. It was also a clear departure from the
conventional foreign-policy straightjacket devised by Kemal
Ataturk, which had for decades forced Turkish diplomacy into the
Procrustean bed of 1920’s-style integral nationalism.
Davutoglu began conventionally, declaring that Turkey’s
geopolitical situation would always dictate the country’s
foreign policy. Then came the bombshell: contrary to the
conventional Kemalist view of the One and Indivisible Turkish
Nation, Davutoglu referred to what everyone has known since
modern Turkey was created: the country has more Azeris than
Azerbaijan, more people of Albanian origin than live in Albania,
more people of Bosniak origin than live in Bosnia, and more
Kurds than in Iraqi Kurdistan.
This reality, Davutoglu maintained, means that violence and
instability in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood threatens to
spill into Turkey itself, and regional external conflicts can
easily become internally disruptive. Hence the credo of Turkish
foreign policy should be “zero conflicts with our neighbors and
in our neighborhood.”
This, he explained, was the reason that Turkey was trying to
find an accommodation with Armenia. It justified Turkey’s policy
vis-à-vis the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq, its
involvement in Bosnia and in Kosovo, its rapprochement with
Syria, and also its attempt to mediate between Syria and Israel.
Turkey, he argued, is neither pro-Israeli nor pro-Syrian: it
seeks an Israeli-Syrian accommodation in order to add another
building block to regional stability. All these steps are taken
by the AKP government because it is in Turkey’s interest, given
not only its geopolitical position, but also its unique
multi-ethnic structure (he didn’t use that terminology, though
the implication was clear).
Since then (Davutoglu became Foreign Minister in May 2009), much
of what Turkey has done can be explained as being in line with
this “zero conflicts” theory, including a slightly more nuanced
policy on the Cyprus issue. Yet recent developments suggest
that, if this policy is pushed to its limits, it stumbles on its
own premises.
One can well understand a Turkish policy of trying to defuse
tensions with Iran over that country’s nuclear program. But the
joint Iranian-Brazilian-Turkish initiative goes beyond such a
policy.
Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva may have stepped on
a hornets’ nest, owing to his unfamiliarity with regional
policies and his general anti-Yanqui sentiments. Erdogan must
have known that, by trying in this way to shield Iran, he is
opening a wider chasm with the EU – and obviously with the
United States. Opposing new sanctions against Iran in the
Security Council further alienated Turkey from both the EU and
the US. This does not sit well with a “zero conflict” policy.
The same can be said about the shrill tone that Turkey, and
Erdogan himself, has recently adopted vis-à-vis Israel. Walking
off the stage at Davos during a round-table debate with Israel’s
President Shimon Peres might have gained Erdogan points in the
Arab world, which has historically viewed Turkey with the
suspicion owed to the old imperial ruler. But the vehemence with
which he lashed out at Israel during the Gaza flotilla crisis
obviously went far beyond (justified) support for beleaguered
Palestinians and (equally justified) criticism of the messy way
in which Israel dealt with an obviously difficult situation.
While gaining support on the so-called Arab street, and perhaps
upstaging Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in the role of a
modern Commander-of-the-Faithful, Erdogan’s policy and behavior
have shocked not only Israelis, but also moderate Arab leaders
in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and some of the Gulf states.
For many years, the AKP appeared to many in the region and
elsewhere as a model for a democratic party with Islamic roots.
But by supporting Hamas, Erdogan has allied Turkey with the most
disruptive and extremist fundamentalist force in the Muslim Arab
world – an organization that has its origins in the Muslim
Brotherhood, the arch-enemy of all Arab regimes in the region
(including, of course, Syria).
Since Erdogan is a critic of Israel, Arab rulers cannot say this
openly. But Arab governments – and their security services – are
beginning to ask themselves whether Turkey’s policies will
undermine whatever internal stability their states possess.
This is the exact opposite of a genuine “zero conflict” policy
that aims to minimize tensions and enhance stability. Turkey now
finds itself, through its alliance with Iran and support for
Hamas, rushing headlong into a series of conflicts – with
Europe, the US, Israel, and moderate Arab regimes that have
survived Iranian Shia fundamentalism but may now feel threatened
by a neo-Ottoman Sunni foreign policy.
Turkey is thus emerging not as a regional mediator, equidistant from contending local players, but as an assertive, if not aggressive, regional power aiming for hegemony. Far from avoiding conflicts and mediating existing tensions, Turkey under the AKP appears intent on stoking new conflicts and creating new frontlines.
1-This article was first published in Project Syndicate on 05 July 2010. |
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