Speech by Claire Palley

Speech by

Claire Palley

Andreas Theophanous artfully puts together headings for Conference discussions – such as “dimension” - which allows everything under the sun to be raised. As last speaker, its hard now to say anything fresh about the internal and external factors affecting the Cyprus problem, or the internal and external aspects of any potential settlement. So I shall focus on strands which, pulled together, could facilitate weaving a rope ladder, enabling those who want a settlement (not of course any old settlement) to climb out of the pit of despond, and to embark on the path of Cyprus reunification.

Although my comments and the emerging analysis, because of my experience, are angled to Greek Cypriot concerns, they can be equally applied to the furthering of Turkish Cypriot aspirations. I add that, only as a model for discussion purposes, is it sensible to categorise factors and aspects as external or internal: the complexity of the Cyprus problem means that factors and aspects, internal and external, are interlinked and often overlapping.

First, addressing external and internal factors in an unsentimental fashion, I turn to the crucial factor, Turkey, key now and over the next many decades, to settling the Cyprus dispute. Only if Turkey believes settlement is in, or at least is not against, her interests, will it occur.

Turkey, just like any other State, is not monolithic. I always think the Republic of Cyprus has fallen down in failing to do more analysis of the elements shaping Turkey’s policies, whether these be the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Army, the Grand National Assembly, the Government or the press. Much of Mr. Denktash’s success rested on his understanding of how to influence these Turkish decision-shaping institutions. I emphasise that no blame attaches to Cyprus’s Foreign Ministry, that incredibly hard-working regiment of only 143 members of the Foreign Legion, or to the few Press and Information Officers, both of whose numbers and resources should, as a top priority, be swelled, so as to have capacity for more analysis and to communicate Cyprus’s positions, especially to EU Member States, rather than having to find time for this between fighting bushfires. That the Foreign Ministry has insufficient resources has adverse effects on policy formation, especially when Turkey’s views are inadequately appreciated. I instance the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Army decisions in December 2003 and January 2004. Had these sunk home with Greek Cypriot politicians, I cannot credit that the 13 February 2004 weapon of “finalisation” would have been put in the Secretary-General’s hands in New York. In contrast, Mr. Denktash was acquiescent, with a little feinting, as he appreciated that a weapon, crafted to bring him into line, would, once Turkey would settle, now be wielded in accordance with his aims.

Small Cyprus cannot hope successfully to manipulate external factors. Regrettably, the first international relations theorist, Thucydides, was correct in putting into the Athenians’ mouths the comment that, where there is not equality of power, justice is not a persuasive argument; and that the strong do what they will while the weak have to live with this. Not a palatable message, and Greek Cypriots have so choked on it, that they have too often concentrated on the rhetoric of justice, without seriously pursuing additional alternative approaches, except for their attempts to use US influence. But third parties cannot be relied on to bring positive results, as they tend to give their own interests priority. Nonetheless, Cyprus needs to continue along the path of using third State influence on elements in Turkey, so that they come to believe that a different policy towards Cyprus would be in Turkey’s best interests. President Papoulias touched on such a role for EU organs and Member States, and States will, in the accession negotiations, use their influence on Turkey, obviously in their own, but also sometimes in Cyprus’s interests.

Absent influence on Turkey, she is likely for the next decade or more to see no incentive to settle the Cyprus dispute, especially since a settlement acceptable to Cyprus would occasion sharp internal disagreement. Moreover, Turkey already has 95% of what she wants as regards Cyprus, being able to soldier on indefinitely, while EU States make up their collective minds as to what membership terms (if at all) will finally be offered Turkey. In this EU-Turkey negotiations phase, Greek self-interest (I abstain from invoking morality and justice) will dictate all possible efforts for Greco-Turkish reconciliation. As a by-product, a better Turkish attitude to Cyprus might be encouraged. But neither Greece, nor the other Guarantor Power, the UK, will give priority to Cyprus interests. Particularly for the UK, her own security interests are paramount. Even in February 1959, the UK was reconciled to the Treaty of Guarantee only in order to obtain security for the SBAs. Associating herself with the USA’s decisions, as the UK does after a little hesitation, security of the western alliance will always come first.

