Affiliated with the University of Nicosia | |||||
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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: CHANGE FOR CYPRUS? By Odysseas Christou
Research Fellow, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs
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Hope, Change and Expectations
Following election,
Greek Americans greeted the turnover of power from the Bush to the
Obama administration as a positive development. There was a
widespread vision of a Hellenophile culture developing in
Washington; this belief was bolstered by the reputations of both the
President and his second-in-command. Obama has ties to the Greek
American community, most significantly through the community’s
substantial presence in the President’s native Chicago. For example,
as a US Senator of Illinois in 2006, Obama endorsed Greek American
Alexi Giannoulias in his successful bid for state Treasurer. In
2009, Giannoulias started campaigning for the US Senate seat once
held by President Obama and has largely been described as Obama’s
protege. Moreover, Vice President Joe Biden has long been viewed
favorably by the Greek American community in his 36-year senatorial
career. As a long-time member and three-time Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, he is considered an expert on the
foreign affairs of the region.
Thus, the elements
seem to be in place for the Obama administration to usher in a new
era in American foreign policy that can redefine his nation’s role
in the international system at a time when a clear balance of power
has yet to replace the obvious and predictable bipolarity of the
Cold War. However, Obama is also faced with an unprecedented set of
circumstances that place his administration in a precarious
position.
The Confluence of Domestic and International Politics
So far in his
presidency, Obama has not been the beneficiary of Senator
Vandenberg’s 1940s aphorism that “politics stops at the water’s
edge”, meaning that domestic politics ought not to interfere with a
unified national foreign policy agenda. The Democratic Party’s
stronghold over the US Congress, where they hold a strong majority
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, assures the
President of strong support for the first two years of his term.
Yet, despite this luxury and high overall public approval, a bitter
sociopolitical rift seems to be growing between “liberal” and
“conservative” America. The Republican Party seems to have lost its
vision as a result of recent electoral defeats and the association
of the party with the Bush years. As the party searches for a new
identity, the existing power vacuum has left it increasingly
vulnerable to ideological extremism hijacking the party platform. In
the absence of a strong opposition to the administration in
Washington - and amidst accusations of racism - attacks on President
Obama and his policies have been characterized by uncommonly potent
vitriol. The so-called “birther” movement which questions Obama’s
eligibility for the presidency by raising suspicions on whether he
is a natural born citizen of the United States, and the organized
Tea Party protests are just some manifestations of this trend. As
conservative talk show hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck
rise in prominence and become figureheads for the Republicans, the
moderate elements of the party are growing increasingly unable to
withstand the movement to the Right, making bipartisanship and a
cohesive national agenda in Washington increasingly difficult.
These ideological
confrontations are compounded by some very significant problems that
may force the United States to look inwards rather than outwards.
The global economic crisis (which was largely caused by lack of
governmental oversight of banking and business practices in the
United States), coupled with the need for a reframed energy policy
have presented significant hurdles to the Obama administration. The
vigorous debate sparked
by the
administration’s initiative for health reform may constitute the
biggest such hurdle. As these power struggles develop domestically
in Washington, it may be difficult for the United States to assert
an Obama Doctrine with global scope; Bill Clinton faced similar
opposition during his tenure when his vision for an internationalist
United States was met with calls for American withdrawal and a
return to isolationism.
In addition,
challenges to such an agenda can come from within Obama’s cabinet.
In assembling his own “team of rivals” - in allusion to Abraham
Lincoln’s bipartisan cabinet - Obama has created a strong mix of
foreign policy experience. The aforementioned Joe Biden can be an
asset, but he also has a history of breaking ranks and going
off-message without notice; the extent to which he will conform to
Obama’s initiatives in the global arena remains to be seen. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates - the most significant holdover from the Bush
administration - has received widespread bipartisan support. His
departure from the policies of his predecessor Donald Rumsfeld and
his support for troop withdrawal and strategic reevaluation in Iraq
and Afghanistan have been in line with Obama’s grand strategic
vision, at least to the extend that it has been articulated thus
far. Yet he is unlikely to remain
in the position for
more than one or two years and his replacement may not find
bipartisan support so easy to achieve and maintain. Perhaps the
greatest challenge from within could come from Obama’s State
Secretary, Hillary Rodham Clinton. As a former political rival to
the President with clear intentions of bidding for the Presidency in
the future, it is obvious that Clinton’s actions in the
international arena will be calculated for both their short-term (as
Obama’s cabinet member) and long-term(as a possible future US
President) repercussions.
