Affiliated with the University of Nicosia |
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The diplomatic battle over Kosovo: A second Cyprus on the EU doorstep? By Predrag Vukovic
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Research Assistant, Cyprus Center for European and International
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Former Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) High Representative Carl Bildt once asked if there was
to be a partition of BiH after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) whether
there would be anything to prevent the Albanians of Kosovo from
demanding independence, triggering not only a war with Serbia, but also
possibly the same demands from the Albanian population in Western
Macedonia (FYROM) and leading to instability in south-east Europe (Bildt, This crisis over
territory is a tragedy not only for the local protagonists but also for
the rest of the international community. It represents the typical
zero-sum ethnic conflict in which claims for self-determination and
independence helplessly clash with claims to sovereignty and territorial
integrity (Yannis, Although the UN
Security Council Resolution When Kosovo
unilaterally declared independence the United States and many countries
in Europe believed that Kosovo would gain quick worldwide recognition.
Their hope was that once this status quo had been accepted and capital and investment flowed into
the newly proclaimed country, the ethnically Serb parts of the province
would then want to take part in the post-independence economic boom and,
as a result, the problem would be solved. However this has not been the
case as Kosovo has not experienced an ‘economic boom’. According to U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, Kosovo is affected by high
unemployment, low investment rates, and a relatively small economic
base. It also remains a regional transit point for narcotics, weapons
and human trafficking and corruption is said to be a major problem
(Foreign Affairs,
Furthermore
Serbia did not reconcile itself to the
fait accompli of Kosovo’s
independence proclamation (De-Construct.net, The decision over
the legality of Kosovo’s independence declaration was finally delivered
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 22nd July. As
was expected and as will be shown both sides to the conflict interpreted
the decision in their favor. The ICJ decision favored the Kosovo
Albanians and they believe that this diplomatic win will lead to
countries that have so far not accepted Kosovo’s independence to do so.
On the other hand the Serbs have lost this one diplomatic battle but not
the war. They have turned their attention to the wording of the ICJ
decision which neither endorsed that this unilateral declaration was a
unique case, the court also failed to approve the province’s avowed
right of secession from Serbia, or any purported right to
self-determination for Kosovo’s Albanians. One of the arguments in the
opposition within Serbia was that the Court answered the question of the
legality of Kosovo’s independence declaration whereas the real question
should have been the legality of Kosovo’s secession (Politika Online,
2010b); Wall Street Journal, 2010). The issue regarding
Kosovo has also led to divisions within the EU, where five member states
– namely Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Romania and Cyprus – have supported
Serbia’s territorial integrity in order to satisfy their own domestic
interests. In addition,
Spain also remains deeply aware of the potential for frozen conflicts in
the Balkans. The Kosovo case is a perfect example of a conflict which
can further complicate the Western Balkan region’s journey towards the
EU (The Guardian, The declaration of
independence was based on the hope that the unfinished processes of the
conflict over Kosovo and the dissolution of former Yugoslavia would
finally come to a conclusion. Although independence did help break the
stalemate by offering a radical solution, it has neither fully resolved
the conflict on the ground between Kosovars and Serbs nor has it settled
the future of Kosovo and the region (Yannis, Prior to this
ICJ decision Balkan analyst Obrad Kesic made some important points in an
interview with regard to the Kosovo issue. One of the main points
derived from this interview and one which is prominent in conflicts
elsewhere is the issue that the conflict will remain a ‘frozen
conflict’despite the ICJ decision. Kesic has so far been correct that
both sides are looking at points in the ICJ decision which satisfy their
own views with regards to Kosovo and on which they are not so flexible.
However there is one consensus that exists amongst all sides and this is
the fact that there should be new negotiations (B92.net, 2010). The
Serbs believe that negotiations should focus on the status of the
province whereas the Kosovo Albanians, along with the majority of the EU
member states, believe that the negotiations should focus on technical
issues such as telecommunications and housing. The problem with the
second approach is that there is disagreement on these matters and that
if one is to start looking at the technical issues it will only be a
matter of time before the status of the province of Kosovo is raised (Politika
Online, 2010b). With regards to
leverage in the negotiations there is one major point which needs to be
raised. The biggest threat ever since the discussions over the status of
the province started was that if the Kosovo Albanians were not happy
with the way that the negotiations were headed, then there would be a
chance for new conflict to erupt in the province just like in March
2004. One of the important points with regard to Pristina’s relationship
with the United States and the EU is the belief of Brussels and the
United States that the Kosovo Albanians are prepared to use force to
achieve their national interest which is an independent Kosovo. The
current Serbian government has stated numerous times that this is a
diplomatic battle in order to achieve Serbia’s national interest, which
is for its territorial integrity to remain intact. The issue that the
Western counterparts are well aware of is that unhappy Kosovo Albanians
are a bigger threat to peace and stability in the Balkans than unhappy
Serbs. This fact gives more leverage to the Kosovo Albanian side with
regards to future negotiations over the province. The two sides have
different expectations with regard to this conflict and it is naďve to
assume that this ICJ decision will solve them.