“Security” is indeed the heart of the matter – even though other intermediate politico-economic factors influence both Powers. Cyprus politicians need to rethink their attitudes to “security” policies, so that these may afford Cyprus better leverage: Cyprus needs to be perceived, not as a gadfly, but as a responsible, mature, EU Member State. If such policies come to have appeal for the USA, then she may convince Turkey that their common security interests indicate need for greater co-operation with Cyprus. Even if helpful reactions from the USA and the UK cannot now be induced, this does not entail that relationships should be allowed to fester. The recent Protocol with the UK is thus wise, because no quarter from which positive influence may one day emerge should be neglected, and the UK still has responsibilities to Cyprus as a Guarantor Power so long as the Treaty of Guarantee exists.

Turning now to the UN

Although badly burning its fingers in 2004, the UN Secretariat has a crucial role, providing a continuing framework for negotiations at appropriate times, and also improving inter-communal contacts through its humanitarian activities. I emphasise the UN’s inter-communal programmes, even if, in the 2002-2004 period, certain activities of a UN agency, encouraged by the USA, over-stepped the thin line, separating desirable help for promoting respect for human rights, from internal interference. What needs now to be prominent in attitudes to the UN is the great assistance the Secretariat has given all Cypriots from early 1964. More attention should be paid to what it achieved from 1975 to 1994: the High Level Agreements and the 1992 Set of Ideas. Of course, in the last decade of that period, Mr. Feissel made a major contribution. In the near future, using again a steadying hand as in earlier days, the Secretariat will make its good offices available to the Cypriot sides.

Internal Factors

As regards internal factors, one must bear in mind the truism, that, just like all political problems, the Cyprus dispute arises from the attitudes of human beings and their interaction with social structures. Obviously, individuals’ attitudes are affected by their personal experiences (and too many Cypriots have had bad ones). Those concerns merge with historic Community memories and even with myths. In consequence, persons have perceptions as to their identity, their rights to group autonomy and to the degree of social and political diversity, or cohesion, they believe desirable. Until Mr. Lordos’ scientific surveys of political attitudes at and after the referenda, quantification of opinions in both Communities was spasmodic. More regular opinion surveys of inter-Community political attitudes will themselves shape attitudes, especially those of “leaders” who go on to formulate policy.

This brings me to a vital factor: politicians. Cyprus is certainly well-endowed with them and some are very distinguished, able to walk on the world stage . Let me take this opportunity of paying tribute to Dr. Lyssarides, whose socialist and Arab world contacts have been vital for Cyprus’s interests.

I am sure you will be unsurprised if I say to you that, just like academics and experts, politicians are opinionated however charming and impressive they can be. To believe you know best and what needs to be done requires a well-developed ego. Blessed with such egos, politicians like other people, absorb prevailing ideologies, but enunciate them compellingly. Although they adopt some ideals, they make pragmatic compromises, and try to show flexibility, rather than rigidity. But they are always competing for power – if not in government, then over men’s thoughts, and they use their considerable rhetorical skills to those ends. Sometimes they appear to see themselves as “strikers,” rather than as members of a team for their Community. Of course, like ordinary citizens, politicians are not immune from confusion, from suspicions, fears, addiction to conspiracy theory and seeing the worst case scenario, not even outdoing the press in these last respects.

Perhaps it is too kind to say that politicians are often “tactful” about saying what they really think long-term, instead making expedient pronouncements on issues of public sensitivity. It is certainly not unkind to say that politicians everywhere have enormous capacity for rationalisations, blaming others, making excuses and providing justifications. Lest anyone should think I’m portraying Cyprus politicians as a unique species, I speak from experience: I was married to a politician in another part of the world.

A special factor in determining politicians’ influence is the character of the prevailing political party system. Another is the electoral machinery of the State – including the many elections at different levels but which, in a small State, involve all politicians. Then there is the kind of proportional representation voting system used. One questions whether the systems in the Republic and the “TRNC” unduly consolidate party control over candidates and whether fractional parties have enough, or too little, representation. Certainly, in a small society like Cyprus, personal and traditional loyalties, the possibility of patronage and exercise of influence, together with personal ability to recruit and control the activists on local committees, could render politicians more self-confident and self-centred than they are in larger societies.

