Affiliated with the University of Nicosia | |||||
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THE CONCEPT OF ‘PROVENTION’ APPLIED TO CYPRUS By Demetrios A. Theophylactou*
Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs – Harvard University
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This essay attempts to share some insights (emanating from my
ongoing research and readings of numerous scholarly works and case
studies) on both the concept and practice of conflict resolution
and/or prevention. The
focus is on the ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations on Cyprus and
efforts to break the seemingly stubborn stalemate; the analysis
draws largely from relevant ideas discussed in John Burton’s
Conflict: Resolution and Provention (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1990). It aims at
injecting some fresh deliberations, i.e. moving beyond resolution
and prevention towards ‘provention’ on previously debated and highly
contemplated issues such as military occupation, maintaining rights
of intervention, moving to a new ‘European’ paradigm, establishing a
mutually accepting and reinforcing bi-zonal federation, and breaking
from the past both in regards to history and language, i.e.
meaningful communication aimed at cooperation.
In brief, this essay considers certain concepts and practices
relating to social and political life and evaluates their potential
impact on the negotiation outcome and beyond.
Moving from Resolution and
Prevention to ‘Provention’
At the outset, it
is worth noting, as we examine the UN-sponsored Cyprus negotiations,
that Burton’s work stretches the concept of commonly accepted
practices of conflict resolution and prevention, as we know them in
many corners of the world, to what he terms ‘provention’.
He argues that the former have a negative connotation, as
their primary aim is to remove sources of conflict, while the latter
goes a step further as it aims to create conditions that lead to
cooperative relationships.
This approach is both legitimate, in the context of Turkey’s
EU accession process, and desirable, in the sense that a mutually
beneficial solution is presumably sought by both communities on the
island.
___________________
* I wish to thank my research assistant, Mark Hirschboeck, for his
invaluable inputs to this article, in particular, and my academic
work, in general, during my fellowship at Harvard University.
To be sure, conflict at the international level has been the result
of violence which “has always been the arbiter when matters of
important ‘national interest’ have been at stake” (p. 66).
In this respect, and as a consequence of outcomes emanating
from violent behavior at the state level, the past effectively
dictates our patterns of thought.
Subsequently, when “societies accept such traditions [of
power structures and authority] it is unlikely that there can
be a […] basis for an understanding of the nature of conflict and
how to resolve it” (pp. 71-2).
Therefore, in divided states like Cyprus “contending” views
inevitably prevail, effectively reflecting “a continuing resistance
to change…” (p. 110).
Realist perspectives of
international relations (i.e. those following Hans Morgenthau and
Kenneth Waltz) are based on the idea that “man is aggressive”, which
has “the effect of distracting attention from any further
consideration of the nature of human behavior [and] of placing the
blame for conflict on persons and groups, thus eliminating from
policy considerations any alterations to institutions and policies”
(p. 73). Language in
itself presents a number of problems. Ambiguous terms are used to
justify policies, leading to confusion. The term “national
interest,” for instance, “may not reflect the views and opinions of
other advisers or of people generally, still less the longer term
interests of the nationals.” By
contrast, it is often used to suggest obligation to some cause,
whatever its implications.
Need for a Value Neutral Approach
Burton posits that conflict resolution is often equated with some
sort of value-laden approach, be it “justice” or “pacifism”, or
“liberalism”, which is often counter-productive (pp. 21-22).
He proposes that, in the search for a lasting and viable
solution, “The only value orientation that is inherent in a study of
conflict […] is the goal of resolving and proventing conflict.”
In other words, it is not productive to try to convince a
party that it “‘should’ or ‘ought’ to treat the other party in some
particular way dictated by value considerations”; rather the aim is
to explore a pragmatic approach with vision, new thinking and less
influence from tradition.
At the bargaining table,
there needs to be a clear distinction between negotiable and
non-negotiable issues (p. 78).
This is perhaps to state the obvious.
Yet it is not always clear whether this dichotomy of choices
and interests, of values and needs, as it were, has been
sufficiently delineated and adequately elaborated in the process of
defining the national interest, on either side.
There is, so to speak, a need to find commonality.
For example, as Burton recalls, “Greek and Turkish Cypriots
discovered that neither wanted ‘Enosis’ or ‘Double Enosis’ (that is
union with Greece or Turkey) but wished to identify with the island
of Cyprus […] once it is discovered that goals are held in common,
(and) the stage is set for a search for means that satisfy all
parties to a dispute” (p. 42).
In a great number of multi-ethnic nations, divided societies present
a case of non-legitimation (p. 137).
In this ambiguous political landscape, power-sharing often
“creates more problems than it solves […] it underlines, if
anything, the minority status of the smaller ethnic community and
[…] leaves the majority with a sense of threat and injustice,” as
the case of Cyprus illustrates (p. 141).
Yet the aim is to move
forward. Indeed, it is
ultimately “adequate educational and development opportunities in a
social framework that provide separate security until there is
identity with a wider society” (p. 146).
How Do We Move On, and What Do We Propose?
A number of
policy-relevant options are in order.
First, language could just as well be a useful tool with a
view to breaking the stereotypes and fears of the past and,
subsequently, creating the needed discourse for a mutually
beneficial cooperation and win-win relationship, in the context of
the EU. Indeed, as
Burton argues, political thinking is largely “influenced by
language,” hence the need to cultivate a new discourse that promotes
‘provention’ and cooperation, and avoids “perpetuating” past
practices and policies (p. 74).
For instance, the idea of the “national interest” often
represents and “reflects the subjective judgment of decision makers”
(p. 76).
Secondly, more
often than not, and relative to the ongoing stalemate, there is also
the implication that lack of support for the “national interest” is
equivalent to disloyalty.
This is a mistaken notion, as it not only perpetuates
divisions between and within the communities, but it mainly prevents
creating thinking from enriching the communication landscape in
transitional societies like Cyprus, that undergo significant social
and political transformation.
Lastly, there are a
few concepts in social and political life, like the “national
interest”, which, in spite of their important political
implications, they cannot “be defined in any precise way” (p. 75).
This makes meaningful communication all the more difficult and,
consequently, it renders any solution all the more elusive.
Thus, there is clearly a need
to redefine the national interest in both Cyprus and Turkey, in a
transparent way that recognizes and respects both their own
interests at the nation-state level, and those of the two Cypriot
communities at the state level, in the broader context of the EU.
This is a prerequisite, first, for a common ground and a
commonly accepted language that in and of itself will facilitate the
search for a mutually beneficial solution in Cyprus, and secondly,
for a forward looking policy that pro-actively embraces ‘provention’
and cooperation. Both of
these objectives presuppose, in turn, less classical realist or
power calculations and territorial ambitions and more post-modern,
liberal approaches in promoting one’s national interest.
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