The ICJ decision should be interpreted as representing the first
battle in the diplomatic war over Kosovo. There is also the possibility
that if the Americans and those who supported the ICJ decision read too
much into it and proclaim it as a new step in international law.
In that case they risk opening several other frozen conflict
trouble spots not only in Europe but in other parts of the world as well
(B92.net, 2010). According to
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, professor of National Security Studies at the U.S.
Naval War College, Belgrade and Pristina may come to an eventual
agreement if the question of boundaries is split from the theoretical
question of independence. Such talks should include preconditions that
Serbia should not be required to change its constitution to cede legal
and territorial claims to Kosovo, nor should the government in Pristina
abandon its earlier declarations. In terms of territorial adjustment,
the broad outline of a settlement is already clear. The Serb-majority
regions north of the Ibar should remain part of Serbia, with some sort
of arrangement made for important Serbian heritage sites and enclaves in
the south. One possible model for this is the agreement reached between
Italy and the Vatican in 1929. The Catholic Church for decades had not
recognized the takeover of Rome by Italy in 1870; the Italian state was
similarly not inclined to cede its claim over its capital city. The
Lateran Treaty resolved this issue by establishing Vatican City as a
neutral but independent state. The Vatican also received
extraterritorial rights over sacred sites in and around Rome and in
other parts of Italy. The Kosovo case is not identical but some points
could be raised from the Lateran model for future negotiations over the
status of the province (Foreign Affairs, 2010). Unfortunately, in
the Balkans for the time being, multi-ethnicity has failed not only in
Kosovo but in Bosnia as well. The United States and the four main EU
members Germany, Britain, France and Italy remain defiant in the failure
of their policies toward the region. On the one hand there is an attempt
to centralize the Bosnian State at the expense of the Serbs and Croats,
and on the other hand there is an attempt to go the other way by
supporting the secession of Kosovo. Clearly the aspirations for
tolerance and multi-ethnicity have been nothing but empty rhetoric (The
Independent, The countries
of the Western Balkans have the same goal: the accession of the region
into the European Union. The problem, however, is that they have
different answers as to when and where the collapse of Yugoslavia ended;
did it end with the secession of Kosovo or earlier? (Politika Online,
2010a). The Western Balkans
are a part of Europe and the EU
must not be placed in a position where it will lose credibility in the
region. However, one of the seeming facts of the conflict between the
Serbs and the Albanians over Kosovo is that it has the chance of turning
into ‘a second Cyprus’, meaning that it will be a ‘frozen conflict’ just
like the one between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This is undesirable to
the EU as it plans on solving the conflict before all of the Western
Balkan States accede. The diplomatic battles over Kosovo will continue
as the fight is a long way from being won or lost.
The attempt to find a ‘middle way’ in the negotiations will be a
true test not only for the local protagonists to the conflict but also
for the international community. The ICJ decision and the responses from
both sides have so far reinforced the fact that a ‘middle way’ is a
necessity if a workable solution is to be reached. This ‘middle way’
will be difficult to find as so far there is no balance in the
negotiations between the Serbs and the Albanians; in fact, the
negotiations have not yet begun. The Albanians hold an advantage
because, as mentioned above, they are prepared to use force to achieve
their national interests.
The Serbs, on the other hand, are not.
As long as there is this dissimilarity then future negotiations
will be very difficult. The stability
of the whole Western Balkan Region depends on a successful solution to
the Kosovo issue amongst all sides. So far this has not been achieved
and the EU is in for a big challenge. One of the starting points of
these negotiations could be the general consensus that there should be
improvements in people’s standard of living both economically and
socially, regardless to their ethnicity. This fact should be the first
stepping stone to future negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians.
References B92.net ( 2010)
Konflikt ce ostati “ zamrznut”.
[Online]. Available from:
http://www.b92.net/info/intervju/index.php?nav_id=446844
[Accessed 20
July 2010]. Berg, E. ( Bildt, Carl.
(
De-[Construct].net ( [Accessed Examiner.com
( [Accessed Foreign Affairs (
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66392/nikolas-k-gvosdev/unfreezing-kosovo
Kecmanovic,
N. ( Kosovocompromise.com
(
http://www.kosovocompromise.com/cms/item/latestnews/en.html?view=story&id=444§ionId=1
[May Politika Online ( Politika
Online (2010) Sta posle misljenja MSP?. [Online]. Available from:
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Sta-posle-misljenja-MSP.sr.html
[Accessed 28
July 2010]. The
Guardian. ( [Accessed The Independent. ( [Accessed Wall Street
Journal. (2010). Kosovo’s Disastrous Precedent. [Online]. Available from:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703977004575392901873224526.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
[Accessed 28
July 2010].
Yannis, A. (
*
The chance for a renewal in negotiations is unlikely to bring
about an immediate breakthrough in the deadlock.
The government in Pristina will not withdraw its
declaration of independence nor will the countries that already
recognized Kosovo remove their recognition. On the other hand,
no government in Belgrade will recognize the current boundaries
in Kosovo as legitimate (Foreign Affairs,
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Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved
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