But, politicians are indispensable animals – even if Mr. Lordos thought they did not always accurately assess the degree of flexibility on political questions shown by members of the public. It is politicians who give the lead, shape most people’s opinions, and create policy, without which nothing can move forward. Obviously Cyprus politicians don’t need any “lessons” from a mere expert, although, as an opinionated academic, I can’t resist giving my lecture. I believe that what has been missing in Cyprus on the Greek Cypriot side since 2002 is the kind of general consensus among political figures which allows a coherent policy to be developed. It was a remarkable joint achievement in January 1989 by then President Vassiliou and the National Council to agree on the Outline Proposals of Establishing a Federal Republic, based on the High Level Agreements and some aspects of the 1980s UN documentation. Those Proposals could be relied upon in Greek Cypriot policy positions until May 2002, and they precluded internal sniping, always a danger. A similar consensual approach to formulating a policy for settlement – but of course with much more material and developments to examine – is long overdue. Arguably, there is greater consensus among Turkish Cypriot politicians, although there may be a not dissimilar vacuum on the Turkish Cypriot side, obscured by the participation in elections of Turkish nationals and influences from Turkey. Nonetheless, Mr. Akinci’s remarks and also Mr. Eroglu’s comment about new situations requiring new policy, indicate a felt need for rethinking in the Turkish Cypriot Community.

I found Mr. Akinci’s open-mindedness about mechanisms to achieve transition to a future Cyprus settlement and to a new state of affairs constructive and hopeful. Although in July 1965 the Government of the Republic (in response to an expressed desire of the Turkish Cypriot House Members to return only to participate in debates on the Electoral Law) declined to contribute to restoration of the situation prior to December 1963. Acting President Clerides in 1974 offered full return to the 1960 Constitution. So repeatedly, in the late seventies and early eighties, did President Kyprianou. But, naturally, with Turkey’s Army sitting in northern Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots only wanted “independence”. Serious re-thinking now, on both sides, about making use of the 1960 Constitution (still operative except in its intercommunal aspects) could result in arrangements going further than he thinks and could lead rapidly to a settlement. Most elements of Mr. Akinci’s recent proposal (but what expert would not suggest some modifications!) could be used to constitute a vehicle for transition and negotiation of a new Constitution and to enabling a move to a new state of affairs. There could be a House of Representatives acting also as a constituent Assembly prior to referenda. All is possible provided that Cypriots think of reasons to do things, not of reasons not to do them, and do not engage in triumphalism and demands for eating words. I hope that the press, which has the ability to kill innovative proposals stone dead – does not insist on dotting and crossing all the i’s and t’s before even a word has been written. Although publicity and information is an important aspect of human rights and democratic procedures, it can do harm, bringing bitter winds, blowing out fluttering candles of hope, just lit. Mr. Akinci’s ideas demand exploration.

Moreover, politicians of both major Communities need to pursue two parallel, but also cross-linked, activities, but with a dignified and silent space around them, without constant press leaks. First, politicians need, in common with politicians of their own Community, to consider what they could agree in any settlement, especially what the minima could be. In this internal exercise, they need to consider what “optimalising” (i.e. aiming for a good deal that they could feasibly obtain) entails, rather than “maximising” (demanding their ideal “visions” in traditional rhetoric, as if they were in a trade union - management confrontation). This is, in the language of conflict-resolution theory, what President Makarios was saying in 1968 about the “feasible” and the “desirable”. Even if politicians assume that their views will be seen merely as bargaining positions, a bad impression, arising from making excessive demands, can spoil an always sensitive atmosphere. It’s unfashionable, and doubtless unpopular, to say this, but I believe that not only is it counter-productive, but that Greek Cypriots will be misunderstood, if they keep emphasising “ a European solution” and the term “democracy,” which many Turkish Cypriots interpret as referring to “majoritarian democracy” without adequate institutional participation rights for the Turkish Cypriot Community. And perceptions of that kind are not removed by qualifying explanations. Let me add that conceptual debate on “bi-zonality” does not help: it merely displaces necessary discussion on specific arrangements.