The International Dimension
Lord Palmerston
once famously remarked that Britain had no permanent allies, only
permanent interests. In the case of the United States, long-standing
interests (at least since the end of the 2nd World War) have created
some long-standing allies. One such case is the relationship with
Turkey, which had been largely defined by Turkey’s primary role in
NATO during the Cold War due to its geopolitically strategic
position. As the alliance once conceived as a counterweight to the
now-defunct Warsaw Pact is undergoing redefinition in its scope and
purpose in the post-Cold War era, the bilateral relations between
the US and individual member states follow suit. Obama has pledged
to leave outdated Cold War policies behind, forcing allies - like
Turkey - that had traditionally received favored status precisely
due to such policies to see bilateral relations with the US in
uncertain terms.
During the Bush
administration, the relationship was strained by complexities in
Turkey’s involvement in the “War on Terror” and the war in Iraq.
While the United States desired Turkey’s involvement in operations
in Iraq, the Turkish government did not agree to the use of its
shared border with Iraq as the staging ground for these operations.
On the other hand, Turkey fears the possibility of Iraq
disintegrating into fragmented enclaves that could give rise to the
establishment of an independent Kurdistan, which could in turn lead
to instability within its own borders.
During his visit to
Turkey in April of 2009, Obama spoke to the Turkish Parliament and
reiterated America’s commitment towards a lasting bilateral
partnership and towards Turkish membership in the European Union. He
expressed the willingness to help resolve the Cyprus dispute with “a
just and lasting settlement that reunifies Cyprus into a bizonal and
bicommunal federation.” However, what the American President avoided
was the linkage of the two issues. As both Obama and Secretary
Clinton have spent the lion’s share of 2009 on damage limitation and
restoration of US relations after the Bush administration, the fact
that Obama’s first address at a foreign legislative body came at
Turkey is beyond symbolic in its significance.
Different
international actors have worn the costume of primary mediators in
the Cyprus impasse over the years. Some changes were reflective of
broader balance of power considerations such as the United Kingdom
being partially replaced by the United States as the power of the
latter waxed, while that of the former waned. Yet as the potential
of the United Nations to provide the necessary incentive structure
for a successful bargaining arrangement between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots is being increasingly doubted, it is doubtful that the
United States will be either capable or willing to assume the
leading role. The European Union has emerged as the actor that can
provide the proverbial carrots and sticks to the major players in
the conflict, especially Turkey and the two Cypriot ethnic
communities. The question remains: what is America’s role in this
relationship?
The American Catch-22
In dealing with the
Cyprus issue, the United States government faces the following
dilemma. On the one hand, if the Obama administration acts as
agenda-setter in the conflict, then any actor that perceives their
position as having been weakened post-settlement may portray the
United States as meddlesome. That image has been long-associated
with the world’s foremost superpower, and in many cases deserved
given its track record during the Cold War, as well as prevailing
global sentiment during the Bush years. On the other hand, if the
Obama administration takes a backseat to the proceedings, they are
liable to being portrayed as washing their hands off Cyprus and risk
alienating the major players in the conflict. The only course of
action that draws the administration out of the dilemma has to be
one that is seen as non-zero-sum; in other words, one that is
perceived as mutually beneficial, especially by the two ethnic
communities on the island. At the same time, the greatest risk for
the United States is the creation of a renewed rift in Turko-American
relations; as a result, one cannot expect Washington to administer
undue pressure on Ankara.
Yet, as already
mentioned, it is clear that such an outcome cannot be unilaterally
provided by the United States since the process of accession for
Turkey to the European Union is intrinsically tied to Cyprus. That
is a conundrum in which the United States will be loathe to become
entangled. What the United States can do under the Obama
administration is to create the same avenues for communication and
encouragement for open dialogue that
have characterized
American foreign policy since Obama’s assumption of the presidency,
even though these labours have yet to bear fruit. A significant
contribution to the Cyprus peace process would contribute to the
validation of Obama’s recently announced award of the 2009 Nobel
Peace Prize, which was met with praise as well as criticism of
premature reward for intentions rather than results. Such a course
of action would also be in line with Obama’s assertion during his
speech at the Turkish Parliament that in the case of Cyprus “there
is cause for hope”. | |||||
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