MAKING A SINGLE DECISION ON TURKEY

MAKING A SINGLE DECISION ON TURKEY

PhD candidate at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels

Research Fellow, Research Center - Intercollege

For some months now, the EU Presidency endeavors to ward off an EU-Turkey crisis. In order to be successful, the Finnish Presidency needs to reconcile Ankara’s and Nicosia’s positions on a formula that envisages the simultaneous implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and the establishment of a direct trading relationship between the EU and the Turkish-Cypriot community. If the Finnish initiative fails, the EU member states will deal with a single, still tough, question: How to interpret the Declaration of September 21, 2005 which foresees punitive measures against Turkey if the latter does not fulfill its Cyprus obligations? That Declaration stressed that “the opening of negotiations on the relevant Chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its contractual obligations to all Member State[1]”. Furthermore the EU member states declared that “[f]ailure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations [between the EU and Turkey].[2]”

The EU Declaration was drafted on the principle of ‘constructive ambiguity’. As a result, it gives some leeway as to how the EU member states will interpret the provisions of that Declaration. The September 2005 decision specifies neither how the opening of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of the Protocol nor how Ankara’s failure to meet its obligations will affect the overall progress in the negotiations. In short, the Declaration says that, in case Turkey does not meet its obligations, it will pay a relevant cost with regard to its membership talks; however, it stops short of specifying it.

The EU member states, however, cannot evade making a single interpretation of their Declaration next December. First, the EU member states will need to track down the relevant Chapters which are affected by Turkey’s denial to implement the Protocol and decide how the opening of negotiations on those chapters will be affected. It is evident that at least three Chapters (Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods; Chapter 14: Transport Policy; and Chapter 29: Customs Union) are directly affected by Turkey’s refusal to implement the Additional Protocol. A fourth Chapter (Chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defense Policy) is also directly affected by Turkey’s veto policy over Cyprus’ participation in the EU-NATO cooperation and in other organizations and international regimes. Some other Chapters, such as Chapter 8 (Competition Policy), Chapter 19 (Social Policy and Employment), Chapter 22 (Regional Policy), and Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) are indirectly affected by Ankara’s refusal to implement the Protocol. It follows that the EU member states’ endeavor to track down ‘the relevant Chapters’ is not one way road.

Even in case the EU member states decide which Chapters the Declaration was referring to, they will still need to define the way in which EU-Turkey negotiations over these Chapters will be affected. One option could be that none of these Chapters will be negotiated up until Turkey meets its obligations. A second option could be that some of these Chapters (e.g. these that are indirectly affected) may be provisionally opened for negotiation, albeit no final decision will be made about their closure up until Turkey implements the Protocol. The difference between the two options is technical and, thence, no further elaboration is required at this stage. The core issue at stake is the interpretation of the Declaration’s reference to ‘the relevant Chapters’.

Secondly, the EU member states will need to decide on how the overall progress in the negotiations will be affected. The suspension of negotiations over some Chapters is already an effect on the overall progress of Turkey’s accession negotiations. In this sense, a first interpretation of that provision could be that the suspension of negotiations over some Chapters is a sufficient affection of the progress of Turkey’s accession negotiations. A second interpretation of that provision could lead to the conclusion that Turkey’s accession negotiations would not have been opened if it did not sign the Additional Protocol extending the EC-Turkey Association Agreement to the ten Member States that acceded on 1 May 2004 and, therefore, Ankara’s denial to implement that Protocol should lead to the suspension of the overall process of negotiations up until Turkey meets its obligations. In short, the first option conflates the two aforementioned provisions of the Declaration and asks for no more punitive measures but the suspension of negotiations over some Chapters, while the second one differentiates the two provisions and asks for a tougher stance against Turkey’s intransigence.

A single decision on Turkey would be a difficult task, for the many interpretations of the Declaration’s provisions sanction many scenarios and options. In a previous issue of In Depth I argued that, although it is difficult to make a prediction, I believe that the many political dilemmas before the EU member states and the divergent national interests and perceptions across the EU, will lead to a decision that will offer Turkey a final chance to meet its obligations. In my view, the EU member states will come to an agreement on the relevant chapters that will be affected in the face of Turkey’s refusal to implement the Protocol. On the other hand, it is close to impossible for the EU-25 to agree on any further sanctions against Turkey. If the EU member states fail to make a single interpretation of their Declaration, then they will not have any other option but set forth another deadline for Turkey. Such a result, however, will have two direct implications. On the one hand, the overall process of negotiations will be de facto suspended. Nicosia, backed by a group of like-minded countries, such as Greece, Austria and France, will block the opening of negotiations over all Chapters before the expiration of the new deadline for the implementation of the Protocol. In the past couple of months, Nicosia has already blocked five bids of the Finnish Presidency to discuss the opening of negotiations over some Chapters[3]. On the other hand, the German Presidency will renew the EU initiative aiming at an agreement between Nicosia and Ankara on the trade offs for the simultaneous implementation of the Protocol and the establishment of a direct trading relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot Community and the EU. At the same time, the UN may undertake some fresh initiatives for the implementation of the 8 July 2006 Agreement between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leaders–brokered by the UN Under-Secretary General Imbrahim Cambari– which outlines further steps in the diplomatic effort to resolve the decades-old conflict on the Mediterranean island[4].

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[1] Declaration by the European Community and its Member States in response to the declaration by Turkey made at the time of signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, 21 September 2005 (emphasis added).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Phileleftheros, “Double veto over Turkey’s Chapters,” November 11, 2006.

[4] In November 2006, Mr. Cambari sent letters to the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot leaders to ask them to put in effect their agreement. It is difficult to assess, however, whether this gesture of a fresh UN involvement in the Cyprus issue will effect a ‘positive result’.

Research Center - Intercollege