Second, both major Communities’ sets of politicians need to meet much more frequently systematically to discuss all the specific issues. Of course meetings, especially between Parties which have partly common ideologies, do occur (and the National Council has compiled various Party views). But I believe not nearly enough has been done. The various pieces of the Cyprus jig-saw puzzle have been lying on the table for years, yet puzzle-solvers still seem determined to fit things together without serious discussion inter se, and in their own idiosyncratic ways. More systematic inter-Community meetings between politicians and resultant discussions would modify such approaches, and would feed back into the internal positions of each set of politicians.

A combination of these preparatory activities will not only bring the main Communities’ politicians nearer agreement, but will help give them confidence that they will be in a position to “sell” any ultimate deal to their own constituencies without being internally sabotaged. It also means that they are more likely to have the kind of “chemistry” enabling then to co-operate in implementing any agreement. To achieve a deal, Cypriots must settle their own ideas and reach mutual understanding: international helpers cannot perform this activity for them, and some saviour is not going to descend from the sky. In their discussions, grievances and ideologies will not disappear, and meetings will sometimes be painful and disappointing. But discussions, in good will, encourage practical application even of principles that conflict, so that applications meet somewhere in middle ground, provided always that both sides know what they want, and have ordered their priorities. I have not frequented Las Vegas, unlike some Cypriots, but I do know that the poker-player with a “Full House” only exposes his cards at the last moment. Thus, public announcement of detailed priorities (as opposed to some very bland statements e.g. “restoration of human rights”) will hamper what will be a hard-fought bargaining process. The ultimate reaching of compromises and agreement is – perhaps regrettably, or perhaps not – unlike a relatively genteel academic seminar, where supposedly unemotional and reasoned arguments are meant to determine general opinions by the seminar’s end. The negotiations will involve tough bargaining, will not be all kisses, and the roses each leader ends up with will indubitably have some thorns on their stems. And of course, throughout the process of reaching agreement, democratic principles and human rights require ability to express dissent at the same time as a majority expresses its approval.

There is time only briefly to list the external and internal aspects of a potential settlement. Earlier speakers have touched on these. I have also distributed a long Agenda of topics which the sides need to canvass in negotiations, some topics obviously being more important than others. Put simplistically, the most significant internal issues will be:

1. functionality and workability of federal government institutions, taken in conjunction with preservation of the bi-communal, bi-zonal character of a federal Cyprus;

2. the territorial demarcation of the two federal units, taken in conjunction with the internal arrangements made in each unit to ensure protection of human rights and non-discriminatory living conditions for all Cypriots ;

3. property rights of all Cypriots and the right of return of displaced persons, taken in conjunction with the humanitarian needs of persons who have, over the last 30 years, built new lives for themselves and their families.

4. Economic powers of the federal government, but I believe that, with involvement of economic experts, Cypriots’ views may converge.

External issues

1. Security (in the wide sense set out in my Agenda), bearing in mind that security threats to an EU Member State in the 21st century differ from the 1960 situation; and

2. the foreign affairs power and EU decision-making by Cyprus (themselves aspects of functionality).

I conclude by re-emphasising, first, the external factor of the need always to consider Turkey’s attitudes, and, second, the internal factor of need for both main Communities’ politicians to decide what they insist on getting out of a settlement and how they are willing to proceed towards one. Those two factors may be connectable by using bridging and imaginative thinking, developing Mr. Akinci’s ideas. The internal process of using the 1960 Constitution as a transformative mechanism would remove Turkey’s justification for her continuing intervention in Cyprus, once the Communities had declared their joint support for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and respect for its Constitution, and had taken steps to honour their words e.g. holding elections. Territorial integrity of Cyprus and the state of affairs under the 1960 Constitution are precisely what Turkey guarantees, as do the UK and Greece. Turkey would, vis-a-vis her future fellow Club members and the whole world, need to prove herself to be a peaceful and law-abiding State. Certainly, in some internal Turkish quarters, such a move to legality all round would not be perceived as serving Turkish interests – there would immediately have to be withdrawal of Turkish forces other than the 1960 contingent, but the “blame” would then rest on Turkish Cypriots, not on Turkey’s Government: Turkey’s consequential withdrawal, followed by her full adherence to international law, would prove her to be a responsible State, deserving of full EU membership, a situation in her own, and in everyone else’s, interests.

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