Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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THE CYPRUS TALKS: ON THE ROAD OF NO RETURN? * By Van Coufoudakis
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Rector Emeritus, University of Nicosia Professor Emeritus and Dean Emeritus, Indiana University-Purdue University |
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After thirty-six years
the consequences of the Turkish invasion are still evident in
Cyprus. Witness the continuing occupation of nearly 37% of the
territory of an EU member by a country aspiring to become an EU
member. Witness the continuing and documented violation of human
rights and Turkey’s total disregard of its international
obligations. Witness the absence of any sanctions for Turkey’s
misconduct. Witness the tragedy of the missing. The recent
identification of some remains may have brought closure to few
families but has not brought to justice those responsible for
their murder. The UN sponsored talks have been part of this
continuing drama. This is a good time to assess where the talks
are headed and what needs to be done to save Cyprus from
destruction on the same year the troubled Republic will be
celebrating the 50th anniversary of its independence. The problems confronting the UN sponsored
talks are not new. They originate in international hypocrisy
that has led to unimplemented unanimous UN Security Council
resolutions and continuing Turkish violations of international
law. Kissinger’s “5 Points”, Clark Clifford’s 1977 verbal
acrobatics and false promises that entrapped President Makarios
in the “constructive ambiguity” of the “bi-zonal bi-communal
federation”, and continuous Greek Cypriot concessions without
reciprocity from Turkey, have brought Cyprus to the dilemma
facing it today. The late President Papadopoulos had the
political courage to call for the rejection of the 2004 Annan
Plan, once he realized how the US and the UK used the UN in
their effort to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus in order to
appease Turkey. The Annan Plan, born of threats and bribes and
based on the principle of Turkey’s appeasement, would have
brought Cyprus under Turkey’s and Britain’s hegemony on the eve
of its EU accession. No self respecting European country would
have accepted to dissolve itself and live under the scheme
proposed by Kofi Annan. In the Cypriot presidential elections of
2008, Dimitris Christofias presented himself as the president
who would solve the Cyprus problem. He acted as if his
predecessors had not wanted a functional democratic solution
that restored human rights, the rule of law and freed Cyprus
from Turkish occupation. Christofias, eager for American and
British support, indirectly legitimized Turkey’s arguments that
blamed the victim for the lack of a solution. I do not question
the President’s commitment to the reunification of Cyprus. The
question remains how he has gone about achieving this elusive
goal. Once the talks got under way between President Christofias
and Mr. Talat, a public relations mythology was generated
intended to create a positive climate for the talks. Domestic
and foreign media, in addition to the new UN Representative
Alexander, the “not so Great”, Downer contributed to this
mythology. It was intended to mask the resurrection of the Annan
Plan, despite its overwhelming rejection by the Greek Cypriots
in 2004. Having learned from the post-mortem of the Annan Plan
about the causes of its rejection, the new mythology stressed
that this would be a “Cypriot solution”, arrived at without
artificial deadlines and externally imposed schemes. The
rhetoric and some of the tactics may have changed but not the
substance of the proposed solution. The new euphoric mythology
also advocated that a solution would be feasible because of the
ideological and personal friendship between the “two leaders”.
In a convenient case of amnesia these observers forgot earlier
claims that the personal and family friendship between President
Clerides and Raouf Denktash would solve the Cyprus problem.
These observers appeared unaware that Turkish policy on Cyprus
is not made in occupied Nicosia but in Ankara, and that Turkey’s
objectives on Cyprus had not changed. Major tactical and political errors were
committed from the start of the Christofias-Talat talks. Instead
of negotiating from a zero base, the Greek Cypriot side was
willing to open talks based on the ideas of the rejected Annan
Plan because “so much work had already been done”. In order to
start the talks on a positive point, the Greek Cypriot side,
much as it had done before, made new concessions without any
reciprocity from Turkey. President Christofias stated that fifty
thousand settlers would stay in Cyprus; agreed to the Turkish
demand for a rotational presidency, and abandoned the strong
Cypriot legal position on the property issue. Instead, he agreed
that the critical property issue would be solved through
political negotiations and not through legal means. This is
exactly what Kofi Annan had demanded. In a classic case of be
careful of what you wish for, recent European Court of Human
Rights decisions appear to follow the government’s political
wishes. Now, the Greek Cypriot side complains that the European
Court of Human Rights may have “sold out” Cyprus. As if these mistakes were not enough, the
Christofias government attempted to delegitimize its domestic
critics by questioning their democratic right to challenge the
President’s policies, while accusing them of rejecting the
island’s reunification and of promoting the partition of Cyprus.
