Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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The renewed balance of power in the Middle East By Hamid R. Khalaj
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Research Associate, Cyprus Center for European and International
Affairs |
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Balance of power has a long history among Mesopotamian civilizations: a
history filled with conflicts between Kings and Emperors out of fear
from each other. An outstanding one would be the war between twelve
kings of Mesopotamia headed by King
Hadadezer of Damascus
and Ahab King of Israel against expansionism of King Shalmaneser III in
853 BC. The objective was to avoid the increase of Assyrians supremacy.
However, their effort was doomed to fail. Centuries later, in a similar
manner, the coalition of Arab governments aimed at controlling the
extension of Israel failed to succeed. Nevertheless, the endeavor
towards establishing the Balance of Power has not always been
ineffective, as the Assyrians were brought to a halt by the mighty
Ourarto civilization, and the unrivaled dominance of Israel has been
struggling by the uncompromising stance of the Islamic Republic in Iran.
It could be said that a new era in the Middle East began following the
exit of the Great Britain from the Persian Gulf in 1967. It signaled an
unmarked page in the political history of the region as it gave way to
the gradual development of independent governments. In this era, as it
was in the ancient time, a multi-polar system configured. Egypt, Iran,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Israel, turn out to become the new
version of Egypt, Elam, Ourarto, Assyrian, and Hebrew civilizations and
like their ancestors they grew to carry on a constant rivalry.
The existence of such state of animosity in both the ancient and modern
time has avoided the supreme domination of one of these regional powers
over the others. However, this balance of power has given each of these
players the chance of survival, in addition to endowing them with a
fragile peace. The process of stabilization of the balance of power
system in the Middle East approximately took till 1991. By that time
neither Israel nor Iran could gain superiority over one another, same as
none of the Arab governments fell ahead of the others.
The last decade of the twentieth century brought with it a relative
atmosphere of peace and calm to the region. Iraq apparently understood
that the effort to invade and occupy territories of its neighbors was in
vain regardless of whether they were supported or opposed by the West.
In addition, six wars between Arabs and Israel proved to have resulted
in nothing but destruction of both side’s resources. Consequently the
time came for signing peace treaties. But the last decade of the
twentieth century had a more significant characteristic; a new regional
bipolar system was emerging. By end of the Cold War, Iraq and Libya lost
their communist comrade; Egypt saw its traditional influence on the Arab
world vanished; Turkey approached Europe evermore. When democracy became
the measure of legitimacy for ruling regimes, Saudi Arabia lost its
reputation. Iraq went deep in a state of seclusion following its
invasion to and consequent retreat from Kuwait. Iran and Israel remained
to compete. They gradually formed a bipolar system in the Middle East
and began taking allies both regionally and globally. Syria became a
partner for Iran and Egypt sided with Israel. Arab governments of the
Persian Gulf formed the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the
Gulf and allied with the United States.
In this fashion, two opposing fronts materialized and became the
base for seeming stability along with rivalry. Interestingly, in the
heat of intense rivalries between Iran and Israel, no direct war has
taken place between the two, yet in no moment of time has the enmity
among them lost imminence. As much as Iran gained partial popularity in
Lebanon and Palestine, Israel also gained support of some of Iran’s
neighbors against the Islamic regime.
Although President Bush’s attack on Ba’athi Iraq did not completely
disarrange the overall regional balance of power, the subjective and
inevitable contradictions of the United States policy in the Middle East
resulted in its vulnerability against both Iran and Israel but in
different perspectives. President Bush administration’s foreign policy
pursued an offensive approach with regards to Iran aimed at promotion of
Israel in the Middle East by restraining the increase of Iran’s regional
power and influence. The idea was to shift the regional balance of power
among the traditional rivals to the sole advantage of Israel by means of
Hard Power.
Campaign against expansion of nuclear weapons of mass destruction became
a reason to threaten Iran while ironically Israel and other countries in
the region like India, and Pakistan have enjoyed nuclear weapons for
years. Upholding democracy was also introduced as another cause to
undermine the defiant Islamic regime in Iran whereas some of the United
States closest allies in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia and Yemen are
under the rule of utmost suppressive and dictatorial regimes. Thus
Regime Change became the prime purpose based on the hypothesis that the
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic in Iran is a result of its
ideological convictions therefore a change in its international and
domestic policies can only occur by removal of the current regime and
its replacement by a regime which is more compatible with the liberal
ideology.
However, not only the effort to change the regime in Iran has somewhat
proved to be unsuccessful so far, but also the implementation of ‘the
Greater Middle East Project’, even after the attack on Iraq has resulted
in the increase of the Iranian regime’s influence in that country. In
addition, the mere threat of Regime Change has resulted in controversial
presidential and parliamentary elections in Iran since 2005, giving way
to empowering hardliners and forcing out moderate reformists from the
political scene within the regime.
Failure of the United States in persuading Iran to abandon its nuclear
program, and at the same time taking total control of the regime by
hardliners may to some extent re-endorse the significance of the balance
of power in the Middle East. For years the United States managed crisis
in the region based on Balance of Power among countries like Iran, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia. The United States may have come to the conclusion that
in order to best satisfy its interests and bring stability to the
region, there is no better way but to renew the balance of power in the
Middle East. Fear of a nuclear Iran is not essentially founded as it was
not in the case of Iraq’s WMDs.
Even Saddam’s attack on Iran happened only when he perceived Iran to be
weak and disarranged after the revolution of 1979 and assumed that
within few days he would be able to annex the oil-rich south of Iran to
Iraq. Once his vision proved to be false, he panicked and lied about
having WMDs and by the same token was overthrown by the United States
and its allies years later. Fear of retribution was what stopped Saddam
short of any offence following both his defeat in Kuwait and Israel’s
bombing of Iraq’s nuclear power plants. Same fear has so far avoided
direct confrontation between Iran and Israel.
It is likely that the United States would return to its previous policy
in the Middle East and prefer a system of Balance of Power as already
there are tacit indications of such shift in policy since President
Obama took office. This approach has the potential to safeguard the
United States’ interests better and avoid conflict and chaos in the
region. It is needless to say that such approach would be more
preferable to Iran as well, pending that the ruling regime realizes this
great opportunity and play its cards sensibly.
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Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved
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