Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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Which way is Turkey going? * By Robert Ellis
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Regular commentator on Turkish affairs and advisor to the Turkey Assessment Group in the European Parliment |
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There are different views on this issue and a great deal of wishful
thinking. According to the latest report from the International Crisis
Group Turkey’s new engagement in the Middle East has been subject to
misconceptions, but we are reassured that Turkey generally allies itself
to EU member states’ foreign policy positions “with values and goals
that are generally favourable to its Western partners”.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s policy of “economic interdependence” with Iran
and its subsequent vote against further sanctions in the UN Security
Council have brought it into direct conflict with its Western allies. At
the G20 summit in Toronto in June President Obama is reported to have
warned Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that unless Turkey shifted
its position on Israel and Iran it stood little chance of obtaining US
weapons. And last month Secretary of State Hillary Clinton convened a
special meeting of the State Department and the National Security
Council to reevaluate US policy towards Turkey.
Even British PM David Cameron, in the panegyric he delivered in Ankara
on his visit in July, reminded his host that despite the nuclear fuel
swap deal concluded between Iran, Turkey and Brazil, Iran would still
retain around 50% of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium.
Trade is clearly a driving force behind Turkey’s rapprochement with
Iran, and at a recent Turkish-Iranian trade forum in Istanbul Erdoğan
set as a target a tripling of bilateral trade from the present $10
billion, 80 percent of which comes from the sale of Iranian natural gas.
A Turkish member of the executive board of the Turkey-Iran business
group saw it as a big opportunity that Turkey could take over the
finance and trade that was carried out by Dubai and the United Arab
Emirates before sanctions were applied, and the Turkish prime minister
saw Turkey as Iran’s door opening to Europe.
This has in fact been confirmed by a Reuters special report, which
states that Turkey’s blossoming financial-economic relationship with
Iran provides Iran with a gateway to the entire European financial
system. “The fact that Turkey is allowing itself to be used as a conduit
for Iranian activity via Turkish banks and the Turkish lira is making it
possible for Iranian funds in Turkish guise to make their way into
Europe.”
Prime Minister Erdoğan has called Iran’s nuclear programme “peaceful and
humanitarian”, but President Abdullah Gül has admitted in an interview
with Forbes Magazine: “I do believe it is their final aspiration to have
a nuclear weapon in the end.” However, when it comes to Israel, Turkey’s
policy of “soft” diplomacy has met its limitations.
Erdoğan’s tirade against Shimon Peres during a panel discussion on Gaza
at the World Economic Forum in January last year was designed for
domestic consumption and the forthcoming local elections in March. The
government’s support for the aid flotilla to Gaza backfired, with
awkward questions being asked about Erdoğan’s own role, but his popular
support was intact. The prime minister’s latent anti-Semitism has been
given full rein and Turkey-Israel relations have suffered as a result.
Drifting east
In contrast to the International Crisis Group’s report the German
Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends for 2010 concludes that double the
number of Turks interviewed compared with 2009 said that Turkey should
act in closest cooperation with the countries of the Middle East in
international matters. There was also a decline in those who said Turkey
should cooperate with the EU and a marked drop in support for Turkish EU
membership from 73% in 2004 to 38% this year. Furthermore, a majority
still agreed that Turkey has such different values that it is not part
of the West.
This drift to the East has been accompanied by much gnashing of teeth
and self-recrimination on the part of the West. For example, US Defence
Secretary Robert Gates blamed Europe “because [Turkey] was pushed, and
it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of
organic link to the west that Turkey sought”. And Italian Foreign
Minister Franco Frattini stated “we Europeans have made a mistake in
pushing Turkey eastwards instead of bringing them towards us”.
But this foreign policy realignment, which reflects the domestic changes
that have taken place since the AKP government came to power in 2002,
should come as no surprise. Prime Minister Erdoğan is not a European in
thought, word or deed, and is still a ‘Kasımpaşalı kabadayı’ (a
bully from the tough neighbourhood in Istanbul where he grew up), which
he reflects in his rhetoric and political instincts. And a broad base of
the Turkish people love him for it.
British foreign minister William Hague has allied himself with his
Finnish colleague Alexander Stubb in advocating Turkish membership of
the EU, and Stefan Füle was beside himself with enthusiasm when he told
the SEECP (South East European Cooperation Process) conference in
Istanbul in June: “Turkey has been making remarkable advances in
reforms”.
In Ankara David Cameron argued “it is just wrong to say that Turkey can
guard the camp but not be allowed to sit in the tent”. But as
Christopher Caldwell, senior editor at The Weekly Standard, countered in
the Financial Times: “This is a non sequitur: a country can
contract a military alliance without forging a political union.”
The International Crisis Group in its report mentions “the undoubted
benefits of a partnership” and the EU continues to emphasize Turkey’s
strategic importance. According to the Transatlantic Trends survey
a plurality of Turks believed that joining the EU would be a good thing
for the Turkish economy, but here they ignore the benefits that Turkey
already enjoys through the customs union. Given the fact that the
European economy is on the ropes and many EU states are struggling to
absorb large-scale immigration, to entertain the prospect of Turkish
membership would be catastrophic and utopian. On his visit David Cameron
concluded a “strategic partnership” with Turkey, whatever that might
imply. Couldn’t we just leave it at that?
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* This article was first published in New Europe newspaper, September 26 - October 2, 2010, p. 9. |
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Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved
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