It also relied on disinformation to create public support for
the proposed “bi-zonal bi-communal federation”. A pamphlet
glorifying this abstract constitutional construct failed to tell
the public that the principles on governance emerging from the
talks created a confederation of two “constituent states” and
not a true federation. The devil was in the details but the
public was deliberately kept in the dark. Once Mr. Eroglu became the new Turkish
Cypriot leader, the President of Cyprus, who had actively
supported Mr. Talat for re-election, found himself literally
begging Eroglu to start the talks where his predecessor left
off. Ankara decided the issue, but the Cyprus government
celebrated Eroglu’s acceptance as a diplomatic victory.
Eroglu may have returned to the talks but his great
caveat remains that while the talks continue all issues are back
on the table. In contrast, the Greek Cypriot side remains
faithful to the concessions it has already made. Downer and Turkey are now pushing for an
acceleration of the talks and have introduced the end of the
year as an implicit deadline.
Downer, Turkey and their Anglo-American cohorts use a
variety of incentives and threats to reach this goal. This
includes the probable reduction of UNFICYP (even though the
government of Cyprus covers the major part of its cost), the
attribution of responsibility by the Secretary-General in
November if there is no progress in the talks, the upcoming
elections in Turkey, Turkey’s next EU evaluation and the need to
open new chapters in the Turkish-EU accession talks, the direct
trade between the EU and occupied Cyprus, and the implied threat
of the recognition of the “TRNC” by newly acquired Islamic
friends of Turkey in the Middle East and Central Asia. What is
even more dangerous is their push for an international
conference on Cyprus. Any Greek Cypriot seriously considering
this idea should first read and understand the tactics, the
objectives and outcomes of the 1995 Dayton conference on Bosnia. Yes, this is a critical time for Cyprus!
After thirty-six years the government does not appear to
fathom Turkey’s regional objectives and their effect on the
survival of the Republic of Cyprus. These objectives are clearly
stated in Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s latest book. While the
government of Cyprus for political reasons may not walk away
from the talks, it needs to reevaluate its negotiating
objectives and tactics and listen to its critics at home.
Turkey’s policy on Cyprus has not changed. On the contrary, its
intransigence has been enhanced by recent theories and actions
of the Erdogan government that no one seems to take seriously in
Nicosia. Wishful thinking, ideological appeals, continuous
concessions and accusations against government critics have
brought Cyprus to the brink. The Cypriot situation presents a challenge to
the Greek-American community. Unfortunately, the glory days of
1974 are gone. Our community, for various reasons, may be tired
of the various problems facing Cyprus and Greece. But if we do
not care, who will? Our apathy will only increase Anglo-American
schemes to appease Turkey by sacrificing Cyprus. Looking back at
the history of the post-1974 talks, we often hear the myth of
the “lost opportunities” for the solution of the Cyprus problem.
The only opportunities lost, starting with the spring 1964 NATO
Plan, have been those aiming to destroy the Republic of Cyprus.
On this 50th anniversary of the independence of
Cyprus, we ought to be looking at ways to strengthen the
Republic, restore the rule of law and human rights and remove
the occupation forces from Cyprus instead of being tempted by
plans aiming to turn this successful democratic EU member to a
Turkish vassal. |
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* This article was firstly published in The (Greek) National Herald, New York, July 24, 2010. | |||||
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Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved
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